Rik de Ruiter

Variations on a Theme. Governing the Knowledge‐Based Society in the EU through Methods of Open Coordination in Education and R&D

Abstract This article focuses on one of the more elaborate new modes of governance in function in the EU context — the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) — and examines its varying degree of institutionalization on policy fields. Three explanations for differences in institutionalization of OMCs are tested through a comparative study of two OMCs adopted in policy fields related with the knowledge‐based society theme. The empirical findings indicate that the institutionalization of an OMC can be best explained by a particular constellation of member‐state preferences, in combination with a catalytic role of the European Commission.This article focuses on one of the more elaborate new modes of governance in function in the EU context — the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) — and examines its varying degree of institutionalization on policy fields. Three explanations for differences in institutionalization of OMCs are tested through a comparative study of two OMCs adopted in policy fields related with the knowledge-based society theme. The empirical findings indicate that the institutionalization of an OMC can be best explained by a particular constellation of member-state preferences, in combination with a catalytic role of the European Commission.

Under the radar? National parliaments and the ordinary legislative procedure in the European Union

This study aims to bring together insights from scholars working on the ordinary legislative procedure with research on national parliaments and European Union (EU) affairs. It is assumed that members of national parliaments – when choosing directives in negotiation at the EU level in need of scrutiny – are confronted with variation in information processing costs, as well as in benefits in terms of policy influence and votes. Hypotheses are formulated on how the cost–benefit calculus can influence the scrutiny of directives agreed upon through the ordinary legislative procedure. An analysis of parliamentary activity in the Dutch and British lower houses on 293 directives indicates that directives which are longer in negotiation at the EU level, on which explanatory memoranda are published, receive media attention and are concluded without informal trilogues in second/third reading, are more scrutinized.This study aims to bring together insights from scholars working on the ordinary legislative procedure with research on national parliaments and European Union (EU) affairs. It is assumed that members of national parliaments – when choosing directives in negotiation at the EU level in need of scrutiny – are confronted with variation in information processing costs, as well as in benefits in terms of policy influence and votes. Hypotheses are formulated on how the cost–benefit calculus can influence the scrutiny of directives agreed upon through the ordinary legislative procedure. An analysis of parliamentary activity in the Dutch and British lower houses on 293 directives indicates that directives which are longer in negotiation at the EU level, on which explanatory memoranda are published, receive media attention and are concluded without informal trilogues in second/third reading, are more scrutinized.

Out of REACH? Parliamentary Control of EU Affairs in the Netherlands and the UK

The role of national parliaments in European integration is a topical issue in current political and academic debates. This article aims to contribute to these debates by formulating three hypotheses on the differences in parliamentary scrutiny between member states. It is hypothesised that due to differences in the structure of political systems, the British and Dutch Upper and Lower House hold their respective governments to account in different ways. The hypotheses will be discussed in light of empirical findings on the EU regulation on the registration, evaluation, authorisation, and restriction of chemical substances (REACH). The empirical evidence provides a mixed picture with regard to these claims.

EU soft law and the functioning of representative democracy: the use of methods of open co-ordination by Dutch and British parliamentarians

The Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) promises to involve a broad range of actors, including members of national parliaments. Several scholars showed that the OMC breaks this promise by affecting the national policy-making process outside of the control of national parliaments. However, this finding can be called into question; scholars drew heavily on anecdotal evidence and did not take sufficiently into account differences between OMCs and member states. This article empirically investigates the use of three OMCs by parliamentarians in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands to assess the performance of national policies related to the knowledge-based society theme. It will be shown that the use of information from OMCs by parliamentarians is dependent on the information provided by the government on the policies OMCs touch upon and the presence of simple benchmarks in an OMC. Moreover, parliamentarians in a consensus democracy use the OMC more frequently.The Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) promises to involve a broad range of actors, including members of national parliaments. Several scholars showed that the OMC breaks this promise by affecting the national policy-making process outside of the control of national parliaments. However, this finding can be called into question; scholars drew heavily on anecdotal evidence and did not take sufficiently into account differences between OMCs and member states. This article empirically investigates the use of three OMCs by parliamentarians in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands to assess the performance of national policies related to the knowledge-based society theme. It will be shown that the use of information from OMCs by parliamentarians is dependent on the information provided by the government on the policies OMCs touch upon and the presence of simple benchmarks in an OMC. Moreover, parliamentarians in a consensus democracy use the OMC more frequently.

Developing Multilateral Surveillance Tools in the EU

The development of the infrastructure of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is an unaddressed topic in scholarly debates. On the basis of secondary literature on the European Employment Strategy, it is hypothesised that a conflict between an incentive and reluctance to act on the EU level on the side of member states limits the choice for a policy instrument to the OMC, and is a driving force behind the development of its infrastructure. From empirical findings on the OMC e-Europe it shows that for the development of the infrastructure of an OMC on a policy field, a need for an instrument has to be present that can neutralise the conflict between an incentive and reluctance to act on the EU level.The development of the infrastructure of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is an unaddressed topic in scholarly debates. On the basis of secondary literature on the European Employment Strategy, it is hypothesised that a conflict between an incentive and reluctance to act on the EU level on the side of member states limits the choice for a policy instrument to the OMC, and is a driving force behind the development of its infrastructure. From empirical findings on the OMC e-Europe it shows that for the development of the infrastructure of an OMC on a policy field, a need for an instrument has to be present that can neutralise the conflict between an incentive and reluctance to act on the EU level.

