Rico Vitz

Sympathy and Benevolence in Hume's Moral Psychology

L. A. SELBY-BIGGE SUGGESTS that there is a significant difference between the moral psychology of Hume’s Treatise and that of his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. In particular, he claims that the psychology of sympathy, which plays such a central role in the second and third books of the Treatise, “is almost entirely ignored in the Enquiry.”1 He then notes, “How it is possible to find room for sympathy in so atomistic or individualistic a psychology as Hume’s, is one of the most interesting questions which are raised by his system.”2 Part of the difficulty in interpreting Hume’s work is due, according to Selby-Bigge, to his use of “words and formulae,” which is frequently “slovenly and indifferent.”3 Hume’s readers might find such a description to be particularly apt for his use of the term ‘sympathy.’ In the Treatise, for example, he identifies sympathy as a principle by which most, if not all, of one’s passions and sentiments are animated (T 363, cf. T 593).4 Elsewhere, he describes this principle as a cognitive mechanism by which people “enter into” the sentiments of others (see, e.g., T 362, 385–86). In the Enquiry, however, he seems to write as if it is merely a sentiment and uses the term ‘sympathy’ as a synonym for the terms ‘benevolence’ and ‘humanity.’ For instance, he says of a virtuous person, “The ideas of happiness, joy, triumph, prosperity, are connected with every circumstance of his character, and diffuse over our minds a pleasing sentiment of sympathy and humanity” (E 234; cf. E 276), and in the second appendix to the second Enquiry, he writes about the “sentiment . . . of general benevolence, or humanity, or sympathy” (E 298).5 Hume’s equivocal use

Natural Beatitude and Religious Reform

In this chapter, I illuminate a pragmatic and social aspect of Descartes’s account of virtuous belief formation, namely, its significance for traditional religion. My explanation proceeds in two stages. First, I review some of the standard objections against Descartes’s philosophical program. I then suggest that even if these objections show that his project fails to establish a new and lasting foundation in the sciences, it would be premature to conclude that it fails to have any enduring social significance. Second, I argue that although Descartes’s account of virtuous belief formation is ultimately unsuccessful with respect to his aim to reform science, it is significant with respect to his aim to reform both traditional Christianity, in particular, and traditional religion, in general.

The Subversion of Traditional Christianity

In this chapter, I elucidate in greater detail the enduring social significance of Descartes’s philosophical program, which I described in Chapter 7. I argue that even if Descartes’s was not an atheist, as some have suggested, his conception of morality is subversive of traditional Christian ethics, both in theory and in practice. Hence, the account of virtuous belief formation that he builds on this conception of morality intends not merely to reform but to subvert traditional Christianity. Thus, rather than providing a way to reconcile traditional religious belief with the new philosophy, Descartes’s account of virtuous belief formation helps to pave the way for subsequent philosophers to attempt to naturalize not only traditional Christianity but religion, in general.

Virtuous Belief Formation

In this chapter, I elucidate each of the three aspects of Descartes’s account of virtuous belief formation that I introduced in Chap. 3. First, I explain his account of virtuous enquiry, clarifying its proper structure, goal, and scope. Second, I explain his account of virtuous judgment, clarifying the norms (1) for accepting propositions concerning ordinary matters, (2) for judging propositions concerning theological propositions, and (3) for judging propositions concerning scientific propositions. Third, I explain his account of virtuous belief fixation, in light of both his conception of virtue and his understanding of the need for a program by which people fix their beliefs.

Morality as a Cosmopolitan Art

In this chapter, I elucidate Descartes’s account of virtue, in two parts. First, I argue that Descartes conceives of morality as an eclectic cosmopolitan art of natural beatitude, and I explain why his account of morality is not a science and is only problematically regarded as Stoic. Second, I show how Descartes intends this art to be applied, explaining how he tries to advance beyond the theories of the ancient moralists by developing both an adequate account of virtue and an accurate account of the techniques, or “remedies,” that one can employ to acquire virtue. In so doing, I show how Descartes’s attempts to provide his readers with the principal truths necessary to facilitate their development from having merely the passion of generosity to possessing the virtue of wisdom, in its highest degree, and, consequently, to enjoying natural beatitude.

The Cartesian Framework

In this chapter, I begin to explain Descartes’s account of virtuous belief formation by doing two things. First, I clarify his conception of the nature of belief. Second, I elucidate the significance of this clarification for understanding, what I call, “the Cartesian framework for virtuous belief formation.” In particular, I explain (1) that the framework is comprehensive insofar as it consists of a method of belief formation that includes not only a method of enquiry and a method of judgment but also a method of belief fixation, (2) that it is modest insofar as it is intended to be understood in light of its proper context and limits, and (3) that it consists of a normative method with a distinctive focus on virtues by which people should be able not only to unmask the beauty of the sciences but also to raise their natures to a higher degree of perfection.

Cartesian Meditation and the Pursuit of Virtue

In this chapter, I analyze a contemporary debate concerning a central aspect of Descartes’s Meditations. The debate concerns the proper way to respond to the question “Who is the Cartesian meditator?” The answers offered by Descartes’s commentators have included (1) a philosophically naive person of common sense, (2) a skeptic, (3) a Scholastic, and (4) an amalgam of such personas. I argue that each of these answers is misguided and that the proper response is not to attempt to answer the question. Rather, I contend, the proper response is to reject the question both because it falsely implies that the meditator is a fictional character and because reading the Meditations as a work of fiction obscures Descartes’s concern with the pursuit of virtue, in general, and with the virtues of belief formation, in particular.

Virtue, Volition, and Judgment

In this chapter, I address what might seem like a formidable challenge to Descartes’s account of virtuous judgment. The challenge goes as follows: Descartes’s account of virtuous judgment requires a commitment to doxastic voluntarism, but doxastic voluntarism is false; therefore, Descartes’s account of virtuous judgment is false. My response to this challenge is twofold. First, I clarify the kind of doxastic voluntarism to which Descartes’s is committed. Specifically, I argue both (1) that there is strong textual evidence that Descartes’s endorses a version of negative direct doxastic voluntarism and (2) that there is insufficient textual evidence that he endorses a version of positive direct doxastic voluntarism. Second, I argue that neither of the most common types of arguments against doxastic voluntarism succeeds Descartes’s position. Hence, I conclude, Descartes’s account of virtuous judgment does not fall prey to the challenge that it requires a commitment to a false version of doxastic voluntarism.