Rex Ahdar

The idea of ‘religious markets’

What explains the ebb and flow of religion? Some U.S. sociologists have argued that the demand for religion is relatively constant throughout history and across cultures and thus the fluctuations in religion are better accounted for by the supply-side factors such as the number and vigour of religious suppliers. Religious economies operate like commercial economies. Competition is said to be as beneficial for religion as it is for mundane products and results in greater religious vitality and overall levels of participation. This thesis is contrary to traditional secularisation theory, which maintained that religious pluralism undermined the plausibility and survival of all faiths. The religious market model and its supporting rational choice theory are examined in this essay. The bold claims of the model are not borne out by the empirical evidence. While the religious market model generates useful insights and data, its limits need to be observed.

A Christian State

A Christian state or mundus Christianus is not easy to define. It is perhaps one where the public, legal and constitutional institutions are “Christian”. (I shall leave to one side for a moment the problem of defining precisely what I mean by Christian.) T. S. Eliot believed that the Christian state was “the Christian Society under the aspect of legislation, public administration, legal tradition and form.” The “state” can refer to the country, nation, society or culture as a whole or, only to the set of governmental institutions within a country. The latter, narrower meaning is the one I wish to adopt here. I shall define the state as “the set of distinctive institutions whose authority is recognised as legally binding within the territory.” A theocracy is undoubtedly a Christian state, indeed one par excellence. I shall refer to theocracy as a “type 1” Christian state, for here both form and substance coincide. By theocracy I mean the situation where there is ecclesiastical supremacy and the state machinery is used to further particular religious interests. The early Jewish nation, Geneva under Calvin and various Islamic states around to the world today are examples of type 1 states. In this monistic polity, membership of the church (using that as a generic term for a religious organisation) and membership of the state are coterminous. Full rights as a citizen turn upon whether one is member of the church; those outside the church are second-class citizens. But a Christian state need not necessarily be a theocracy.

Exemptions for Religion or Conscience under the Canopy of the Rule of Law

This essay endeavours to restate the case for the right to freedom of conscience and religion. Specifically, it seeks to make the case for exemptions from the law of the land for religious believers and similarly-situated citizens who hold sincere conscientious beliefs. The rule of law is not something to be ignored, and carving out exemptions for conscience has been criticized as unfair, anomalous, potentially open-ended in scope, and difficult to administer. I attempt to assuage these legitimate concerns by underscoring the importance of the dignity of the individual and the virtue of protecting religious minorities (and dissenters of all stripes), who challenge the conventions of the day. If the default position is the rule of law, believers face an uphill task. Ultimately, only a truly liberal polity can offer protection to what, in every age, is a fragile liberty.

The Empty Idea of Equality Meets the Unbearable Fullness of Religion

The essay argues that religion is a much “fuller” concept than equality, as substantial and weighty as equality is derivative and hollow. The empty, tautological, misleading, but rhetorically powerful nature of equality was compellingly demonstrated by Peter Westen, a generation ago. It is ironic that, despite the manifest inadequacy of equality as an independent good, in the increasingly strident clashes between religionists and those asserting claims based on equal treatment, or freedom from discrimination, the former tend to lose on the whole. All rights are said to be on the same level. As the courts repeatedly pronounce, there is no hierarchy. But the empirical experience of the Kulturkampf belies that assertion. This essay seeks to return the contest to a more even playing field by demystifying some of the ascendant-like claims of equality in contemporary rights disputes.

Solemnisation of Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Freedom

Same-sex marriage is legal or likely to be legalized in many Western nations. One important safeguard invariably incorporated in the legislation providing for same-sex marriage has been an exemption for religious ministers who object to solemnizing such marriages. Another category of potential objectors consists of marriage registrars, commissioners or celebrants employed or appointed by the state. By contrast, an accommodation grounded in the right of religious freedom and conscience for these governmental celebrants has not been granted. This article examines the introduction of same-sex marriage in three jurisdictions – England and Wales, New Zealand and Canada. It analyses the precise ambit of the exemption for religious celebrants, considers the vulnerability of such exemptions to future legal challenge and questions the validity of denying free exercise accommodation to state-appointed celebrants.