Renée de Nevers

NATO's International Security Role in the Terrorist Era

What role does NATO play in combating terror? NATOs missions have expanded dramatically since the end of the Cold War, and most of the United States’ closest allies are members of the alliance. Nevertheless, NATO plays, at best, a supportive role in U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. The alliance contributes to preventive and defensive missions to address the threat of terrorism, and its consequence management plans aim to respond to terrorist attacks and to mitigate their effects. But many of the essential activities of the fight against terrorism occur outside NATO, through bilateral cooperation or loose coalitions of the willing. Three factors help to explain NATOs minor role in combating terrorism: shifts in alignments and threat perceptions caused by systemic changes, the alliances limited military capabilities, and the nature of the fight against terror itself. Over time the consequences of NATOs limited role could be severe. If NATOs strongest members do not seek to address their core security threats within the alliance, NATO may have difficulty sustaining its military value.

Private Security Companies and the Laws of War

The use of contractors employed by private security companies (PSCs) has exploded in recent years, outpacing efforts to assess the consequences of increased reliance on PSCs for international humanitarian law (IHL). This matters both for the states that hire these companies and for the employees of PSCs on or near battlefields. This article examines the legal status of PSCs under the existing IHL framework, focusing on activities where PSC employees carry weapons and how the presence of PSCs in asymmetric conflicts increases the challenge of determining what actions are appropriate within the laws of war. In most cases, PSC employees cannot be accorded combatant status under IHL. However, the actions of private contractors may put their protection as civilians under IHL at risk, and this is particularly true in asymmetric conflicts. I argue that changing the status of PSCs on the battlefield under IHL to take into account the tasks they are performing is not the answer. Rather, bearing IHL in mind, states need to rethink the tasks that PSCs conduct on their behalf, even if this means reducing reliance on PSCs or limiting state military activities. Notably, the USA should re-evaluate its reliance on PSCs to conduct tasks in situations where PSC employees are likely to be pulled into hostilities.The use of contractors employed by private security companies (PSCs) has exploded in recent years, outpacing efforts to assess the consequences of increased reliance on PSCs for international humanitarian law (IHL). This matters both for the states that hire these companies and for the employees of PSCs on or near battlefields. This article examines the legal status of PSCs under the existing IHL framework, focusing on activities where PSC employees carry weapons and how the presence of PSCs in asymmetric conflicts increases the challenge of determining what actions are appropriate within the laws of war. In most cases, PSC employees cannot be accorded combatant status under IHL. However, the actions of private contractors may put their protection as civilians under IHL at risk, and this is particularly true in asymmetric conflicts. I argue that changing the status of PSCs on the battlefield under IHL to take into account the tasks they are performing is not the answer. Rather, bearing IHL in mind, states need to rethink the tasks that PSCs conduct on their behalf, even if this means reducing reliance on PSCs or limiting state military activities. Notably, the USA should re-evaluate its reliance on PSCs to conduct tasks in situations where PSC employees are likely to be pulled into hostilities.

Sovereignty at Sea: States and Security in the Maritime Domain

The oceans present a variety of perils to both states and private actors, ranging from smuggling to direct attacks on vessels. Yet, a disconnect exists between states’ maritime power and sovereign fleets due to the emergence of open shipping registries in the 20th century. How have great powers like the United States responded to threats generated by transit of the oceans for legitimate and illicit purposes? The nature of peacetime security threats that states confront at sea has shaped divergent responses. The main maritime powers draw a distinction between threats aimed at states and threats to commerce. Where perceived threats to the state are concerned, great powers have sought to revise understandings of the protections sovereignty provides—specifically, by seeking expanded interdiction rights—to further their own security goals. When maritime powers perceive that international commerce is under threat, they delegate the sovereign protection function both upward to internationally sanctioned maritime coalitions and outward to private security firms. These policies are responses to the security challenges that result from the decoupling of sovereign power and the merchant fleet that followed the emergence of open shipping registries.

