Richard H. Adams

Remittances, Investment, and Rural Asset Accumulation in Pakistan

Internal and external migration can have a profound impact on rural asset accumulation in most Third World countries. In many African, Asian, and Latin American countries the bulk of the labor force still lives in the countryside. In these countries the large difference between expected rural and urban or foreign incomes, coupled with the risk-reducing functions of migration, causes workers to migrate, either to urban centers or abroad. The remittances—defined as the money or goods sent home by migrant workers—can have a large effect on the accumulation of assets in these rural areas. For example, an inflow of external remittances to rural households at the upper end of the income distribution could increase land accumulation by the rich. In general terms the effect of remittances on asset accumulation in a rural Third World economy depends on answers to three questions: (a) Who migrates? (b) How much net income do migrants remit? and (c) What are the marginal effects of these remittances on household consumption and investment? Because of data limitations, in this article I propose to examine only the first and the third questions; other researchers have addressed the second issue. In the past surprisingly little attention has been focused on the question of the marginal effects of remittances on household consumption and investment in the rural Third World. This inattention has been due to three considerable methodological problems. The first is fungibility; because remittances are like any other form of cash income, it is difficult to associate this income source with any particular changes in household expenditure behavior. The second problem relates to the multiple-round effects of remittances on the local economy. For example, an inflow of remittances into a rural area may lead to a surge in expenditures in housing, which may, in turn, create new income and employment opportunities for the poor and unskilled. Unfortunately, however, few studies haveInternal and external migration can have a profound impact on rural asset accumulation in most Third World countries. In many African, Asian, and Latin American countries the bulk of the labor force still lives in the countryside. In these countries the large difference between expected rural and urban or foreign incomes, coupled with the risk-reducing functions of migration, causes workers to migrate, either to urban centers or abroad. The remittances—defined as the money or goods sent home by migrant workers—can have a large effect on the accumulation of assets in these rural areas. For example, an inflow of external remittances to rural households at the upper end of the income distribution could increase land accumulation by the rich. In general terms the effect of remittances on asset accumulation in a rural Third World economy depends on answers to three questions: (a) Who migrates? (b) How much net income do migrants remit? and (c) What are the marginal effects of these remittances on household consumption and investment? Because of data limitations, in this article I propose to examine only the first and the third questions; other researchers have addressed the second issue. In the past surprisingly little attention has been focused on the question of the marginal effects of remittances on household consumption and investment in the rural Third World. This inattention has been due to three considerable methodological problems. The first is fungibility; because remittances are like any other form of cash income, it is difficult to associate this income source with any particular changes in household expenditure behavior. The second problem relates to the multiple-round effects of remittances on the local economy. For example, an inflow of remittances into a rural area may lead to a surge in expenditures in housing, which may, in turn, create new income and employment opportunities for the poor and unskilled. Unfortunately, however, few studies have

International Migration, Remittances, and the Brain Drain: A Study of 24 Labor-Exporting Countries

While the level of international migration and remittances continues to grow, data on international migration remains unreliable. At the international level, there is no consistent set of statistics on the number or skill characteristics of international migrants. At the national level, most labor-exporting countries do not collect data on their migrants. Adams tries to overcome these problems by constructing a new data set of 24 large, labor-exporting countries and using estimates of migration and educational attainment based on United States and OECD records. He uses these new data to address the key policy question: How pervasive is the brain drain from labor-exporting countries? Three basic findings emerge: With respect to legal migration, international migration involves the movement of the educated. The vast majority of migrants to both the United States and the OECD have a secondary (high school) education or higher. While migrants are well-educated, international migration does not tend to take a very high proportion of the best educated. For 22 of the 33 countries in which educational attainment data can be estimated, less than 10 percent of the best educated (tertiary-educated) population of labor-exporting countries has migrated. For a handful of labor-exporting countries, international migration does cause brain drain. For example, for the five Latin American countries (Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica and Mexico) located closest to the United States, migration takes a large share of the best educated. This finding suggests that more work needs to be done on the relationship between brain drain, geographical proximity to labor-receiving countries, and the size of the (educated) population of labor-exporting countries.

International Migration, Remittances, and Poverty in Developing Countries

Few studies have examined the impact of international migration and remittances on poverty in a broad cross-section of developing countries. The authors try to fill this gap by constructing a new data set on poverty, international migration, and remittances for 74 low- and middle-income developing countries. Four key findings emerge: 1) International migration-defined as the share of a countrys population living abroad-has a strong, statistical impact in reducing poverty. On average, a 10 percent increase in the share of international migrants in a countrys population will lead to a 1.9 percent decline in the share of people living in poverty (

Evaluating the Economic Impact of International Remittances On Developing Countries Using Household Surveys: A Literature Review

1.00 a person a day). 2) Distance to a major labor-receiving region-like the United States or OECD (Europe)-has an important effect on international migration. Developing countries that are located closest to the United States or OECD (Europe) are also those countries with the highest rates of migration. 3) An inverted U-shaped curve exists between the level of country per capita income and international migration. Developing countries with low or high per capita GDP produce smaller shares of international migrants than do middle-income developing countries. The authors find no evidence that developing countries with higher levels of poverty produce more migrants. Because of considerable travel costs associated with international migration, international migrants come from those income groups which are just above the poverty line in middle-income developing countries. 4) International remittances-defined as the share of remittances in country GDP-have a strong, statistical impact in reducing poverty. On average, a 10 percent increase in the share of international remittances in a countrys GDP will lead to a 1.6 percent decline in the share of people living in poverty.