Why Is Fast Track the Way to Go? Justifications for Early Agreement in the Co‐Decision Procedure and Their Effects

Since the introduction of the co-decision procedure by way of the Maastricht Treaty, the procedure has been transformed considerably. One of the most striking innovations is the possibility to adopt a legislative act in first reading. This article aims to answer the questions whether the increasing use of this fast track procedure is in line with Treaty provisions and/or intra/inter-institutional rules, and what the effects are of these stipulations. The empirical findings presented in this study indicate that two reasons for taking the fast track gain dominance in the practical political process, ie the political priorities of the Council and European Parliament (EP) and whether these actors consider a legislative file as urgent. From a study of two directives, it becomes clear that this dominance of factors has consequences for the type of early agreement reached (first or early second), the quality of the adopted legislation and its implementation at the national level.

Public Parliamentary Activities and Open Methods of Coordination

This study investigates how members of parliament (MPs) of opposition parties in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands go public with information on the performance of national policies from six open methods of coordination (OMCs), and to what extent country differences in the set-up of parliamentary systems matter in this context. The empirical findings indicate that Dutch MPs use more information from OMC reports to shame the incumbent government than do British MPs. In both parliaments these shaming activities take place primarily in committee meetings and have no link with newspaper coverage on OMCs. Activities of MPs aimed at going public with information from OMC reports established only a weak link between OMCs and the citizens in European Union member states.This study investigates how members of parliament (MPs) of opposition parties in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands go public with information on the performance of national policies from six open methods of coordination (OMCs), and to what extent country differences in the set-up of parliamentary systems matter in this context. The empirical findings indicate that Dutch MPs use more information from OMC reports to shame the incumbent government than do British MPs. In both parliaments these shaming activities take place primarily in committee meetings and have no link with newspaper coverage on OMCs. Activities of MPs aimed at going public with information from OMC reports established only a weak link between OMCs and the citizens in European Union member states.

Full disclosure? The Open Method of Coordination, parliamentary debates and media coverage

This article answers the question of which EU-level characteristics of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) are most likely to result in pressure on national governments to reconsider their policies as a result of OMC-related parliamentary activities and media coverage. On the basis of interviews with European Commission officials and an analysis of parliamentary debates in committee meetings and newspaper coverage on six OMCs in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in the period 1996–2009, three characteristics are selected and their empirical relevance assessed. The findings indicate that, when an OMC is adopted in a policy field without any other type of EU-level activity already present, or does not include indicators/benchmarks or peer learning activities, the OMC will not increase the pressure on a national government.This article answers the question of which EU-level characteristics of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) are most likely to result in pressure on national governments to reconsider their policies as a result of OMC-related parliamentary activities and media coverage. On the basis of interviews with European Commission officials and an analysis of parliamentary debates in committee meetings and newspaper coverage on six OMCs in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in the period 1996–2009, three characteristics are selected and their empirical relevance assessed. The findings indicate that, when an OMC is adopted in a policy field without any other type of EU-level activity already present, or does not include indicators/benchmarks or peer learning activities, the OMC will not increase the pressure on a national government.

Houses of Abstention or Houses of Reflection? Upper Houses in EU Member States and the Ex ante Scrutiny of EU Legislation

Abstract Scholars interested in the role of national parliaments in the EU legislative process hardly paid attention to the differences in scrutiny between Upper Houses of EU member states. It is hypothesized in this article that structural differences between bicameral systems can explain differences between Upper Houses in scrutiny of EU legislative proposals. The hypotheses are assessed with a qualitative content analysis of parliamentary debates in the Dutch and British Upper Houses on the scrutiny of EU directives agreed upon through the ordinary legislative procedure in the period 2000–2010. The empirical findings indicate that differences in the set-up of bicameral systems can only in part explain the variation in ex ante scrutiny. Moreover, in both the British and Dutch bicameral systems, MPs of the Upper and Lower Houses most of the time do not contradict each other on substantive grounds when the same EU legislative acts are scrutinized. The results also show that the scrutiny by Upper Houses improves the output legitimacy of the EU legislative process.AbstractScholars interested in the role of national parliaments in the EU legislative process hardly paid attention to the differences in scrutiny between Upper Houses of EU member states. It is hypothesized in this article that structural differences between bicameral systems can explain differences between Upper Houses in scrutiny of EU legislative proposals. The hypotheses are assessed with a qualitative content analysis of parliamentary debates in the Dutch and British Upper Houses on the scrutiny of EU directives agreed upon through the ordinary legislative procedure in the period 2000–2010. The empirical findings indicate that differences in the set-up of bicameral systems can only in part explain the variation in ex ante scrutiny. Moreover, in both the British and Dutch bicameral systems, MPs of the Upper and Lower Houses most of the time do not contradict each other on substantive grounds when the same EU legislative acts are scrutinized. The results also show that the scrutiny by Upper Houses imp...

Is parliamentary attention to the EU strongest when it is needed the most? National parliaments and the selective debate of EU policies:

When do parliaments debate European Union policies? Normative arguments suggest that debates enhance government accountability. Others warn of government bias, declining debate near elections, and parties avoiding Eurosceptic publics. Our conclusions are more differentiated. We argue that rank-and-file parliamentarians rather than leaders initiate debates. Political incentives guide their debate selection towards salient policies in the countries in which voters care most. However, where the motivation Eurosceptic publics provide and institutions facilitating rank-and-file agenda-setting are lacking, EU law-making and European Council priorities will raise little parliamentary attention. Analysis of original data, using a Bayesian and multilevel framework, lends credibility to our views. Claims of a government bias, election effects, or trends towards more debate are unlikely to hold in all countries.