Rebekka King

Critical theory of religion vs. critical religion

Last year’s editorial, ‘‘How can mainstream approaches become more critical?’’ (Goldstein, Boer, King and Boyarin, 2015) provoked some strong responses. Initially, these occurred in social media—a place which one might think unlikely for intellectual discussion but in some ways has become its vanguard. There a debate ensued (mostly between Russell McCutcheon, Craig Martin, and CRR Editor Warren S. Goldstein), which was published subsequently in Religion Bulletin under the title ‘‘On the Nature and Ends of Critique in the Study of Religion.’’ After that, we received two submissions, one by Craig Martin and the other by Timothy Fitzgerald, which were largely responses to the editorial. Both were published in the December 2015 issue of CRR (see Fitzgerald, 2015 and Martin, 2015). They focused on a line of inquiry we had neglected in our editorial, centering on the problems with the category of religion, which Fitzgerald has coined ‘‘critical religion.’’ Here, we want to engage critical religion as articulated by McCutcheon, Fitzgerald, and Martin, recognizing that they do not stand as a cohesive unit and that there may be as much disagreement between them as there is agreement. While we appreciate the many insights that critical religion has contributed to our understanding of religion as a category, we also find limitations in the debate over the category and the ensuing assumptions concerning the methods of scholarly analysis of religion. In juxtaposition to critical religion, we shall offer a critical theory of religion more narrowly defined (a position with which we closely identify). In the Facebook exchange, McCutcheon’s and Martin’s objections centered on our value laden approach—which is an aspect that we share with religious traditions. We argued that in order to engage in critique, one must select values as a ground for evaluation. McCutcheon pointed out that values are socially located, and we agree. Nevertheless, we see his attempt to gain a historical, institutional understanding as similarly value laden

How can mainstream approaches become more critical

Since our launch, we have received a number of submissions that follow what we consider to be ‘‘mainstream’’ approaches in the study of religion. We think that all of these approaches have the potential to be critical, but in many cases, those who employ them do not take the additional steps necessary to make their scholarship a critical contribution. This suggests that a discussion of pathways between (to borrow Max Horkheimer’s terms) traditional and critical approaches may be helpful to both readers and potential contributors. Some of the comments below reiterate and expand on our inaugural editorial. We will begin our discussion with religious studies, where to a considerable extent, critical approaches have in fact become normative. While there is much work to be done, the inherently interdisciplinary nature of religious studies makes it a useful guide to the study of religion from particular disciplinary perspectives. Our discussion will continue with theology, biblical criticism, and the relationship between the two. In the sociology of religion, which has much to learn from religious studies and biblical criticism, we would characterize mainstream approaches as those belonging to the other major paradigms including interpretive sociology, comparative-historical sociology, positivism, functionalism, social constructionism (phenomenology) or rational choice. While some of the work within some of these paradigms has been critical, too much of it has not. The fields on which we concentrate in this editorial are intended as models for a more comprehensive discussion. In this editorial, we will make suggestions as to how the scholarship in each of these fields can become

On a balanced critique: (or on the limits of critique):

Despite emphasizing in previous editorials that critique means to discern both the positive and the negative based on sets of values, we have nevertheless received some manuscripts whose primary aim is to trash religion without considering its positive role. These manuscripts have made gross generalizations about religion as if it is one thing and assumed that the task of scholars who study it is to expose its inconsistencies and inaccuracies, often through condemnation or mockery. As such, their understanding of religion is one-dimensional. Since we have addressed that there is no commonly agreed upon definition of religion and that the usefulness of the very category itself has been subject to much debate within religious studies, it would be absurd to make any generalized claims that can be applied to all religions. Just as there are naysayers about religion, there are those on the other side who shy away from saying anything negative or critical about it. It is almost as if they have taken to heart the old school-yard adage, ‘‘if you don’t have anything nice to say, don’t say anything at all.’’ Included among these are not only those who proclaim to be value-free (as we have discussed in previous editorials), but those who want to celebrate world religions in some type of ecumenical effort to bring humanity together. Focusing for example on how religions can contribute to the promotion of peace while ignoring how religions can fuel war is to see only one side of the coin. It is at times disappointing to receive submissions that reflect the type of simplistic thinking we work to discourage our undergraduate students from adopting. While it might be tempting to dismiss these papers as an artifact of our interdisciplinary edict, perhaps coming from scholars less invested or embedded in the disciplinary conversations common to the study of religion, we find that this experience provides fodder for further thinking about the nature of critique both as it emerges in Critical Research on Religion and in the discipline writ large. We want to explore further the question,

Specter and horizon: Critique in ethnographies of North American Christianity:

With reference to two different projects examining North American Christianities, this symposium contribution explores opportunities for critique when conducting fieldwork. Drawing from observations made by E. E. Evans-Pritchard, I suggest that critique is most productive when it uses the perspective and position of one’s interlocutors as its point of departure.

Critical trajectories and the timing of critique

This editorial discusses the place of critique at different stages in research and writing. It evokes Foucault’s conception of critique as transformative and draws from the symposium in this issue examining the role of critique in anthropology to shift the conversation to the question of when critique occurs. The editorial advocates for the notion of critique as a competency that is dependent upon context.

Coffee with McCutcheon: A Conversation about Language, Pedagogy and Critical Pluralism

Russell McCutcheon has had monumental effect on the theoretical and methodological study of religion. His works have since shaped a generation of scholars interested in the craft of being a scholar of religion. This article gives a glimpse of a young McCutcheon seeking to answer how we align our scholarly commitments with our pedagogical objectives. McCutcheon offers us a glimpse of the teacher at work. Interrogating not just the content and arguments presented within but the very language his students seek to make sense of a semesters worth of readings in early Christian literature. The article discusses the problem of language in the methodological study of religion. The various considerations for teaching and research are also discussed. McCutcheons focus on the particulars of a religious tradition allows ethnographers, along with scholars in other disciplines, to take seriously the practices, beliefs and notions of identity specific to their subjects of study. Keywords: Christian literature; ethnographers; McCutcheon; pedagogical objectives