Richard S. John

Identifying and Structuring the Objectives of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Its Followers

This study addresses three questions: What are the objectives of the leaders of ISIL? What are the objectives of the followers of ISIL? How are the two sets of objectives related? To answer these questions, we analyzed the transcripts of interviews and presentations of 59 subject matter experts (SMEs) and conducted a separate analysis of speeches of ISIL leaders and selected Internet sources. In both efforts we identified and structured the strategic, fundamental, and means objectives of ISIL and its followers. The results indicate that ISIL’s leaders pursue four strategic objectives: (1) Establish a Caliphate in Iraq and the Levant, (2) Control and Govern the Caliphate, (3) Expand Islam and Sharia Law Worldwide, and (4) Recreate the Power and Glory of (Sunni) Islam. The followers’ objectives can be partitioned into three strategic objectives: Humanitarian Fulfillment, Religious Fulfillment, and Personal Fulfillment. The objectives identified from the SME interviews were similar to those identified from ISIL leaders’ statements and the Internet. However, the Internet search revealed many more personal objectives of ISIL followers. The results further indicate that ISIL’s leadership objectives are closely aligned with those of its followers. There also is a sharp contrast between the objectives of ISIL and those of Al Qaeda, particularly ISIL’s emphasis on occupying and controlling territories in Iraq and Syria versus Al Qaeda’s focus on worldwide jihad.

Perceptions of Randomized Security Schedules

Security of infrastructure is a major concern. Traditional security schedules are unable to provide omnipresent coverage; consequently, adversaries can exploit predictable vulnerabilities to their advantage. Randomized security schedules, which randomly deploy security measures, overcome these limitations, but public perceptions of such schedules have not been examined. In this experiment, participants were asked to make a choice between attending a venue that employed a traditional (i.e., search everyone) or a random (i.e., a probability of being searched) security schedule. The absolute probability of detecting contraband was manipulated (i.e., 1/10, 1/4, 1/2) but equivalent between the two schedule types. In general, participants were indifferent to either security schedule, regardless of the probability of detection. The randomized schedule was deemed more convenient, but the traditional schedule was considered fairer and safer. There were no differences between traditional and random schedule in terms of perceived effectiveness or deterrence. Policy implications for the implementation and utilization of randomized schedules are discussed.

Jurors’ Presumption of Innocence

The presumption of innocence explicitly forbids jurors from using official suspicion or indictment as evidence of guilt in a criminal trial. A behavioral experiment tested whether jurors follow this prescription. It revealed that, compared to when a suspect had been merely named, jurors thought that the individual was significantly more likely to be guilty after a detective referred the case to the district attorney and when he was formally charged and thus a criminal defendant. A judicial instruction to presume innocence reduced jurors’ beliefs in the defendant’s guilt. Regression analyses indicate that jurors’ prior beliefs predicted their posterior beliefs and further that their prior beliefs were predictive of verdicts even after accounting for their posterior beliefs. The findings suggest that jurors make different assumptions about the guilt of a criminal defendant before the introduction of evidence and that these assumptions influence their overall evaluation of the case and their verdict.

Attacker Deterrence and Perceived Risk in a Stackelberg Security Game

In Stackelberg security games, a defender must allocate scarce resources to defend against a potential attacker. The optimal defense involves the randomization of scarce security resources, yet how attackers perceive the risk given randomized defense is not well understood. We conducted an experiment where attackers chose whether to attack or not attack targets protected by randomized defense schemes, the key treatment variable being whether the defender picks one target at random to guard or imperfectly guards all targets. The two schemes are expected-payoff equivalent, and when provided separately we found no effect of having one scheme or the other. Yet, when both are present, we found that subjects had a preference for the fixed scheme, a preference that cannot be reduced to differences in beliefs. Overall, our results suggest that understanding how individuals perceive risk is vital to understand the behavior of attackers.