The Impact of Remittances on Poverty and Inequality in Ghana

Abstract This literature review covers 50 recent empirical studies of the economic impact of international remittances on the developing world that are based on household survey data. It begins by reviewing the considerable methodological problems confronting economic work on international remittances, and then examines the strengths and weaknesses of various economic studies of the impact of remittances in the developing world on such outcomes as: poverty and inequality, health and education, investment and savings, labour supply and participation, and economic growth. It finds that while international remittances generally have a positive impact on poverty and health in the developing world, remittances can have negative effects on labour supply, education and economic growth.

Remittances, Consumption and Investment in Ghana

This paper uses a new, 2005/06 nationally-representative household survey to analyze the impact of internal remittances (from Ghana) and international remittances (from African and other countries) on poverty and inequality in Ghana. To control for selection and endogeneity, it uses a two-stage multinomial logit model with instrumental variables focusing on variations in migration networks and remittances among various ethno-religious groups in Ghana. The paper finds that both internal and international remittances reduce the level, depth, and severity of poverty in Ghana. However, the size of the poverty reduction depends on the type of remittances received. In general, poverty in Ghana is reduced more by international than internal remittances. For households receiving international remittances, the level of poverty falls by 88.1 percent with the inclusion of remittances; for households receiving internal remittances, poverty falls by 69.4 percent with the inclusion of remittances. The paper also finds that both types of remittances increase income inequality in Ghana. For households with internal remittances, the inclusion of remittances causes the Gini coefficient to rise by 4 percent, and for households with international remittances, the inclusion of remittances causes the Gini to increase by 17.4 percent.

Economic Growth, Inequality, and Poverty : Findings from a New Data Set

This paper uses a new, nationally-representative household survey from Ghana to analyze within a rigorous econometric framework how the receipt of internal remittances (from within Ghana) and international remittances (from African or other countries) affects the marginal spending behavior of households on a broad range of consumption and investment goods, including food, education and housing. Contrary to other studies, which find that remittances are spent disproportionately on consumption (food and consumer goods/durables) or investment goods (education and housing), the findings show that households receiving remittances in Ghana do not spend more at the margin on food, education and housing than households with similar income levels and characteristics that do not receive remittances. When the analysis controls for endogeneity and selection bias, the findings show that any differences in the marginal spending behavior between remittance-receiving and non-receiving households are explained completely by the observed and unobserved characteristics of households. Households in Ghana treat remittances just like any other source of income, and there are no changes in marginal spending patterns for households with the receipt of remittance income.

Migrant labor remittances in South Asia

The author uses new data from 50 developing countries and 101 intervals to examine the impact of economic growth on poverty and inequality. He finds that growth represents an important means for reducing poverty in the developing world. When economic growth is measured by survey mean income (consumption), there is a strong, statistical link between growth and poverty reduction. When economic growth is measured by GDP per capita, the statistical relationship between growth and poverty reduction is still present, albeit not quite as strong. Economic growth reduces poverty because growth has little impact on income inequality. In the data set income inequality rises on average less than 1.0 percent a year. Since income distributions are relatively stable over time, economic growth tends to raise incomes for all members of society, including the poor. When growth is measured by survey mean income (consumption), the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth is -2.59. In other words, on average, a 10 percentage point increase in economic growth (measured by survey mean income) will produce a 25.9 percent decrease in the proportion of people living in poverty (

The Demographic, Economic and Financial Determinants of International Remittances in Developing Countries

1 a person a day).

The Economic Impact of International Remittances on Poverty and Household Consumption and Investment in Indonesia

This paper provides a strategic overview of key issues relating to the remittance industry in the South Asia region. The paper builds on recent research on remittances that prominently features the South Asia region. Rather than duplicate that work, this study focuses only on the regions distinguishing characteristics, namely: a large migrant population of semiskilled and unskilled workers largely concentrated in the Persian Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, contributing to rising remittance flows; the presence of dedicated public institutions and government financial incentives aimed at facilitating and providing support for temporary migration and remittance inflows; the existence of large state bank branch networks with immense potential for a more effective and efficient remittance financial market; and the widespread use of trade-related informal remittance channels by both legal and illegal migrants.