Richard Moon

The constitutional protection of freedom of expression

In this book, Richard Moon puts forward an account of freedom of expression that emphasizes its social character. Such freedom does not simply protect individual liberty from state interference; it also protects the individuals freedom to communicate with others. It is the right of the individual to communicate: an activity that is deeply social in character, and that involves socially created languages and the use of community resources, like parks, streets, and broadcast stations. Moon argues that recognition of the social dynamic of communication is critical to understanding the potential value and harm of language and to addressing questions about the scope and limits on ones rights to freedom of expression. Moon examines the tension between the demands for freedom of expression and the structure of constitutional adjudication in the Canadian context. The book discusses many of the standard freedom of expression issues, such as the regulation of advertising, election spending ceilings, the restriction of hate promotion and pornography, state compelled expression, freedom of the press, access to state and private property and state support for expression. It examines several important Supreme Court of Canada decisions including Irwin Toy, Dolphin Delivery, RJR Macdonald, Keegstra and Butler.

The Supreme Court of Canada on the Structure of Freedom of Expression Adjudication

A discussion of the Supreme Court of Canadas freedom of expression decisions which move between a discourse of freedom and rationality when defining of the freedom to a causal or behavioural discourse when determining justified limits.

Religious Accommodation and Its Limits: The Recent Controversy at York University

A recent request for religious accommodation at York University has generated controversy not just about the merits of the particular claim but also about the general practice of religious accommodation under human rights codes and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I will argue that the York case highlights the diffi culty in treating religion as a ground of discrimination and more generally in fi tting religion into an equality rights framework. Th is diffi culty stems from the complex character of religious adherence, which can be viewed as both a personal commitment to a set of claims about truth and right and as a cultural identity that is expressed in shared spiritual practices. When religion is viewed as a cultural identity, it seems right that it be accommodated, unless this would cause “undue hardship” to others. Yet when it is viewed as a set of beliefs about right and truth, particularly when those beliefs are inconsistent with public values, it is not clear why it ought to be accommodated.