Ricardo D. Paredes

EL FIN DE LA EDUCACIÓN PÚBLICA EN CHILE

Entre los anos 2000 y 2006 las escuelas municipales (o publicas) en Chile redujeron su matricula en 186.000 alumnos (caida de 13%), mientras que las escuelas privadas subvencionadas, receptoras del mismo financiamiento estatal, la han aumentado en 386.000 (aumento de 38%). En este trabajo distinguimos factores de demanda, asociados a las decisiones de los padres, y de oferta, asociados a las decisiones de los sostenedores, que determinan el cambio de la composicion de la matricula en Chile. Hallamos evidencia que las restricciones institucionales que afectan la demanda por tipos de educacion solo dan cuenta parcial de la tendencia. Otros factores, asociados a las decisiones de los propios municipios, explican la mayor parte de la caida de la educacion municipal. Ello es tambien en parte el resultado del desfinanciamiento natural a que conducen las restricciones asimetricas sobre financiamiento y costos en Chile.

Should Students Be Allowed to Miss

ABSTRACT Many educational policymakers consider attendance as a tool to induce learning. Researchers also agree that attendance has a positive effect on learning; however, there are few empirical studies that measure the nature and significance of that effect. The authors analyzed the effect of class attendance on academic performance and evaluated the existence and importance of a minimum attendance requirement. Using student data from a sample of public primary schools in Chile, and considering for endogeneity and sample selection bias, they found two important results. First, attendance had a relevant and statistically significant effect on educational performance. Second, the existence of a threshold was identified, but educational performance did not continue to decrease after a certain number of absences, which seems to contradict policies that have a minimum attendance requirement.

MATCHING FOR BALANCE, PAIRING FOR HETEROGENEITY IN AN OBSERVATIONAL STUDY OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FOR-PROFIT AND NOT-FOR-PROFIT HIGH SCHOOLS IN CHILE

Conventionally, the construction of a pair-matched sample selects treated and control units and pairs them in a single step with a view to balancing observed covariates

Reducing the Educational Gap: Good Results in Vulnerable Groups

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Government Concession Contracts in Chile: The Role of Competition in the Bidding Process

and reducing the heterogeneity or dispersion of treated-minus-control response differences,

THE DYNAMICS OF THE LABOR MARKETS IN CHILE

Y

Vouchers, choice, and public policy: An overview

. In contrast, the method of cardinality matching developed here first selects the maximum number of units subject to covariate balance constraints and, with a balanced sample for

Assignment of work shifts to public transit drivers based on stated preferences

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Competition Pressures and Academic Performance in Chile

in hand, then separately pairs the units to minimize heterogeneity in

Judicial versus Private Auctions: Better without Protection?

Y