Richard Joyce

The Error In ‘The Error In The Error Theory’

In his paper ‘The Error in the Error Theory’[this journal, 2008], Stephen Finlay attempts to show that the moral error theorist has not only failed to prove his case, but that the error theory is in fact false. This paper rebuts Finlays arguments, criticizes his positive theory, and clarifies the error-theoretic position.

Darwinian Ethics and Error

Suppose that the human tendency to think of certain actions andomissions as morally required – a notion that surely lies at the heart of moral discourse – is a trait that has been naturallyselected for. Many have thought that from this premise we canjustify or vindicate moral concepts. I argue that this is mistaken, and defend Michael Ruses view that the moreplausible implication is an error theory – the idea thatmorality is an illusion foisted upon us by evolution. Thenaturalistic fallacy is a red herring in this debate,since there is really nothing that counts as a ‘fallacy’ at all. If morality is an illusion, it appears to followthat we should, upon discovering this, abolish moraldiscourse on pain of irrationality. I argue that thisconclusion is too hasty, and that we may be able usefullyto employ a moral discourse, warts and all, withoutbelieving in it.

Metaethics and the empirical sciences

What contribution can the empirical sciences make to metaethics? This paper outlines an argument to a particular metaethical conclusion—that moral judgments are epistemically unjustified—that depends in large part on a posteriori premises.

THEISTIC ETHICS AND THE EUTHYPHRO DILEMMA

It is widely believed that the Divine Command Theory is untenable due to the Euthyphro Dilemma. This article first examines the Platonic dialogue of that name, and shows that Socrates’s reasoning is faulty. Second, the dilemma in the form in which many contemporary philosophers accept it is examined in detail, and this reasoning is also shown to be deficient. This is not to say, however, that the Divine Command Theory is true—merely that one popular argument for rejecting it is unsound. Finally some brief thoughts are presented concerning where the real problems lie for the theory.

The origins of moral judgment

Is human morality a biological adaptation? And, if so, should this fact have any substantial impact on the ethical inquiry of how we should live our lives? In this paper I will address both these questions, though will not attempt definitively to answer either. Regarding the former, my goal is to clarify the question and identify some serious challenges that arise for any attempt to settle the matter one way or the other. Regarding the latter, my ambitions here are restricted to some brief critical comments on one recent attempt to answer the question in the affirmative.

Expressivism, Motivation Internalism, and Hume

David Hume is often taken to be a moral expressivist (Flew, 1963; Ayer, 1980, pp. 84–5; Price, 1988, p. 6; Snare, 1991; Harman, 1996, p. 97). He is, moreover, often taken to have presented in the Treatise one of the strongest arguments for moral expressivism: the so-called Motivation Argument. As a metaethicist, I am interested in whether expressivism is true, and thus interested in whether the argument that people think they find in Hume is a sound one. Not being a Hume scholar (but merely a devoted fan), I am less interested in whether Hume really was an expressivist or whether he really did present an argument in its favour. Hume’s metaethical views are very difficult to nail down, and by a careful selection of quotes one can present him as advocating expressivism, or cognitivist subjectivism, or moral scepticism, or a dispositional theory, or an ideal observer theory, or even utilitarianism. It is entirely possible that Hume’s position is indeterminate when considered against these terms of modern moral philosophy; it is also entirely possible that he was hopelessly confused (much as it pains me to admit it). However, I doubt very much that Hume should be interpreted as an expressivist in any straightforward manner, and therefore I am doubtful that he should be interpreted as arguing in its favour. Most of this essay does not discuss Hume directly at all: I critically discuss the Motivation Argument and I advocate a certain positive metaethical view — one that mixes elements of traditional expressivism with elements of cognitivism.

Moral Realism and Teleosemantics

William Harms has argued that if human morality is the product ofnatural selection, moral realism will follow. The thesis that hethinks allows this bridge is teleosemantics. This argument ismistaken. Even granting both premises, forms of radical moralnon-realism remain viable, since the utterance of mistaken statements(or commands) may enhance reproductive fitness.

The Prospects for If-Thenism

Yablo [2017: 115] calls calibration problems in philosophy ‘hostage crises’ because in philosophy they tend to ‘involve a (relatively) thin, innocent claim and a (relatively) weighty, debatable one; the first is hostage to the second in that the second must hold or the first fails’. Calibration problems are not unique to philosophy. Perhaps the most well-known calibration problem was introduced by the social psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Tversky and Kahneman [1982] call their particular calibration problem ‘the conjunction fallacy’ and illustrate it with the following vignette about Linda.

Reply to ‘On the Validity of a Simple Argument for Moral Error Theory’

I thank Kasper Christensen for his astute critical paper (Christensen 2016), which succeeds in revealing some infelicities and clumsiness in how I summed up a central argument in The Myth of Morality (2001). The master argument itself stretches over several chapters of that book, and though the argument no doubt has its fair share of problems, Christensen has given me no new grounds for revising its substance. But on page 42 of my book I made an attempt to state the argument in a crisp argumentative form (which Christensen calls ‘ARG’), and then went further and tried to present its structure in the simplest propositional form I could manage (which Christensen calls ‘fARG’), and I now see that these attempts at clarifying matters for the reader had some problems. First of all, propositional logic was always going to be insufficient to capture the reasoning of ARG due to the fact that it is insufficient to properly capture the modal notion of ‘X regardless of Y’ which lies at the heart of ARG. Christensen is quite correct that one needs to step up to modal logic in order to accomplish this. So fARG is a waste of time; I’ll happily commit it to the flames. Let us, then, examine ARG more closely. Premise 1 of ARG is as follows: