Rex L. Cottle

Unemployment: A labor market perspective

Twentieth century economists have made countless attempts to resolve the causes and cures of unemployment. However none have ventured to consider unemployment not as a social problem but as a market response to political and economic incentives. By treating unemployment as a labor market, where workers rationally select periods of joblessness and where special interest groups profit from unemployment, this paper develops a theoretically consistent model to explain the effects that policy and economic variables have on unemployment. Empirical results support this approach and the worker disincentive effects of UI compensation by estimating simultaneously a demand and supply for unemployment.

Some economic effects of the California agricultural labor relations act

The California Agricultural Labor Relations Act (CALRA) evolved in the 1970s because the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) excluded agricultural workers. CALRA effectively placed the United Farm Workers Union in a stronger bargaining position vis-a-vis farmers than the NLRA had done for industrial unions vis-a-vis nonfarm business firms. Society has suffered a net economic loss from CALRA and the events preceding its enactment. Since passage of the act, at least three effects have been verified: Relative to conditions that would otherwise have been expected to exist, consumers are facing higher prices; agricultural workers are earning lower wages; and landowners have suffered losses in land values.

Codetermination: Union style

Many European countries have instigated a form of “industrial democracy” by legislating codetermination schemes. However, codetermination may also be accomplished without legislation. We show that unionizing an industry’s labor supply will also achieve much the same results as mandatory codetermination as long as unions are exempt from antitrust legislation. The value of “union codetermination” will yield returns beyond what economists have previously predicted.

Demand uncertainty, competition, and 'non-binding' price controls

Abstract In our paper, we will present a general model that demonstrate that a price floor or a price ceiling, although not effective at the existing market price, nevertheless alters the competitive equilibrium and leads to erroneous policy conclusions.