Richard Rosenfeld

DOES IMMIGRATION INCREASE HOMICIDE? Negative Evidence From Three Border Cities

Understanding the complex relationship between immigration and crime was once a core concern of American sociology. Yet the extensive post-1965 wave of immigration to the United States has done little to rekindle scholarly interest in this topic, even as politicians and other public figures advocate public policies to restrict immigration as a means of preventing crime. Although both popular accounts and sociological theory predict that immigration should increase crime in areas where immigrants settle, this study of Miami, El Paso, and San Diego neighborhoods shows that, controlling for other influences, immigration generally does not increase levels of homicide among Latinos and African Americans. Our results not only challenge stereotypes of the “criminal immigrant” but also the core criminological notion that immigration, as a social process, disorganizes communities and increases crime.

The prediction of violence and homicide in young men.

In this prospective study, the authors predicted violence and homicide in 3 representative school samples (N = 1,517). Participants were part of a longitudinal, multiple cohort study on the development of delinquency in boys from late childhood to early adulthood in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Thirty-three participants were convicted of homicide, 193 participants were convicted of serious violence, whereas another 498 participants self-reported serious violence. Predictors of violence included risk factors in the domains of child, family, school, and demographic characteristics. Boys with 4 or more violence risk factors were 6 times more likely to later commit violence in comparison with boys with fewer than 4 risk factors (odds ratio [OR] = 6.05). A subset of risk factors related to violence also predicted homicide among violent offenders. Boys with 4 or more risk factors for homicide were 14 times more likely to later commit homicide than violent individuals with fewer than 4 risk factors (OR = 14.48). Implications for the prevention of violence and homicide are discussed.

Dimensions of Social Capital and Rates of Criminal Homicide

Robert Putnam comprehensively analyzes the multidimensional nature of social capital and makes a persuasive argument for its relevance to various community social problems, including violent crime. However, systematic empirical evaluations of the links between the multiple dimensions of social capital and violence are limited by the lack of adequate measures. Using data from the Social Capital Benchmark Survey, the authors model the relationships between several dimensions of social capital and homicide rates for 40 U.S. geographic areas. Their findings show that many forms of social capital highlighted in the literature as having beneficial consequences for communities are not related to homicide rates. Two dimensions of social capital, social trust and social activism, do exhibit significant associations with homicide rates, net of other influences. However, in the latter case, the relationship is positive, and in both cases, simultaneous equation models suggest that these dimensions of social capital are consequences as well as causes of homicide. The results underscore the importance of examining the different dimensions of social capital and assessing their reciprocal relationships with homicide and other social outcomes.

The Influence of Crack Cocaine on Robbery, Burglary, and Homicide Rates: A Cross-City, Longitudinal Analysis

After tracking one another closely for decades, the U.S. robbery rate increased and the burglary rate declined in the late 1980s. The authors investigate the impact of crack on this divergence using a two-stage hierarchical linear model that decomposes between-and within-city variation in crime rates for 142 cities. Given its prominence in discussions of crack and criminal violence, homicide offending is also examined. Net of other influences, cities with higher levels of crack use experienced larger increases in robbery and decreases in burglary. Cities with greater levels of crack had higher homicide rates but did not show more rapid increases in these rates than other cities. The results suggest that the emergence and proliferation of crack shifted the balance of urban offending opportunities and rewards from burglary to robbery.

Explaining spatial variation in support for capital punishment: A multilevel analysis

This research examines the effects of social context on support for the death penalty using individual‐level data from the 1974–98 General Social Survey (GSS), which have been linked with aggregate‐level data on homicide rates and sociodemographic, political, and economic characteristics. Consistent with instrumental, social threat, and constructionist perspectives, this study finds that residents of areas with higher homicide rates, a larger proportion of blacks, and a more conservative political climate are significantly more likely to support the death penalty, net of compositional differences. These results warrant further attention to contextual and individual sources of public support for the death penalty.

Social disorganization, drug market activity, and neighborhood violent crime

Although illicit drug activity occurs within local communities, past quantitative research on drug markets and violent crime in the United States has been conducted mainly at the city level. The authors use neighborhood-level data from the city of Miami to test hypotheses regarding the effect of drug activity and traditional indicators of social disorganization on rates of aggravated assault and robbery. The results show that drug activity has robust effects on violent crime that are independent of other disorganization indicators. The authors also find that drug activity is concentrated in neighborhoods with low rates of immigration, less linguistic isolation and ethnic heterogeneity, and where nondrug accidental deaths are prevalent. The authors find no independent effect of neighborhood racial composition on drug activity or violent crime. The results suggest that future neighborhood-level research on social disorganization and violent crime should devote explicit attention to the disorganizing and violence-producing effects of illicit drug activity.

Discrepancy between Perceived First-Person and Perceived Third-Person Mass Media Effects.

Surveys conducted in two midwestern cities investigated the hypothesis that says people will perceive effects of mass media as being greater on others than on themselves. Findings demonstrate this, with almost 90% of respondents judging they were less influenced than were others. Respondents with more education saw others as being even more influenced, but not themselves so much. Older respondents were most likely to feel mass media influenced them less than others, perhaps because older people feel they have other sources of information.

Changing Relationships between Men and Women A Note on the Decline in Intimate Partner Homicide

Using a rich data set for St. Louis, this article documents a substantial decline in intimate partner homicide over the past 25 years, compares intimate partner events with other types of homicide, and explores the relationship between changes over time in the level and type of intimate partner homicide and the living arrangements of men and women. The author finds that much of the decrease in partner homicide is a function of the declining rate of marriage and that, in certain key respects, homicides involving unmarried couples more closely resemble acquaintance homicides than spousal homicides. Finally, the author proposes that some of the broad social changes involving marriage and family that have contributed to the decline in intimate partner homicide may be deeply implicated in the dramatic rise in youth violence over the past 10 years.

The crime drop in comparative perspective: the impact of the economy and imprisonment on American and European burglary rates

Influential statements on recent American crime reductions maintain that the crime drop was confined to the USA. Yet other research has revealed comparable crime decreases in Europe. We suggest that the USA and European crime declines occurred in tandem because they were both brought about by upturns in the economy. In light of US research showing crime reductions resulting from growth in imprisonment, we also examine the possibility that rising imprisonment rates reduced European crime rates. We test these hypotheses in a pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis of burglary rates in the USA and nine European nations between 1993 and 2006. The results indicate that burglary declines in the US and Europe were associated with rising consumer confidence. By contrast, imprisonment appears to be significantly related to burglary rates only after unusual policy interventions, such as Italys 2006 clemency measure that dramatically reduced the size of its prison population. We interpret these findings as reflecting the structural similarity and economic integration of the worlds developed nations and the uneven convergence in US and European punishment policies.

The Impact of Police Stops on Precinct Robbery and Burglary Rates in New York City, 2003-2010

New York City experienced a dramatic reduction in crime during the 1990s and continuing through the first decade of the current century. Researchers and commentators have debated the role of policing in New York’s crime drop, including the crime impact of New York’s policy of “stop, question, and frisk” (SQF)—yet, prior research on the crime-reduction effects of SQF is limited in important respects. We seek to overcome many of these limitations in a study of SQF effects on yearly precinct-level robbery and burglary rates in New York between 2003 and 2010. Contrary to prior research, the study reveals few effects of SQF on robbery and burglary. We caution against drawing definitive conclusions from both the current and prior research and recommend that future research address both the impact of SQF on crime and possible collateral effects on the rights and liberties of citizens in the communities most affected by the policy.