Rega Wood

Distinct Ideas and Perfect Solicitude: Alexander of Hales, Richard Rufus, and Odo Rigaldus

Gods care for his creatures is perfect. Scripture assures us that God knows each of them individually: Are not five sparrows sold for two pennies? And not one of them is forgotten before God. Why, even the hairs of your head are all numbered (Lk. 12:6-7). But most Christians also hold that Gods simplicity is perfect, and prominent theologians of the early 13th century agree that this means that God does not have a different concept or idea for each creature. There is only one divine idea, William Altissiodorensis says; only when we speak allegorically can we accept the view that there are many and diverse ideas in the mind of God {Summa áurea II tr.l c.2, 11:17). Philip the Chancellor agrees: from the complete simplicity of the divine essence it follows that there is no multitude of divine ideas (Summa de Bono 56). On this issue, William and Philip and their later contemporaries had the support of the great 11th century theologian, St. Anselm of Canterbury.1 Choosing instead to follow St. Augustine,2 around 1236 Richard Rufus rejects the consensus of theological opinion at that time.3 In his De ideis, he holds that perfect solicitude for individuals requires that we posit many divine ideas—and not just a multitude of

The Earliest Known Surviving Western Medieval Metaphysics Commentary

Erfurt Quarto 290 includes two commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Timothy B. Noone established the attribution to Richard Rufus of Cornwall of the commentary that appears on folios 1–40,1 chiefly on the basis of a thirteenth-century ascription to Richard Rufus, deciphered by Fr. Leonard Boyle; the aim of this essay is to show that the author of the commentary on folios 46–56 is also Richard Rufus. Since the manuscript itself was copied before 1250, both commentaries are clearly early. Noone calls the commentary on folios 1–40, the Scriptum, but that seems misleading since Noone also claims that what we have is a record preserved by its auditors, a reportatio (p. 65). And in medieval scholarly practice, a reportatio is distinguished from a scriptum, which is a written version corrected by the author and meant for publication. In order not to prejudice the question whether this commentary is reportatio or a scriptum, we will call it the Dissertatio in Metaphysicam Aristotelis, taking the term ‘Dissertatio’ from the work’s incipit (Vat. lat. 4538, fol. 1ra): “Placet nobis nunc parumper disserere de quadam propositione quam dicit Aristoteles in ‘Veteri Philosophia.’” Rufus cites the Dissertatio as the work of a secular author,2 so it must have been written before he became a Franciscan in 1238. The shorter, more primitive commentary found on folios 46–56 probably dates from around 1235, but the basis for that claim will be stated at the end of this paper. Most of this essay is devoted to establishing the attribution of the earlier commentary to Rufus, chiefly on the basis of comparisons with Rufus’s Dissertatio in Metaph. and his “De intellectu divino.” Rufus’s first Metaphysics commentary, which we will call the Memoriale quaestionum Richari Rufi in Metaphysicam Aristotelis (Mem.), begins with the words:

Scotus's Argument for the Existence of God

Scotuss argument for the existence of God is an attempt to combine proofs based on the idea of causality and Aristotelian principles with proofs based on superiority and Augustinian principles.1 It has two parts: First, Scotus proves a posteriori that a first effective cause exists and a priori that a first effective cause is possible. Second, he proves that if a first effective cause can exist, it must exist. The first argument is a cosmological or physico-theological proof based on the nature of causality in the world; the second argument is an ontological argument in the sense that it uses our concept of God to show that he exists. The two arguments are combined. In one sense Scotus uses the cosmological argument to demonstrate a premise required for the ontological argument. In another sense Scotus uses the ontological argument to make the cosmological argument, which is based on manifest but contingent propositions, fit the form of an Aristotelian scientific demonstration.

Speculum animae: Richard Rufus on Perception and Cognition

“Garrulus sum et loquax et expedire nescio. Diu te tenui in istis, sed de cetero procedam.” These are the words of Richard Rufus of Cornwall, a thirteenth-century Scholastic and lecturer at the Universities of Paris and Oxford. Rufus is apologizing to his readers: “I am garrulous and loquacious, and I don’t know how to be efficient. I have detained you with these things a long while, but let me now proceed to another topic.” This apology introduces the third part of the Speculum animae, a preliminary modern edition of which we publish here. In this short treatise, Rufus presents a unique Aristotelian theory of perception, describes what is and is not intelligible, and finally proves to his own satisfaction the immortality of the rational soul. To us this would hardly seem the place to apologize for being long-winded; indeed, we might wonder how Rufus could accomplish such an ambitious task in such a short treatise. We would certainly not accuse him of excessive verbosity. But Rufus was a man of exceptional humility, who once referred to himself as the least of the lesser (Franciscan) thinkers of his time.1 Despite Rufus’s humility, he was no minor figure in the development of Scholastic philosophy. A teacher at the Universities of Paris and Oxford (fl. 1231–1256 A.D.),2 he is the author of the earliest known, surviving lectures on several of Aristotle’s major texts, including the Metaphysics, the Phys-

The Wodeham Edition: Adam Wodeham's Lectura Secunda

Adam de Wodeham (ca. 1298-1358) has yet to reclaim the stature once accorded him as one of the greatest medieval philosopher-theologians. An eminent Franciscan philosopher in his own right, Wodeham was also a briUiant interpreter of John Duns Scotus and WiUiam of Ockham, whose works he mastered. Wodehams esteem for Scotus and Ockham helped soUdify their reputations, as his own work advanced the Franciscan theological tradition. Wodeham was at once more subtle than Ockham and