Rients Galema

Do Powerful CEOs Determine Microfinance Performance

Recently, microfinance has been coming under public and media attacks. The microcredit crisis following from microfinance-induced suicides in 2010 in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh indicates that weak corporate governance and imprudent risk taking have far-reaching consequences. Yet, analyses of corporate governance mechanisms among microfinance institutions (MFIs) remain underdeveloped. As a response, this study examines the impact of CEO power on MFI risk taking by deriving explicit predictions of this effect from a characterization of the microfinance industry. Based on a sample of 280 microfinance institutions, our results suggest that powerful CEOs of microfinance non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have more decision-making freedom than powerful CEOs of other types of MFIs. This induces them to make more extreme decisions that increase risk. Furthermore, the decision-making freedom powerful CEOs have in NGOs appears to lead to worse decisions, because the presence of powerful CEOs in microfinance NGOs is associated with lower performance.

Do Powerful CEOs Have an Impact on Microfinance Performance

In this study we show that Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) with more powerful CEOs have higher performance variability. A powerful CEO is defined as one that also chairs the board of directors. CEO power is reflected in higher performance variability if CEOs have more latitude of action, i.e. managerial discretion. Managerial discretion can be limited by having stakeholder electives on the board. We find that CEO power only has an effect on MFI performance variability when there are no stakeholder electives on the board. Furthermore, we argue that CEOs in non-profit MFIs have more discretion, because their dual mission implies their CEOs are harder to control. We find that CEO power increases performance variability of non-profit MFI’s, while it has no effect for other MFI types.

When central banks buy corporate bonds: : Target selection and impact of the European Corporate Sector Purchase Program

In March 2016 the European Central Bank (ECB) announced the Corporate Sector Purchase Program (CSPP) as part of its expanded asset purchase program. Using hand-collected, weekly lists of bonds purchased and held under the CSPP, we investigate the drivers of the purchase decisions and the impact of the program on the financing decisions of targeted firms. We find that, consistent with the goal of decreasing credit premia while minimizing price distortions, purchases of eligible bonds characterized by both higher credit risk and higher liquidity are more likely and more timely. Bonds issued by firms more likely to face difficulties in tapping the credit market directly are also more likely to be purchased. The CSPP appears effective in alleviating these difficulties. Firms targeted by the program increase their amount of bonds outstanding significantly more than non-targeted eligible issuers; the effect is mostly driven by companies making limited use of market debt before the start of the program. However, no difference is found in the variation of total debt between targeted and non-targeted eligible issuers. Together, these results suggest that the CSPP has favored the substitution of bonds for other forms of debt capital.

European Bank Efficiency and Performance: The Effects of Supranational Versus National Bank Supervision

This chapter explores European bank efficiency and performance. First, the authors provide an overview of the key estimation methods for efficiency and discuss selected applications to the European banking sector. Second, they apply stochastic frontier analysis to investigate the extent to which the reallocation of supervisory powers is associated with efficiency differences between European banks. In doing so, the discussion focuses particularly on whether direct supervision by the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) as opposed to national competent authority (NCA) is related to cost and profit efficiency.