Richard Harding

Impact of cultural exposure on young Chinese students’ adaptation in a UK business school

This study examines young Chinese students’ (born post 1985) adaptation to cultural exposure in the UK. Built from data collected from in-depth interviews, the research establishes that, through direct communication with students from various cultural backgrounds during teamwork, the Chinese students adapt to varying degrees in ideology, socialisation, forms of discourse and face system. The research finds that the extent of adjustment is moderated by their individual learning approaches as well as contextual mediation. The results are confirmed by the findings from a comparison group of similar students in China, with respect to age, gender and learning. Implications arising from the study suggest that the internationalisation of education should enhance ‘cultural synergy’, so that both the local and international students can enrich their learning experiences and develop intercultural competence.

The Society for Nautical Research Annual Lecture 2010

A 3.25 p.m. on 14 June 1910 a group of 40 to 50 gentlemen assembled at the Royal United Services Institution in Whitehall. They had all responded to a call proposing the establishment of a society of nautical antiquaries. It was proposed that it be called the Jal Society in honour of the French maritime antiquarian and lexicographer, August Jal (1795–1875). The principle of forming such a society was accepted, but the name was not and within a month the title ‘Nautical Research Society’ was in use. On 2 December the rules of the society were approved with a minor change in the title to Society for Nautical Research (SNR).2 A proposal to form such a society had been in the offing for a few years and had gathered pace significantly during 1909. Among its original movers, scepticism about its potential remained almost until its launch. It was expected to be a modest group of enthusiasts, principally engaged in exchanging information between themselves. Together they would build up the sum of knowledge of maritime antiquities and collect material for a nautical encyclopaedia or dictionary. Yet these enthusiasts were extremely well connected. The group that they assembled to help bring the Society into existence and formed the first council was a remarkable selection of Edwardian society. The president was Vice Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg (1854–1921), then Vice-Admiral commanding 3rd and 4th Divisions of the Home Fleet and shortly to become Second Sea Lord (1911) and First Sea Lord in the following year. Among the vice-presidents were other naval officers actively engaged in the contemporary disputes and debates around the reform of the Royal Navy. Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge (1831–1924) was a founder member of the Navy Records Society and critic of Sir John Fisher’s (1841–1920) ‘dictatorship of the materialiate’, which advocated material superiority over all other elements of strategic consideration. Another archcritic of Fisher’s was Admiral Sir Reginald Custance (1847–1935). On the other hand, another vice-president was the naval architect who made real Fisher’s naval revolution, Sir Philip Watts (1846–1920). Watts was Director of Naval Construction

The Society for Nautical Research: Where are we now and where are we going?

T Society for Nautical Research (SNR) has had a distinguished role in the establishment of the public understanding of maritime history. The 96 volumes of The Mariner’s Mirror, and its occasional publications, almost exactly coincide with the maturing of modern maritime history. Although the Mirror could never capture the entire scope and richness of such a phenomenon, reading through its volumes gives a good indication of the concerns and methods of its membership and other contributors from 1911 to the present day. Nowhere else could one find such a collection of research articles, book reviews, notes and queries dedicated to humankind’s relationship with the sea. The SNR’s involvement in the restoration and preservation of HMS Victory, the establishment of the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, and the development of the Victory Museum into the Royal Naval Museum at Portsmouth gives it a particularly important place in the shaping to the present institutional structure of maritime history in the United Kingdom. Over the last century the SNR can justly claim to have played a central role in promoting the serious study of maritime history internationally and, within Britain, in the establishment of its great public institutions.1 With a history like this behind it, a steady international membership and an active Council intent on taking forward the Society’s charitable mission to educate the public, to question where we are and where we are going may seem strange. The seventy-fifth anniversary of the Society did not generate much thought or excitement around these questions. Nevertheless, anniversaries tend to stimulate reflection and historians involved with societies or journals are particularly prone to review their paths to the present.2 Although anniversaries provide an occasion, a more fundamental stimulus for reflection seems to be the point at which professional historians see themselves as practitioners of a distinct subdiscipline engaged in a battle for recognition against those who ignore or dismiss the value of their work. For example, economic historians seem to have been engaged in a constant battle

