Richard Dean

The value of humanity in Kant's moral theory

This is critical review of Richard Dean’ book, The Value of Humanity in Kant’s Moral Theory. Dean’s book was evaluated, and some of his interpretations of Kant were critiqued. However, it concludes that Dean’s book is illuminating especially, as regards the distinction he made between consent and informed consent and their roles in biomedical practice.

Cummiskey's Kantian Consequentialism

In Kantian Consequentialism, David Cummiskey argues that the central ideas of Kants moral philosophy provide claims about value which, if applied consistently, lead to consequentialist normative principles. While Kant himself was not a consequentialist, Cummiskey thinks he should have been, given his fundamental positions in ethics. I argue that Cummiskey is mistaken. Cummiskeys argument relies on a non-Kantian idea about value, namely that value can be defined, and objects with value identified, conceptually prior to and independent of the choices that a rational agent would make. The contrasting Kantian concept of value is that to possess value is to be the object of (one sort or other) of rational choice. Inasmuch as Cummiskey gives no reason to reject the Kantian account of value in favour of his own (consequentialist) account, his argument does not establish that Kants ethics inevitably leads to normative consequentialism.

Stigmatization and Denormalization as Public Health Policies: Some Kantian Thoughts

The stigmatization of some groups of people, whether for some characteristic they possess or some behavior they engage in, will initially strike most of us as wrong. For many years, academic work in public health, which focused mainly on the stigmatization of HIV-positive individuals, reinforced this natural reaction to stigmatization, by pointing out the negative health effects of stigmatization. But more recently, the apparent success of anti-smoking campaigns which employ stigmatization of smokers has raised questions about whether stigmatization may sometimes be justified, because of its positive effects on public health. Discussion of the issue so far has focused on consequences, and on some Kantian considerations regarding the status of the stigmatized. In this article, I argue that further Kantian considerations regarding the treatment of the general public (the potential stigmatizers) also count against any public health policy involving stigmatization. Attempts to encourage stigmatization are likely to fail to appeal to the rational decision-making abilities of the general public, and the creation of stigmatized groups (even if they are stigmatized for their voluntary behavior) is an obstacle to the self-improvement of members of the general public.

Humanity as an Idea, as an Ideal, and as an End in Itself

Kant emphasizes that moral philosophy must be divided into two parts, a ‘purely rational’ metaphysics of morals, and an empirical application to individuals, which Kant calls ‘moral anthropology’. But Kant gives humanity (die Menschheit) a prominent role even in the purely rational part of ethics – for example, one formulation of the categorical imperative is a demand to treat humanity as an end in itself. This paper argues that the only concepts of humanity suited to play such a role are the rational idea of humanity, and the rational ideal derived from this idea, which Kant discusses in Critique of Practical Reason and other texts.

Glasgow's Conception of Kantian Humanity

In “Kant’s Conception of Humanity,” Joshua Glasgow defends a traditional reading of the humanity formulation of the Categorical Imperative. Specifically, he opposes taking good will to be the end in itself, and instead argues that the end in itself must be some more minimal “rational capacity.” Most of Glasgow’s article is directed against some arguments I have given in favor of taking the end in itself to be a good will, or the will of a rational being who is committed to morality. In this response to Glasgow, I both consider Glasgow’s main points, and propose some general strategies for avoiding common interpretive pitfalls in discussing the humanity formulation.

‘Kantian Ethics, Dignity and Perfection’, by Paul Formosa

In Kantian Ethics, Dignity and Perfection, Paul Formosa distinguishes between strict interpretation of Kant’s ethics and the development of an ethical system that is Kantian in spirit. Formosa’s project is the latter, and he argues for the principle of treating humanity as an end in itself as being the central principle of a plausible and compelling Kantian ethics. Of course, Formosa’s project does not ignore Kant’s texts, and he uses his own positions on some scholarly debates as a foundation for his version of Kantian ethics. But, by diverging from strict interpretative scholarship, Formosa leaves greater room for employing the principle of charity, for rejecting some of Kant’s own presuppositions, and for drawing connections between Kant’s ethical thought and current philosophical views. One can see the structure of the book as consisting of a series of decision points regarding how to take Kant’s ethics, with Formosa providing reasons for the reader to follow along with his decisions at each point. So, he argues that the humanity formulation is a more satisfactory moral principle than principles that rely on universalization; then that a humanity-based Kantian ethics is best understood as a version of moral constructivism rather than moral realism; and then that the ‘rational nature’ that must be treated as an end in itself is best understood as a potential for morality, rather than some other realized or latent form of rational nature. Formosa adds other important points in developing his view, including strategies for applying the principle of treating humanity as an end in itself (he supplies an original understanding of ‘consent’), and a distinction between the ‘status dignity’ that qualifies someone as an end in herself, and an ‘achievement dignity’ at which one ought to aim as an ideal. The book will be of significant interest to Kantian ethicists, not only for its new contributions to some interpretative debates, but also for its attempt to place Kantian ethics in the framework of current moral philosophy. Hard-core sceptics about Kant’s approach to ethics, and partisans who oppose Formosa’s reading of some of Kant’s texts, will likely be unmoved by Formosa’s arguments, but he succeeds in his apparent aim of guiding open-minded readers deftly through a plausible version of Kantian ethics.