Richard Boyd

On the current status of the issue of scientific realism

The aim of the present essay is to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the various “traditional” arguments for and against scientific realism. I conclude that the typical realist rebuttals to empiricist or constructivist arguments against realism are in important ways inadequate; I diagnose the source of the inadequacies in these arguments as a failure to appreciate the extent to which scientific realism requires the abandonment of central tenets of modern epistemology; and I offer an outline of a defense of scientific realism which avoids the inadequacies in question.

Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology

A realistic and dialectical conception of the epistemology of science is advanced according to which the acquisition of instrumental knowledge is parasitic upon the acquisition, by successive approximation, of theoretical knowledge. This conception is extended to provide an epistemological characterization of reference and of natural kinds, and it is integrated into recent naturalistic treatments of knowledge. Implications for several current issues in the philosophy of science are explored.

The illogical basis of phylogenetic nomenclature

The current advocacy for the so-called PhyloCode has a history rooted in twentieth-century arguments among biologists and philosophers regarding a putative distinction between classes and individuals. From this seemingly simple and innocuous discussion have come supposed distinctions between definitions and diagnosis, classification and systematization, and now Linnaean and “phylogenetic” nomenclature. Nevertheless, the metaphysical dichotomy of class versus individual, insofar as its standard applications to the issue of biological taxonomy are concerned, is an outdated remnant of early logical positivist thinking. Current views on natural kinds and their definitions under a scientific realist perspective provide grounds for rejecting the class versus individual dichotomy altogether insofar as biological entities are concerned. We review the role of natural kinds in scientific practice and the nature of definitions and scientific classifications. Although inherent instabilities of the PhyloCode are clearly sufficient to argue against the general application of this nominally phylogenetic system, our goal here is to address serious and fundamental flaws in its very foundation by exposing the unsubstantiated philosophical assumptions preceding and subtending it.ResumenLas propuestas actuales en favor del llamado Código de Nomenclatura Filogenética (Phylo-Code) tienen una historia basada en argumentos desarrollados, durante el siglo veinte, por biólogos y filósofos sobre una distinción putativa entre clases e individuos. De esta simple y aparentemente inocua discusión han surgido supuestas distinciones entre definición y diagnosis, clasificación y sistematización, y ahora entre nomenclatura Lineana y “filogenética.” Sin embargo, la dicotomía metafísica clase contra individuo, al menos en lo concerniente a su aplicación estándar al tema de taxonomía biológica, es un remanente obsoleto del pensamiento positivista lógico. Opiniones actuales sobre categorías naturales y sus definiciones bajo la perspectiva del realismo científico proveen bases para rechazar por completo dicha dicotomía, al menos en lo que concierne a las entidades biológicas. En este artículo se revisa el papel de las categorías naturales en la práctica científica, y la naturaleza de las definiciones y la clasificación científica. Aún cuando la inestabilidad inherente en el Código de Nomenclatura Filogenética es claramente suficiente para argumentar contra la aplicación general de este sistema nominal filogenético, el objetivo de este artículo es mostrar las serias y fundamentales deficiencias en sus propias bases al exponer las suposiciones filosóficas sin fundamento que le preceden y sustentan.

Homeostasis, Higher Taxa, and Monophyly

Several authors have argued that higher taxa are monophyletic homeostatic property cluster natural kinds. On the traditional definition of monophyly, this will not work: the emergence of taxon-defining homeostatic property clusters would not always correspond to unique speciation events. An alternative conception of monophyly is developed and advocated, which can accommodate the homeostatic property cluster proposal. Recent work in philosophy of science shows that it meets appropriate standards of objectivity and precision.

The Logician’s Dilemma: Deductive Logic, Inductive Inference and Logical Empiricism

One of the consistent and admirable features of the practice of logical empiricist philosophers of science during the period in which logical empiricism dominated English-language philosophy of science was the remarkable extent to which they subjected their own philosophical conceptions to persistent criticism, especially with respect to the question of their adequacy as an account of the (sound elements of) the actual practice of scientists. During roughly the decade 1955–1965 it became clear, largely as a result of investigations by logical empiricists (see, e.g., Feigl 1956; Hempel 1954, 1958, 1965a) that there were serious problems to be solved if logical empiricism was to prove adequate to the task of explicating all of “... the relevant facts concerning the logic and procedure of science.” In a number of papers (Boyd 1972, 1973, 1979, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984a, 1984b) I have argued that in fact logical empiricism is inadequate to this task and that a scientific realist conception of scientific knowledge is required in order to obtain an adequate account of even instrumental knowledge in science. My strategy in those papers has been to try to show, about every recognized feature of scientific methodology, that its epistemic reliability (even with respect to instrumental knowledge) can neither be explained nor justified except from a realist perspective.

Reference, (in)commensurability and meanings

Received conceptions of the meanings of scientific terms assign to meanings an essentially benign methodological role: the meaning of a term consists of principles or inference rules which are, always or for the most part, (approximately) true or reliable. In fact, many scientific terms have meanings which are malignant: which are mainly false or misleading and which detract from, rather than contribute to, scientific progress. Kuhn’s conception of incommensurability can be fruitfully extended to take account of malignant meanings. Malignant meanings are especially implicated in cases, like that of human sociobiology, in which the influence of social ideology on scientific practice is especially profound.