Richard Corry

Causal Realism and the Laws of Nature

This paper proposes a revision of our understanding of causation that is designed to address what Hartry Field has suggested is the central problem in the metaphysics of causation today: reconciling Bertrand Russell’s arguments that the concept of causation can play no role in the advanced sciences with Nancy Cartwright’s arguments that causal concepts are essential to a scientific understanding of the world. The paper shows that Russell’s main argument is, ironically, very similar to an argument that Cartwright has put forward against the truth of universal laws of nature. The paper uses this insight to develop an account of causation that does justice to traditional views yet avoids the arguments of Russell.

Can Dispositional Essences Ground the Laws of Nature

A dispositional property is a tendency, or potency, to manifest some characteristic behaviour in some appropriate context. The mainstream view in the twentieth century was that such properties are to be explained in terms of more fundamental non-dispositional properties, together with the laws of nature. In the last few decades, however, a rival view has become popular, according to which some properties are essentially dispositional in nature, and the laws of nature are to be explained in terms of these fundamental dispositions. The supposed ability of fundamental dispositions to ground natural laws is one of the most attractive features of the dispositional essentialist position. In this paper, however, I cast doubt on the ability of dispositional essences to ground the laws of nature. In particular I argue that the dispositional essentialist position is not able to coherently respond—sympathetically or otherwise—to Cartwrights challenge that there are no true general laws of nature.

Climate Change and Intergenerational Justice

We point out that climate change raises issues of intergenerational justice which are similar to, and closely connected with, the issues of international justice discussed in the previous chapter. We counter arguments, common amongst certain economists, that we should put a reduced value on future commodities, because people in the future will on average be wealthier than us. We also counter arguments, also to be found in economics literature, to the effect that we should put a reduced value on future well-being, because doing so is democratic. We argue that this position involves a serious misunderstanding of the nature and value of democracy.

Climate Change and International Justice

We offer three arguments which all converge on the conclusion that industrialized countries are morally obliged to significantly reduce their emissions, while developing countries have little or no such obligation. Furthermore industrialized countries are obliged to help the developing world adapt to the climate change that is going to happen. We conclude by arguing that the topic of this chapter is intimately related to intergenerational justice, which is the topic of the next chapter.

Climate Science As a Social Institution

We have argued that the near consensus among climate scientists does, all else being equal, constitute genuine evidence in favor of the theory anthropogenic global warming. Many skeptics have argued that all else is not equal, however. In particular, the so-called Climategate scandal of 2009 has been used by numerous skeptics to argue that climate scientists are lying or are unduly biased against skeptical views. In this chapter we consider these charges in the specific context of literature in the philosophy and social studies of science. We argue that science in general can provide good grounds for belief even though science is never devoid of politics and vested interests, and that there is no reason to think that climate science is different in this respect.

Is Climate Science Really Science

We consider the charge that climate science is not really science since it does not meet the criteria of falsifiability set out by Karl Popper. Popper’s views have been extremely influential but we argue that Popper’s criteria fail to take account of the complexity of modern science, and climate science is a perfect example of this failure. the mismatch between Popper’s criteria and climate science is a reason for doubting Popper’s criteria, not for doubting the legitimacy of climate science.

Skepticism and Climate Change Skepticism

We argue that the climate change debate has been plagued with confusions resulting from the fact that the word “skepticism” has been given positive connotations. Many people, including a number of professional philosophers and scientists, regard skepticism as an intellectual virtue, and as a particularly scientific virtue at that. We will consider various ways of understanding the word “skepticism” and argue that skepticism is not a virtue, and that there is nothing scientific about it.

Climate Change and Personal Responsibility

In this chapter we turn from matters of public policy to matters of private morality. We argue that climate change has a number of implications for how those of us in the industrialized world should live; we are obliged to limit our carbon footprints as well as engage in political action. If we fail to do both of these things we are failing to live up to our moral obligations. the precise nature and extent of these obligations will depend to some extent on the policies of our governments.

Experts in the Climate Change Debate

After defining the word “expert”, we argue that everyone involved in the climate change debate is to one degree or another reliant on the testimony of experts, or at least those whom they believe to be experts. We consider a variety of means by which nonexperts can hope to identify genuine experts, and work out what to believe when expert (or apparent expert) testimony conflicts. We draw conclusions about how those of us who are not climate scientists can hope to form rational beliefs about the reality of anthropogenic climate change (ACC).