Richard Cross

Two Models of the Trinity

Contrary to a common assumption, I argue that there is full agreement between East and West on the issue of the relation between the divine essence and the divine persons. I defend this claim by using the understanding of universals found in D. M. Armstrong to cast light on the theories. Taking Gregory of Nyssa and John of Damascus as representatives of the Eastern tradition, I show that this tradition sees the divine essence as a numerically singular object that is wholly present in each divine person. The Eastern tradition explicitly sees this object as a universal. The Western tradition – exemplified in Augustine and Aquinas – likewise sees the divine essence as a numerically singular object that is wholly present in each divine person. But this tradition customarily denies that such an object could be a universal, on the merely philosophical grounds that universals are divided amongst the particulars that share them, and thus cannot be numerically one. Having shown the fundamental consonance of the two traditions, I argue by way of conclusion that differences between social and non–social theories of the Trinity depend entirely on the nature and extent of the features that are supposed to distinguish the persons from each other.

Duns Scotus's theory of cognition

Introduction 1. Sensation 2. Intuitive cognition 3. Abstractive cognition (1): abstraction and concept formation 4. Abstractive cognition (2): intelligible species 5. The ontological status of cognitive acts 6. The production of cognitive acts 7. The soul and its powers 8. Semantic internalism and the grounds of intentionality 9. Mental language and the nature of conceptual content 10. The ontological status of mental content Concluding remarks

Some Varieties of Semantic Externalism in Duns Scotus's Cognitive Psychology

According to Scotus, an intelligible species with universal content, inherent in the mind, is a partial cause of an occurrent cognition whose immediate object is the self-same species. I attempt to explain how Scotus defends the possibility of this causal activity. Scotus claims, generally, that forms are causes, and that inherence makes no difference to the capacity of a form to cause an effect. He illustrates this by examining a case in which an accident is an instrument of a substance in the production of a certain sort of effect. All that is required is that the accident is relevantly joined to the substance, whether or not it inheres in the substance. Since intelligible species are bearers of semantic content, it follows that non-inherent objects of thought can also be the bearers of such content. Such objects are included in the mind without inherence, and the boundary between the mind and external reality is to this extent broken down.

Divine Monarchy in Gregory of Nazianzus

This suggests that all three persons somehow derive from the divinity. Thus, it seems to identify the primal cause of the three persons as the divinity and to assert that the three persons are somehow “from” this divinity. The divinity is therefore, apparently, the “monarch” of the persons. This sort of teaching seems to be confirmed in other passages—which I discuss below—in which Gregory identifies the divine monarchy with the divinity or the Trinity of persons. As is also widely acknowledged, however, Gregory also claims on many occasions that the Father is the cause of the Son and Spirit. A few representative texts on this latter point should suffice, all of which occur in the context of discussions of the origination of the Son and/or Spirit:

Duns Scotus on Divine Substance and the Trinity

Charting a course between modalism (the belief that there is just one divine person) and tritheism (the belief that there are three divine substances or Gods) has long been the major problem for Trinitarian theology. In what follows, I shall discuss part of the contribution made by Duns Scotus to this problem. I will argue that, with a few small modifications, Scotus presents a coherent account of the doctrine of three persons in one substance, and thus that this doctrine can be coherently defended against both modalism and tritheism. I do not intend to give a complete presentation of Scotuss Trinitarian thought.

The eternity of the world and the distinction between creation and conservation

According to an important set of medieval arguments, it is impossible to make a distinction between creation and conservation on the assumption of a beginningless universe. The argument is that, on such an assumption, either God is never causally sufficient for the existence of the universe, or, if He is at one time causally sufficient for the existence of the universe, He is at all times causally sufficient for the universe, and occasionalism is true. I defend the claim that these arguments are successful. Since Christian theology requires a distinction between creation and conservation, arguments in favour of the possible eternity of the world fail.

On generic and derivation views of God's trinitarian substance

The view that the divine substance is some item common to the three persons is frequently rejected in modern trinitarian thought in favour of the view that the divine substance is properly identical with the Father in a way that it is not identical with the Son or Spirit. I argue that these views cannot safeguard the monarchy of the Father, and that in order to safeguard this latter doctrine, it is necessary to hold that the divine substance is some item common to the three persons. I show how this view does not require that there is any sense in which the divine substance is prior to the divine persons.

Catholic, Calvinist, and Lutheran Doctrines of Eucharistic Presence: A Brief Note towards a Rapprochement

This article explores Schlatters doctrine of the Trinity in the light of the contemporary debate, focusing on the relation of the economic and the ontological Trinity. It is shown that Schlatter relates Gods triune being and Gods trinitarian action through the notion of love – where Gods love ad extra as well as ad intra is oriented toward the particular in such a way as to enable true otherness. It will be argued, moreover, that Schlatters contribution to the contemporary trinitarian debate lies in propounding an applied trinitarian theology which is faithful to its object. When God in himself and in relation to creation is oriented toward and actively seeks the other, then theology cannot talk about Gods being apart from the actuality of his actions in this world.

Atonement without satisfaction

According to Swinburne, one way of dealing with the guilt that attaches to a morally bad action is satisfaction, consisting of repentance, apology, reparation, and penance. Thus, Christs life and death make atonement for human sin by providing a reparation which human beings would otherwise be unable to pay. I argue that the nature of Gods creative activity entails that human beings can by themselves make reparation for their sins, merely by apology. So there Is no need for additional reparation, and the satisfaction theory of the atonement is otiose. Following an insight of Swinburnes, I argue that satisfaction is not sufficient for forgiveness, since satisfaction does not place the wronged party under any obligation to forgive the wrongdoer. Christs death merits the forgiveness of those sins for which human beings have made satisfaction. It does this in virtue of a divine promise to reward Christs meritorious life with the forgiveness of such human sin.

Angelic Time and Motion: Bonaventure to Duns Scotus

Angels are immaterial beings; time and motion seem to be features solely of material reality. so, the very title of my chapter might be thought oxymoronic. But the medievals held that the duration of an angel is not necessarily infinite, and that angels are capable of certain sorts of temporary activity, and even of causally interacting with the material world. These claims require angels to be related, somehow or other, to both time and place. And according to the medievals, angelic causal activities are not restricted to particular places. This entails, in turn, that we need to be able to give some account of how angels come to interact with different parts of the material universe: how, in other words, they might move. As i shall try to show, the medievals proposed sharply conflicting solutions to these various questions, all of which were hotly debated in the schools. in what follows, i try to give a flavor of some of these disputes, and of the most interesting philosophical moves made in the debates. i make no attempt to be thorough; i cherry-pick what seem to me to be the highlights, while trying to maintain some kind of coherent narrative. i begin with motion, and then turn to consider time. And in order to understand the varieties of accounts of angelic motion, we need a grasp of the options for angelic location. so, i start briefly with location, treating only those aspects of the debates that are required for an understanding of angelic motion.