Raymond J. La Raja

Who Gave Soft Money? The Effect of Interest Group Resources on Political Contributions

We consider the effect of various organizational resources on political contributions. Using a unique data set of soft money contributors from 1997 to 1998, our resource-based model examines how capital, membership, and experience influence the decision to give money to political parties. By observing decision making in a relatively unconstrained regulatory environment typified by the soft money regime, we demonstrate the conventional wisdom that financial resources determine the size of political contributions. Financial wealth, however, does not predict whether an organization will make a contribution in the first place. Instead, we show that a lack of alternative resources makes it more likely that organizations will spend money on politics. These findings have important implications for determining who benefits under various campaign finance rules.

Term Limits, Campaign Contributions, and the Distribution of Power in State Legislatures

Using campaign contributions to legislators as an indicator of member influence, we explore the impact of term limits on the distribution of power within state legislatures. Specifically, we perform a cross-state comparison of the relative influence of party caucus leaders, committee chairs, and rank-and-file legislators before and after term limits. The results indicate that term limits diffuse power in state legislatures, both by decreasing average contributions to incumbents and by reducing the power of party caucus leaders relative to other members. The change in contribution levels across legislators in different chambers implies a shift in power to the upper chamber in states with term limits. Thus, the impact of term limits may be attenuated in a bicameral system.

Don’t Blame Donors for Ideological Polarization of Political Parties: Ideological Change and Stability Among Political Contributors, 1972-2008

Are campaign contributors to parties and candidates in the United States becoming more ideological? Popular and scholarly accounts suggest that political contributors have disproportionate influence in politics, which suggests an important role for them in shaping party ideology and widening the divide between the major American parties. Using the American National Election Studies (ANES) time series data from 1972 to 2008, we find that although the importance of ideology in motivating donations fluctuates from election to election, there is substantial ideological stability in the donor population over time until 2002 when the proportion of ideological donors sharply increases. Ideological extremism has not become a stronger predictor of contributing money. We conclude that mass donors are not necessarily driving partisan polarization. The implication is that politicians are not so much responsive to ideological extremism as they are strategic in mobilizing ideologues in pursuit of resources and electoral goals.

Why Super PACs: How the American Party System Outgrew the Campaign Finance System

The growth of political spending by outside groups reflects the demise of a campaign finance system that was designed during an era when candidates largely controlled their electoral destinies. The original 1974 law assumed a candidate-centered framework in which political parties mattered less as sources of electoral support. Since the 1980s, partisan polarization and intense competition for control of government has pushed the candidate-centered framework to its limits. Partisans have strong incentives to organize collectively through party organizations and party allied groups to maximize opportunities for taking control government. The campaign finance system, however, is unsuited to the emergent party system because of its unwieldy restrictions on political parties and excessively low contribution limits, which have declined in value due to inflation. The current system induces a highly inefficient redistribution of regulated funds from incumbent officeholders to parties, and the escalating use of unrestricted funds by Super PACs and other weakly transparent campaign groups, which have strong legal protections in the wake of judicial decisions such as Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. *Corresponding author: Raymond J. La Raja , Associate Professor, Department of Political Science,University of Massachusetts, 200 Hicks Way, Amherst, MA 01003-9277, USA, E-mail: laraja@polsci.umass.edu

The (Non-)Effects of Campaign Finance Spending Bans on Macro Political Outcomes: Evidence from the States

This paper seeks to understand the effect of campaign finance laws on electoral and policy outcomes. Spurred by the recent Supreme Court decision, Citizens United v. FEC (2010), which eliminated bans on corporate and union political spending, the study focuses on whether such bans generate consequences notably different from an electoral system that lacks such bans. We observe three key outcomes: partisan control of government, incumbent reelection rates and corporate tax burdens. Using historical data on regulations in 49 American states between 1935 and 2009 we test alternative models for evaluating the impact of corporate and union spending bans put in place during this period. The results indicate that spending bans appear to have limited, if any, effect on these outcomes.

From Bad to Worse: The Unraveling of the Campaign Finance System

This article argues that the campaign finance system has deteriorated under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). The system retains the vices of the former regime while jettisoning its virtues. Although successful at banning national party soft money, achieving this narrow goal has come at high cost. Significant problems remain or worsen including the time politicians spend fundraising, the unfair distribution of campaign money, and arrangements that weaken political parties and empower interest groups. Critically, public trust in the system has not changed at all since passage of BCRA. The essay closes by offering modest suggestions to improve the state of affairs.This article argues that the campaign finance system has deteriorated under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). The system retains the vices of the former regime while jettisoning its virtues. Although successful at banning national party soft money, achieving this narrow goal has come at high cost. Significant problems remain or worsen including the time politicians spend fundraising, the unfair distribution of campaign money, and arrangements that weaken political parties and empower interest groups. Critically, public trust in the system has not changed at all since passage of BCRA. The essay closes by offering modest suggestions to improve the state of affairs.

Money in the 2014 Congressional Elections: Institutionalizing a Broken Regulatory System

The campaign finance system has fragmented campaign activity in response to rules that are unworkable in a strong party system. The 2014 congressional elections illustrate how party coalitions have adapted to practices that enable them to raise and spend money outside this formal regulatory framework. For several election cycles, partisan interest groups have used outside campaign organizations to circumvent rules that constrain candidate and party committees. The 2014 elections illustrate how party leaders in Congress and these candidates have now embraced the outside campaign strategy to wrest some control from other elements of the party. Recent changes to campaign finance rules may shift additional money toward traditional committees, but outside groups like Super PACs are now established features of US political campaigns. DOI 10.1515/for-2014-5032

Richer Parties, Better Politics? Party-Centered Campaign Finance Laws and American Democracy

Would “party-centered” campaign finance laws that channel money primarily through party organizations improve American politics? Scholars have long argued that political parties are essential mediating institutions in a democracy. Yet in comparison to other democracies, American campaign finance laws have been designed to be “candidate-centered.” Constraints on political parties have also created opportunities for interest groups to engage directly in campaigns in support of favored candidates and policies. The growing presence in elections of interest groups at the expense of formal party organizations thus has potential negative implications for the functioning of democracy. This paper explains what we know about the relationship between money, campaign finance laws, and political parties, with the goal of exploring whether party-centered campaign finance laws might improve elections, representation, and governing. Importantly, it emphasizes the need for new knowledge that may help in designing new campaign finance laws. *Corresponding author: Raymond J. La Raja, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, USA

Political Participation and Civic Courage: The Negative Effect of Transparency on Making Small Campaign Contributions

This study assesses whether public disclosure of campaign contributions affects citizens’ willingness to give money to candidates. In the American states, campaign finance laws require disclosure of private information for contributors at relatively low thresholds ranging from

Detecting and Understanding Donor Strategies in Midterm Elections

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