Raymond Riezman

The Engine of Growth or Its Handmaiden? A Time-Series Assessment of Export-Led Growth

This paper presents an analysis of time-series data for the countries in the Summers-Heston (1991) data set, in an attempt to ascertain the evidence for or against the export-led growth hypothesis. We find that standard methods of detecting export-led growth using Granger-causality tests may give misleading results if imports are not included in the system being analyzed. For this reason, our main statistical tool is the measure of conditional linear feedback developed by Geweke (1984), which allows us to examine the relationship between export growth and income growth while controlling for the growth of imports. These measures have two additional features which make them attractive for our work. First, they go beyond meredetection of evidence for export-led growth, to provide a measurement of itsstrength. Second, they enable us to determine the temporal pattern of the response of income to exports. In some cases export-led growth is a long-run phenomenon, in the sense that export promotion strategies adopted today have their strongest effect after eight to 16 years. In other cases the opposite is true; exports have their greatest influence in the short run (less than four years). We find modest support for the export-led growth hypothesis, if “support” is taken to mean a unidirectional causal ordering. Conditional on import growth, we find a causal ordering from export growth to income growth in 30 of the 126 countries analyzed; 25 have the reverse ordering. Using a weaker notion of “support”—stronger conditional feedback from exports to income than vice versa, 65 of the 126 countries support the export-led growth hypothesis, although the difference in strength is small. Finally, we find that for the “Asian Tiger” countries of the Pacific Rim, the relationship between export growth and output growth becomes clearer when conditioned on human capital and investment growth as well as import growth.

A Strategic and Welfare Theoretic Analysis of Free Trade Areas

Abstract We construct a three-country model to determine how the formation of free trade areas (FTAs) affects optimal tariffs and welfare. We find that, at constant rest of the world (ROW) tariffs, the adoption of internal free trade induces union members to reduce their external tariffs below the Kemp–Wan [J. Int. Econom. 6 (1976) 95–97] level, and causes ROWs terms of trade to improve and its welfare to rise. When ROW also behaves optimally, its policy response to the formation of the FTA is to raise tariffs. Generally, FTA members prefer to liberalize internal trade partially and find regional integration appealing only if their collective size is sufficiently large. We also demonstrate how FTAs may undermine the attainment of global free trade.

Customs unions and the core

Abstract Customs union formation is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage countries make coalitional choices according to core theory. In the second stage optimal tariffs are determined. This yields a theory that predicts which customs unions form. An example shows that a customs union can be an equilibrium even when both member countries do better at free trade.

The engine of growth or its handmaiden

This paper presents an analysis of time-series data for the countries in the Summers-Heston (1991) data set, in an attempt to ascertain the evidence for or against the export-led growth hypothesis. We find that standard methods of detecting export-led growth using Granger-causality tests may give misleading results if imports are not included in the system being analyzed. For this reason, our main statistical tool is the measure of conditional linear feedback developed by Geweke (1984), which allows us to examine the relationship between export growth and income growth while controlling for the growth of imports. These measures have two additional features which make them attractive for our work. First, they go beyond meredetection of evidence for export-led growth, to provide a measurement of itsstrength. Second, they enable us to determine the temporal pattern of the response of income to exports. In some cases export-led growth is a long-run phenomenon, in the sense that export promotion strategies adopted today have their strongest effect after eight to 16 years. In other cases the opposite is true; exports have their greatest influence in the short run (less than four years). We find modest support for the export-led growth hypothesis, if “support” is taken to mean a unidirectional causal ordering. Conditional on import growth, we find a causal ordering from export growth to income growth in 30 of the 126 countries analyzed; 25 have the reverse ordering. Using a weaker notion of “support”—stronger conditional feedback from exports to income than vice versa, 65 of the 126 countries support the export-led growth hypothesis, although the difference in strength is small. Finally, we find that for the “Asian Tiger” countries of the Pacific Rim, the relationship between export growth and output growth becomes clearer when conditioned on human capital and investment growth as well as import growth.

Dynamic tariffs with asymmetric information

Recent developments in dynamic game theory are applied to determine when two countries can sustain freer trade given that they determine trade policies non-cooperatively. Countries know their own level of protection, but not the other countrys level of protection. Using import trigger strategies, cooperation (in the form of low tariffs) can be supported, although there are periodic reversionary (high tariff) episodes. However, if terms of trade trigger strategies are used, cooperation does not occur.

Uncertainty and the Choice of Trade Policy in Oligopolistic Industries

This paper investigates the design of trade policies in an uncertain world. Governments in each of two countries select between direct quantity controls and subsidies in an attempt to shift profits in favour of domestic, imperfectly competitive firms. The equilibrium of this bilateral policy game depends critically on the variability of the environment. In a world of certainty, both governments would choose to regulate the behaviour of their firms through direct quantity controls. With a sufficient amount of uncertainty, both governments regulate their firms through subsidies. This result reflects an important tradeoff between the strategic advantages of direct quantity controls and flexibility gained by the use of subsidies

Optimal Education Policies and Comparative Advantage

We consider the optimal education policies of a small economy whose government has a limited budget. Initially, the economy is closed and the government chooses its education policy to maximize welfare under autarky. When the economy trades with the rest of the world the government chooses a new education policy that maximizes welfare under trade. Is it ever optimal for the government to choose its new policy so that it reverses the economys comparative advantage? We find that if the budget stays fixed when it is optimal to ‘move up the skills chain’ it is not feasible. In such a case, a foreign loan is welfare improving. A move in the opposite direction can be optimal, and when it is optimal it is also feasible.

Preference Bias and Outsourcing to Market: A Steady-State Analysis

We analyze a model that focuses on the export/outsource decision. Outsourcing has the advantage of providing better information about local preferences. The disadvantage is that producing in the host country also means using the inferior technology embodied in the local capital. The decision of whether to offer an outsourcing contract weighs these two effects against each other. The host country accepts the outsourcing contract if the higher price they pay for the outsourced good is worth the benefit of consuming a manufactured good closer to their ideal variety. These results suggest that as low income countries develop they become a more attractive destination for outsourcing because the quality of their capital improves and the local market is more lucrative. In addition, the developing low income country finds the outsourcing contract more attractive since their increased demand for the correct variety of the manufactured good increases. This suggests that preference based outsourcing is more likely to occur with higher income host countries.

The Principles of Exchange Rate Determination in an International Financial Experiment

This paper reports the first experiments designed to explore the behavior of economies with prominent features of international finance. Two “countries,” each with its own currency, were created. International trade could take place only through the operation of markets for currency. The law of one price and the flow of funds theory of exchange rate determination were used to produce general equilibrium models that captured much of the behavior of the economies. Prices of goods, as well as the exchange rate, evolve over time toward the predictions of the models. However, both the law of one price and purchasing power parity can be rejected for reasons that do not appear in the literature. Patterns of international trade were as predicted by the law of comparative advantage.

Trade and the distribution of human capital

Abstract We develop a two-country, two-sector model of trade where the only difference between the two countries is their distribution of human capital endowments. We show that even if the two countries have identical aggregate human capital endowments the pattern of trade depends on the properties of the two human capital distributions. We also show that the two distributions of endowments also completely determine the effects of trade on income inequality. We also look at a simple majority voting model. It turns out autarky and free trade with and without compensation may be the voting outcome.