Regina M. Abrami

Institutions and Inequality in Single-Party Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam and China

Despite the fact that China and Vietnam have been the world’s two fastest growing economies over the past two decades, their income inequality patterns are very different. In this paper, we take a deep look at political institutions in the two countries, demonstrating that profound differences between these polities influence distributional choices. In particular, we find that elite institutions in Vietnam encourage the construction of broader policy-making coalitions, have more competitive selection processes, and place more constraints on executive decision-making than exists by way of elite institutions in China. As a result, there are stronger political motivations for Vietnamese leaders to provide equalizing transfers that limit inequality growth among provinces.

The New Face of Chinese Industrial Policy: Making Sense of Anti-Dumping Cases in the Petrochemical and Steel Industries

Why have Chinas petrochemical and steel industries behaved so differently in seeking trade protection through antidumping measures? We argue that the patterning of antidumping actions is best explained in terms of the political economy of economic restructuring in pillar industries and its effect on industry structures. In the petrochemical industry, the shift toward greater horizontal consolidation and vertical integration reduces the collective action problems associated with antidumping petitions among upstream companies. It also weakens downstream companies lobbying in favor of the general protection of highly integrated conglomerates. In the steel industry, by contrast, national industrial policy in the absence of exogenous economic shocks fails to weaken local state interests sufficiently. Fragmented upstream and downstream channels instead persist, with strong odds against upstream suppliers waging a successful defense of material interests.