Richard F. Weisfelder

Early Voices of Protest in Basutoland: The Progressive Association and Lekhotla La Bafo

Deliberate British support for the supremacy of the Basotho monarchy and the prerogatives of chieftainship after 1884 assured that those traditional institutions would adapt to changing socioeconomic conditions within a relatively narrow, increasingly rigid format not conducive to popular participation. Despite strong official discouragement of overt challenges to the existing structures of rule, various new channels of popular expression began to emerge as potential alternative outlets for political agitation. The expansion of mission education, cash cropping, the money economy, and labor migration along with other similar innovations unleashed forces for reform which could not be entirely contained and quickly became, in Lord Haileys words, “much stronger than the Administration realized” (1953: 136). Hailey recognized that the diverse groups generating such social and political pressures included not only the educated, incipient “middle class,” but also certain dissatisfied segments of the chieftainship. Together with most observers, he devoted major attention to the all-important development of the Basutoland National Council, which had evolved in part as a product of colonial inspiration, encouragement, and guidance. However, Hailey, like virtually all other analysts, gave minimal attention to the equally crucial and highly controversial roles of emergent interest aggregations such as the Progressive Association and Lekhotla la Bafo (The Council of Commoners). Nevertheless, these groups established a heritage of political ideas and of interaction with both colonial and chiefly administrations that is vital in understanding the policies, values, and behavior of subsequent Basotho political parties.

Lesotho's interactions with South Africa and regional organisations in Southern Africa

Media reports alleged in late 2012 that South Africa was treating Lesotho ‘worse than … under apartheid’. To test that premise, this article contrasts Lesothos regional and bilateral interactions during the colonial and apartheid eras with present relationships. It reviews bilateral and regional factors that impact Lesotho, emphasising Lesothos roles in the Southern African Customs Union, the Common Monetary Area, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as well as diverse bilateral transactions with South Africa. Lesothos experiences with SADC economic, political and security operations are evaluated. Whether a mutually beneficial relationship with South Africa is replacing the prior hegemonic pattern is questioned, especially after the peaceful transfer of power in 2012 to Lesothos opposition parties. Dual citizenship, open borders, an economic union and even the remote possibility of political fusion are discussed. Finally, the article addresses how Basotho view border issues, why they have reservations about regionalism and political amalgamation, and why commitment to separate Lesotho statehood persists.

What is delaying elections in Lesotho

Recurrent political crises in Lesotho are rooted in constitutional and electoral systems and party politics dating back to the 1960s. The present constitutional arrangements that ended military rule in 1993 replicated virtually all of the British-style parliamentary institutions from the 1965 preindependence constitution. Cabinet government by the popularly elected majority in the lower house of a sovereign parliament coexisted with a constitutional monarch and an upper house composed of ex officio senior chiefs and appointees that could delay legislation, but do little else. National elections were conducted on a first-past-the-post basis in single-member constituencies. In 1965 and 1970, this system created a multiparty outcome that only slightly disadvantaged the opposition parties. In the two most recent elections, the same system virtually excluded from Parliament opposition parties that received 25% of the vote in 1993 and 40% in 1998. Lacking a stake within Parliament, the disgruntled opposition leadership had no compunction about challengingthe legitimacy of the political institutions and attempting to displace the elected government by means of mass protests, military mutinies and royal intervention.