Richard P. Eibach

Picture Yourself at the Polls: Visual Perspective in Mental Imagery Affects Self-Perception and Behavior

The present research demonstrates that the visual perspective—own first-person versus observers third-person—people use to picture themselves engaging in a potential future action affects their self-perceptions and subsequent behavior. On the eve of the 2004 U.S. presidential election, registered voters in Ohio were instructed to use either the first-person or the third-person perspective to picture themselves voting in the election. Picturing voting from the third-person perspective caused subjects to adopt a stronger pro-voting mind-set correspondent with the imagined behavior. Further, this effect on self-perception carried over to behavior, causing subjects who were instructed to picture voting from the third-person perspective to be significantly more likely to vote in the election. These findings extend previous research in autobiographical memory and social judgment linking the observers perspective with dispositional attributions, and demonstrate the causal role of imagery in determining future behavior.

“Keep Your Eyes on the Prize”: Reference Points and Racial Differences in Assessing Progress Toward Equality

White Americans tend to perceive greater progress toward racial equality than do ethnic minorities. Correlational evidence (Study 1) and two experimental manipulations of framing (Studies 2 and 3) supported the hypothesis that this perception gap is associated with different reference points the two groups spontaneously use to assess progress, with Whites anchoring on comparisons with the past and ethnic minorities anchoring on ideal standards. Consistent with the hypothesis that the groups anchor on different reference points, the gap in perceptions of progress was affected by the time participants spent deliberating about the topic (Study 4). Implications for survey methods and political conflict are discussed.

Free at last? Social dominance, loss aversion, and white and black Americans' differing assessments of racial progress.

White Americans tend to believe that there has been greater progress toward racial equality than do Black Americans. The authors explain this difference by combining insights from prospect theory and social dominance theory. According to prospect theory, changes seem greater when framed as losses rather than gains. Social dominance theory predicts that White Americans tend to view increases in equality as losses, whereas Black Americans view them as gains. In Studies 1 and 2, the authors experimentally tested whether groups judge the same change differently depending on whether it represents a loss or gain. In Studies 3-6, the authors used experimental methods to test whether White participants who frame equality-promoting changes as losses perceive greater progress toward racial equality. The authors discuss theoretical and political implications for progress toward a just society.

Seeing meaning in action: A bidirectional link between visual perspective and action identification level

Actions do not have inherent meaning but rather can be interpreted in many ways. The interpretation a person adopts has important effects on a range of higher order cognitive processes. One dimension on which interpretations can vary is the extent to which actions are identified abstractly--in relation to broader goals, personal characteristics, or consequences--versus concretely, in terms of component processes. The present research investigated how visual perspective (own 1st-person vs. observers 3rd-person) in action imagery is related to action identification level. A series of experiments measured and manipulated visual perspective in mental and photographic images to test the connection with action identification level. Results revealed a bidirectional causal relationship linking 3rd-person images and abstract action identifications. These findings highlight the functional role of visual imagery and have implications for understanding how perspective is involved in action perception at the social, cognitive, and neural levels.

2The morphEffect of septal lesions on male song and aggression in the colonial zebra finch (Taeniopygia guttata) and the territorial field sparrow (Spizella pusilla)

The present investigation assessed the effect of lesions of the septum on male courtship and aggression in the territorial field sparrow (Spizella pusilla) and the colonial zebra finch (Taeniopygia guttata). In addition, pair-bonding and a variety of other social behaviors were examined in the zebra finch and dawn song (both the strictly agonistic song type and the multipurpose song type) was examined in the field sparrow. Zebra finches were tested in three phases both before and after receiving bilateral electrolytic lesions of the septum or sham surgery. These phases were: (1) competition tests in which a subject and a stimulus male were exposed to a female in an adjacent cage; (2) sexual behavior tests with a female; and (3) 10-day group cage tests in which subjects were in a mixed-sex environment. Aggressive behaviors (chases, threats, beak fences and pecks) were significantly reduced by septal lesions but not by sham surgery. Directed song (courtship) was significantly reduced in sexual behavior tests, with similar trends in other testing phases. Male field sparrows were tested 2 days pre-surgery and 2 days post-surgery in outdoor aviaries placed in their natural habitat. Tests consisted of dawn song observations and observations of courtship and aggression following introduction of a female to the subjects aviary, which was followed 10 min later by the introduction of another male (without removing the female). Septal lesions significantly facilitated both overt aggression (chases) and the number of simple (multi-purpose) songs. These results provide evidence that the septum participates in the regulation of male aggression and song in songbirds, and further suggest that variations in septal function may exist between territorial and colonial species.