Sovereignty and Ethical Argument in the Struggle against State Sponsors of Terrorism

Abstract In prosecuting the war on terror, the Bush Administration asserts that the protections inherent in state sovereignty do not apply to state sponsors of terrorism. I examine three elements of normative arguments to assess the administrations policies. The administration sought to delegitmize terrorism by underscoring the uncivilized nature of terrorist acts. It sought to link the war on terror to efforts to prohibit the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and to frame the invasion of Iraq as central to this war. Finally, the administration proposed new international standards of behavior by arguing that state sponsors of terrorism should be held accountable for terrorist acts planned on their territory, and by seeking to link the protections against intervention inherent in the sovereignty norm to this behavior. Despite initial support for delegitmizing terrorism, the US attempt to frame the war on terror as linked to WMD and Iraq met with skepticism, and it faced fierce competition from alternate frames with regard to Iraq. Finally, the invasion of Iraq stimulated resistance to US policy on normative grounds, with particular concern about the consequences for the sovereignty norm.Abstract In prosecuting the war on terror, the Bush Administration asserts that the protections inherent in state sovereignty do not apply to state sponsors of terrorism. I examine three elements of normative arguments to assess the administrations policies. The administration sought to delegitmize terrorism by underscoring the uncivilized nature of terrorist acts. It sought to link the war on terror to efforts to prohibit the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and to frame the invasion of Iraq as central to this war. Finally, the administration proposed new international standards of behavior by arguing that state sponsors of terrorism should be held accountable for terrorist acts planned on their territory, and by seeking to link the protections against intervention inherent in the sovereignty norm to this behavior. Despite initial support for delegitmizing terrorism, the US attempt to frame the war on terror as linked to WMD and Iraq met with skepticism, and it faced fierce competition from ...

State Interests and the Problem of Piracy: Comparing U.S. and UK Approaches to Maritime PMSCs

The U.S. and the UK supported the introduction of PMSCs on merchant vessels to address Somali piracy. This article describes U.S. and UK regulations and guidelines for PMSCs and shippers seeking to hire them. A central concern for each has been ensuring control of the weapons to be used by PMSCs. The U.S. has also sought to vet contractors to ensure the security of U.S. ports and transport facilities, while the UK has focused on ensuring that contractors and companies meet its firearms requirements. These distinctions reflect differences in the regulation of firearms in the U.S. and the UK.The U.S. and the UK supported the introduction of PMSCs on merchant vessels to address Somali piracy. This article describes U.S. and UK regulations and guidelines for PMSCs and shippers seeking to hire them. A central concern for each has been ensuring control of the weapons to be used by PMSCs. The U.S. has also sought to vet contractors to ensure the security of U.S. ports and transport facilities, while the UK has focused on ensuring that contractors and companies meet its firearms requirements. These distinctions reflect differences in the regulation of firearms in the U.S. and the UK.

Modernizing the Geneva conventions

The Geneva conventions are outdated, but simply ignoring them is not the answer, nor should the solution focus solely on the terrorist threat. Instead, Washington should take the lead in revitalizing the conventions to account for the full range of challenges posed by modern wars.

Private Security Companies and Private Transnational Transfers

The US intervention in Iraq, and its subsequent efforts to stabilize and reconstruct that country, brought attention to the phenomenon of private military and security companies (PSCs). For the general public, perceptions of PSCs were shaped by a few significant events: the killing of four security contractors employed by Blackwater USA in Fallujah on March 31, 2004, and the killing of 17 Iraqi civilians in Baghdad’s Nisoor Square on September 16, 2007 by a Blackwater security convoy employed by the US State Department.

Russia in Europe’s New Equation

The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in late 1991 created a new international political and Security climate. The new states generated by the upheavals in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have faced substantial obstacles in their efforts to construct — or reconstruct — working market economies, democratic political systems, and the basic elements of civil society that undergird them.