America, the war of 1739–48 and the development of British global power

Britains global power rested on her ability to move effective forces to different parts of the globe. Seapower was at the core of this, but it also required expeditionary armies to establish British power on land in a more permanent fashion. During the Seven Years War (1756-63) Britain proved that she possessed this global power and that it was an extremely effective diplomatic weapon. The factors that contributed to this global capability were many and developed during the decades prior to 1756. One of those factors was the mobilisation of American manpower. This paper examines the contribution of the American Regiment raised in 1740 to serve with British expeditionary forces in the West Indies. Although the operation was a disaster, the experience of raising the troops and employing them was an important step in clarifying the manner in which American manpower could best be tapped for war in the Americas.

The Royal Navy, 1930-1990: innovation and defence

This new book explores innovation within the Royal Navy from the financial constraints of the 1930s to World War Two, the Cold War and the refocusing of the Royal Navy after 1990. Successful adaptation to new conditions has been critical to all navies at all times. To naval historians the significance and process of change is not new, but in recent years innovation has been increasingly studied within a number of other disciplines, providing new theoretical positions and insights. This study examines key case studies of change, some successful others less so, which place the experience of the Royal Navy within a variety of economic and strategic contexts. Together these studies provide excellent new insights against which to set recent ideas on innovation and provide a stimulus to more research by historians and scholars in other disciplines.

British Naval Captains of the Seven Years' War: The view from the quarterdeck

that were undertaken and the impact that this had on the size and nature of the Swedish navy. A large central chapter details the ways in which ships were built or procured and examines the strength of the navy in comparison with the other major navies of northern Europe. Individual chapters then examine the resources and organizational capabilities required to supply the navy with sails and cordage, cannon, seamen and provisions. Each chapter is similarly structured. Glete provides an overview of the subject, discusses the archival sources and historiography that have informed his research and he then explores the subject chronologically, finishing with conclusions based on his analysis. In some cases he has carried out ground-breaking primary research, while in other areas he provides more of a synthesis of published research. He is refreshingly honest in dealing with the current state of knowledge in certain areas of naval and state administration and in many ways this book could be used as a research agenda for future work. Much of what he writes is truly innovative, but he has the ability to present extremely complex issues in such a clear and matter-of-fact way that his conclusions appear self-evident. Although he is heavily influenced by theoretical approaches, he does not over-burden his text with jargon and his unpretentious manner helps to sustain the reader through a very large book. The book is completed with an extensive appendix that lists all Swedish naval ships during the period and a comprehensive bibliography. Although hugely impressive the book is by no means perfect. It is clear that Glete was aware of his health while writing it and some parts feel a little as though he was using his last chance to get everything down on paper. This is perhaps truest of the rather too long and over-detailed chapter on warships and naval strength. One suspects that had circumstances been different Glete may have developed the content into two or even three books on the subject. The book would have also benefited greatly from an editor with a stronger grasp of English who could have eliminated the all too numerous grammatical errors and directly translated Swedish idioms that appear throughout. However, these are minor quibbles that do not detract from the fact that this is an extremely important book, not just in terms of increasing our knowledge of the Swedish navy but of understanding the importance of navies and state formation in early modern Europe. It should be required reading for anyone studying naval history in the early modern period, although its size and very high price may prohibit this to a certain extent. martin Bellamy glasgow museums http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00253359.2013.818359

Sea power: the struggle for dominance, 1650-1815

By 1650 war at sea had many of the characteristics that were to be familiar for the next 160 years. Warships had assumed the basic form and design that developed into the classic line-of-battle ship and frigate (Lavery, 1983; Gardiner, 1992). The purpose of navies was generally agreed. States put fleets to sea with the intention of fighting their enemies, destroying their trade and invading their territory, as well as defending their own lands and trade. The warship was also a symbol of state power for domestic and diplomatic purposes. The size and decoration of ships such as the English Sovereign of the Seas (1637) and the French Soleil Royal (1669) were self-conscious expressions of royal power. These warships were extremely expensive and complex, and the need for basic administrative systems to support large-scale state navies was recognized and, in some states, in place.