Aging attitudes moderate the effect of subjective age on psychological well-being: evidence from a 10-year longitudinal study.

Older subjective age is often associated with lower psychological well-being among middle-aged and older adults. We hypothesize that attitudes toward aging moderate this relationship; specifically, feeling older will predict lower well-being among those with less favorable attitudes toward aging but not those with more favorable aging attitudes. We tested this with longitudinal data from the National Survey of Midlife Development in the United States-II assessing subjective age and psychological well-being over 10 years. As hypothesized older subjective age predicted lower life satisfaction and higher negative affect when aging attitudes were less favorable but not when aging attitudes were more favorable. Implications and future research directions are discussed.

Visual Perspective in Mental Imagery: A Representational Tool that Functions in Judgment, Emotion, and Self-Insight

Visual imagery plays a prominent role in mental simulations of past and future events: people tend to “see” events in their minds eye when they think about them. When picturing events people often use their own first-person perspective, looking out at the situation through their own eyes. However, other times people use a third-person perspective, so that they see themselves in the image from the visual perspective an observer would have. This chapter presents a theoretical model proposing that imagery perspective functions to determine whether people understand events bottom-up, in terms of the phenomenology evoked by concrete features of the pictured situation (first-person), or top-down, in terms of abstractions that integrate the pictured event with its broader context (third-person). This model integrates existing findings and generates novel predictions that challenge widespread assumptions about the function that imagery perspective serves. We review a program of research that supports these predictions, demonstrating the role of imagery perspective in defining the experiential and conceptual facets of the self, determining emotional responses to recalled and imagined life events, and shaping forecasts of future behavior and emotion. We conclude by discussing how the proposed model helps to distinguish the visual dimension of perspective from other dimensions on which perspective may vary. We consider how this model connects with other theories concerning the self and event representation, and we explore the implications for classic and contemporary areas of social psychological inquiry including attribution, social perspective-taking, culture, emotional coping, and top-down versus bottom-up processing.Abstract Visual imagery plays a prominent role in mental simulations of past and future events: people tend to “see” events in their minds eye when they think about them. When picturing events people often use their own first-person perspective, looking out at the situation through their own eyes. However, other times people use a third-person perspective, so that they see themselves in the image from the visual perspective an observer would have. This chapter presents a theoretical model proposing that imagery perspective functions to determine whether people understand events bottom-up, in terms of the phenomenology evoked by concrete features of the pictured situation (first-person), or top-down, in terms of abstractions that integrate the pictured event with its broader context (third-person). This model integrates existing findings and generates novel predictions that challenge widespread assumptions about the function that imagery perspective serves. We review a program of research that supports these predictions, demonstrating the role of imagery perspective in defining the experiential and conceptual facets of the self, determining emotional responses to recalled and imagined life events, and shaping forecasts of future behavior and emotion. We conclude by discussing how the proposed model helps to distinguish the visual dimension of perspective from other dimensions on which perspective may vary. We consider how this model connects with other theories concerning the self and event representation, and we explore the implications for classic and contemporary areas of social psychological inquiry including attribution, social perspective-taking, culture, emotional coping, and top-down versus bottom-up processing.

Idealizing Parenthood to Rationalize Parental Investments

Although raising children has largely negative effects on parents’ emotional well-being, parenthood is often idealized as a uniquely emotionally rewarding role. We tested the hypothesis that belief in myths idealizing parenthood helps parents cope with the dissonance aroused by the high financial cost of raising children. In Study 1, parents endorsed the idealization of parenthood more when only the costs of parenting were made salient than when both the costs of parenting and the long-term benefits of having children were made salient. When dissonant feelings were measured before idealization of parenthood, these feelings mediated the influence of the salient information on idealization of parenthood. In Study 2, participants reported greater enjoyment of the time they spent with their children and intended to spend more leisure time with their children when only parenting costs were made salient than when the long-term benefits of having children were also made salient (or when no costs or benefits of having children were made salient). We discuss the implications of our results for parental-investment theory and for the propagation of myths idealizing parenthood.

