Richard A. Hilbert

Marxism as Science: Historical Challenges and Theoretical Growth

This paper examines Marxisms claim to be a science. The first part considers possible models of science and argues that the most coherent is Imre Lakatoss methodology of scientiBc research programs. In his conception scientific knowledge grows on the basis of a hard core ofpostulates which are protectedfrom refutation by the development of a series of auxiliary theories. Such a research program is progressive rather than degenerating if successive theories are consistent with the core, explain anomalies and make predictions, some of which are realized. In the second part I argue that with some qualijications the history of Marxism -from Marx and Engels, to German Marxism, to Russian Marxism, and finally to Western Marxism-conforms to the model of aprogressive research program. In the thirdpart Iclaim that deviations from the model, such as Soviet Marxism, are due to the breakdown of the reciprocal interaction between Marxisms heuristics and historical challenges.

Durkheim and Merton on Anomie: An Unexplored Contrast and Its Derivatives

Combining the anomie theories of Durkheim and Merton yields: anomie prevents anomie. This incoherence indicates that the theorists cannot be referencing the same phenomenon. Differences are pursued in the assumptions and orientations of the two theorists, particularly the ontological status of deviance, the role it plays in the health of society and the sense in which it is normal, the nature of a crisis, the formal relationship between deviance and anomie, and the similarities in theoretical outcomes to those of common sense reasoning. Durkheim s theory emerges as more compatible with labeling theory, ethnomethodology, and contemporary social problems theory than with American functionalism. Merton s theorizing emerges as an empirical example of Durkheimian ritual anomie prevention practices.

Garfinkel's recovery of themes in classical sociology*

In order to derive functionalism from Durkheim and Weber, Parsons had to openly break with some twenty of their theoretical assertions. Express rejections of classical themes lie at the foundation of functionalist sociology. This very foundation is what came unglued by Garfinkels empirical studies of Parsonian social dynamics. In correcting the inadequacies of functionalism, many of the themes rejected by Parsons have been inadvertently resurrected and developed by ethnomethodologists, albeit in altered form. This is not to say that Garfinkel and classical theorists are saying the same things but rather to point out some historical continuities that have gone largely unrecognized. To recognize these thematic continuities is to gather an improved radical vision of society and social practices. Such perspective also provides new understanding of how and why functionalist theory would arise in the first place, namely as an instance of Weberian rationalization and Durkheimian anomieprevention ritual.

Ethnomethodological Recovery of Durkheim

When Parsons derived action theory from Durkheims sociology, he also argued with Durkheim, disputed his claims, and expressly rejected some of his fundamental principles. Accordingly, American functionalism contained a hidden “negative image” of Durkheim. Parsonss student, Harold Garfinkel, addressed functionalism at its weak points, eventually overthrowing most of what Parsons had to say about society. Some of these weak points were predicated on Parsonss rejection of Durkheim, including explicit rejection of Durkheims equivalences between society, morality, and objective reality. Garfinkels ethnomethodology therefore rejected what had been premised on Parsonss rejection of Durkheim. In so doing, it reversed the negative image of Durkheim back to its positive classical form and empirically demonstrated some of Durkheims most troubling principles. Since Garfinkel did not deliberately recover Durkheim in this manner, the dynamics of this case make it an interesting study of how theorists read other theorists.

The Classical Roots of Ethnomethodology: Durkheim, Weber and Garfinkel

Hilbert demonstrates the historical connection between the nineteenth-century theory of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, in which sociology had its origins, and the ethnomethodological approach articulated in the 1960s by Harold Garfinkel. The author rejects the conventional view that draws radical distinctions between the two systems and at the same time provides an intellectual genealogy of ethnomethodology.