Richard Sicotte

Passenger Shipping Cartels and Their Effect on Trans-Atlantic Migration

We investigate the impact of passenger shipping cartels on trans-Atlantic migration during the early twentieth century. We assemble from primary sources a detailed database of passenger flows and cartel operations and show that cartel operation reduced migratory flows by approximately 20 to 25. Further, we show that there was no strong intertemporal substitution in migration to North America (at least in the short run) and, therefore, that the effects of cartel operation were not undone by later migration. Lastly, we find that cartel operation had no appreciable effect on the variability of migration flows, providing evidence against the notion that unfettered competition was destabilizing to turn-of-the-century transportation markets.

Economic Crisis and Political Response: The Political Economy of the Shipping Act of 1916

Governments often respond to crisis situations with radical economic policies. The Shipping Act of 1916 created a government-owned shipping company. This significant departure from prior policy arose in the atmosphere of crisis surrounding the war in Europe. The Wilson Administration was able to use political institutions to its advantage and ensure that alternative, more moderate proposals would not be considered by the legislature. Initially thwarted by a filibuster, the administration was forced to compromise in order to maintain party loyalty and pass the bill in 1916.

STRATEGIC BIDDING AND CONTRACT RENEGOTIATION

When firms bid in procurement auctions, they take into account the likelihood of future contract renegotiations. If they anticipate that certain input quantities will change ex post, they have an incentive to strategically skew their itemized bids, thereby increasing profits for themselves and costs for the procuring agency. We develop and estimate a structural model of strategic bidding using a data set of road construction projects in Vermont. We find that bidding strategies lead to increased markups for renegotiated items and reduced markups for nonrenegotiated items, results consistent with bid�?skewing.

Cartel Organization, Price Discrimination and the Trans-Atlantic Passage, 1899-1911

This paper studies the operation of trans-Atlantic passenger shipping cartels during the period 1899-1911 and its effects on passenger traffic. We systematically document and categorize cartel agreements on the basis of key aspects of internal organization. Then, we exploit the variation in internal organization across markets and over time to investigate whether any specific organizational aspects were more effective in reducing flows from competitive levels. We find some evidence that the assessment of fines for violations of the agreement enhanced collusion, but no evidence that the posting of bonds (to guarantee the fines) or the formation of pooling arrangements had any incremental effect. We also take advantage of the richness of the data on passenger flows to show that collusion had a smaller effect on first and second-class passenger flows relative to third class service. Finally, we provide estimates of consumer substitution across passenger classes due to collusion and show that such substitution was small but non-negligible, especially during periods of normal cartel operation. Our study has broader implications for the theory of collusion, and on how collusion affects the quality, rather than the quantity, of products purchased by consumers.

War and Foreign Debt Settlement in Early Republican Spanish America

Upon gaining independence, most Spanish American countries had accumulated a substantial external debt, and by 1829 each defaulted. It took decades for these countries to settle their debts and even longer for them to access new loans. We argue that a major factor influencing the pattern of debt service was the incidence of war. War created incentives for governments to channel scarce resources to «emergency» spending and domestic debt service, rather than to the repayment of the foreign debt. Interestingly, we detect an asymmetry between countries long in good standing with creditors and those that had only recently settled. Countries that had established a longer record of continuous debt service were far less likely to default in times of war. We also find that international wars were responsible for the largest effects.