Chapter four - Visual Perspective in Mental Imagery: A Representational Tool that Functions in Judgment, Emotion, and Self-Insight

Visual imagery plays a prominent role in mental simulations of past and future events: people tend to “see” events in their minds eye when they think about them. When picturing events people often use their own first-person perspective, looking out at the situation through their own eyes. However, other times people use a third-person perspective, so that they see themselves in the image from the visual perspective an observer would have. This chapter presents a theoretical model proposing that imagery perspective functions to determine whether people understand events bottom-up, in terms of the phenomenology evoked by concrete features of the pictured situation (first-person), or top-down, in terms of abstractions that integrate the pictured event with its broader context (third-person). This model integrates existing findings and generates novel predictions that challenge widespread assumptions about the function that imagery perspective serves. We review a program of research that supports these predictions, demonstrating the role of imagery perspective in defining the experiential and conceptual facets of the self, determining emotional responses to recalled and imagined life events, and shaping forecasts of future behavior and emotion. We conclude by discussing how the proposed model helps to distinguish the visual dimension of perspective from other dimensions on which perspective may vary. We consider how this model connects with other theories concerning the self and event representation, and we explore the implications for classic and contemporary areas of social psychological inquiry including attribution, social perspective-taking, culture, emotional coping, and top-down versus bottom-up processing.Abstract Visual imagery plays a prominent role in mental simulations of past and future events: people tend to “see” events in their minds eye when they think about them. When picturing events people often use their own first-person perspective, looking out at the situation through their own eyes. However, other times people use a third-person perspective, so that they see themselves in the image from the visual perspective an observer would have. This chapter presents a theoretical model proposing that imagery perspective functions to determine whether people understand events bottom-up, in terms of the phenomenology evoked by concrete features of the pictured situation (first-person), or top-down, in terms of abstractions that integrate the pictured event with its broader context (third-person). This model integrates existing findings and generates novel predictions that challenge widespread assumptions about the function that imagery perspective serves. We review a program of research that supports these predictions, demonstrating the role of imagery perspective in defining the experiential and conceptual facets of the self, determining emotional responses to recalled and imagined life events, and shaping forecasts of future behavior and emotion. We conclude by discussing how the proposed model helps to distinguish the visual dimension of perspective from other dimensions on which perspective may vary. We consider how this model connects with other theories concerning the self and event representation, and we explore the implications for classic and contemporary areas of social psychological inquiry including attribution, social perspective-taking, culture, emotional coping, and top-down versus bottom-up processing.

Seeing Failure in Your Life: Imagery Perspective Determines Whether Self-Esteem Shapes Reactions to Recalled and Imagined Failure

The present research reveals that when it comes to recalling and imagining failure in ones life, changing how one looks at the event can change its impact on well-being; however, the nature of the effect depends on an aspect of ones self-concept, namely, self-esteem. Five studies measured or manipulated the visual perspective (internal first-person vs. external third-person) individuals used to mentally image recalled or imagined personal failures. It has been proposed that imagery perspective determines whether peoples reactions to an event are shaped bottom-up by concrete features of the event (first-person) or top-down by their self-concept (third-person; L. K. Libby & R. P. Eibach, 2011b). Evidence suggests that differences in the self-concepts of individuals with low and high self-esteem (LSEs and HSEs) are responsible for self-esteem differences in reaction to failure, leading LSEs to have more negative thoughts and feelings about themselves (e.g., M. H. Kernis, J. Brockner, & B. S. Frankel, 1989). Thus, the authors predicted, and found, that low self-esteem was associated with greater overgeneralization--operationalized as negativity in accessible self-knowledge and feelings of shame--only when participants had pictured failure from the third-person perspective and not from the first-person. Further, picturing failure from the third-person, rather than first-person, perspective, increased shame and the negativity of accessible knowledge among LSEs, whereas it decreased shame among HSEs. Results help to distinguish between different theoretical accounts of how imagery perspective functions and have implications for the study of top-down and bottom-up influences on self-judgment and emotion, as well as for the role of perspective and abstraction in coping.