Richard Holton

Willing, wanting, waiting

Introduction 1. Intention 2. Belief 3. Choice 4. Weakness of Will 5. Temptation 6. Strength of Will 7. Rationality 8. Freedom Bibliography

How is Strength of Will Possible

Weakness of will is traditionally identified with akrasia: weak-willed agents, on this view, are those who intentionally do other than that which they judge to be best. This gives rise to the puzzle of how such failure is possible: how can an agent intentionally perform an action whilst believing a better option is available? Suppose, however, that one were unconvinced by the traditional identification of weakness of will with akrasia. Suppose one thought instead of weakness of will as failure to persist in one’s resolutions. And, correspondingly, suppose one thought of strength of will as success in persisting with one’s resolutions. Then the interesting question would no longer be how weakness of will is possible. It is all too easy to see how an earlier resolution could be overcome by the growth of a subsequent desire. Rather, the interesting question would be how strength of will is possible. How do agents succeed in persisting with their resolutions in the face of strong contrary inclinations? Elsewhere I have argued for an account of weakness of will and strength of will along these lines; I will summarize those ideas shortly. Here my focus is on the interesting question that follows: on how strength of will is possible. My answer, in brief, is that we standardly achieve strength of will by exercising will-power. I mean this as more than a pleonasm. My claim is that will-power is a distinct faculty, the exercise of which causally explains our ability to stick to a resolution. To get some idea of what a separate faculty of will-power might be, let us contrast this approach with the two alternatives that have been dominant in recent philosophical discussion (alternatives first):