Risto Saarinen

Weakness of will in Renaissance and reformation thought

Introduction 1. Ancient and Medieval Background 2. The Renaissance 3. The Lutheran Reformation 4. The Calvinist Reformation 5. Conclusions and Epilogue Sources and Literature Index

The Surplus of Evil in Welfare Society: Contemporary Scandinavian Crime Fiction

The best-selling Scandinavian crime fiction of the last ten years extensively deals with the problem of remaining evil in a peaceful and just welfare society. It develops a view of “secular theodicy” which aims at explaining the presence of radical evil in a secular late modern society. In this explanation it employs the Lutheran imagery of “hidden God” (Deus absconditus). The paper reviews recent novels by Henning Mankell, Anne Holt, Sven Westerberg, Helena von Zweigbergk and Anna Jansson.

Weakness of Will: The Plurality of Medieval Explanations

Sometimes the history of philosophy can provide us with a laboratory situation in which new ideas are introduced into old contexts in such a way that we can clearly see the reactions they provoke and the changes they cause. This was the case when Aristotle’sNicomachean Ethicswas translated into Latin in the middle of the thirteenth century. Within a very short time a new Aristotelianism introduced a number of new questions related to philosophical psychology. The old context of Augustinian Christianity offered only a limited amount of conceptual tools for the understanding of these new questions. A paradigm shift was, therefore, necessary in many areas related to the philosophy of mind. In spite of some conflicts the contemporary historian is for the most part surprised to find how flexible the medieval scholars were in changing their conceptual frameworks to suit the new philosophy. In the following I will highlight these developments through one exemplary case study, that is, the medieval reception of Aristotle’s ‘weakness of will’.

Metapher und biblische Redefiguren als Elemente der Sprachphilosophie Luthers

Zu den schwierigsten Problemen der Forschung über die Sprachauffassung Luthers gehört es, unterschiedliche Fragenkomplexe sinnvoll unter einem gemeinsamen Aspekt zu behandeln. Neben den hermeneutischen Schlagworten der Bibelauslegung werden sowohl Begriffe der Linguistik als auch Motive der patristischen Logos-Christologie und Signum-Sakramentologie von den Lutherforschern häufig ohne Rücksicht auf die Vielfältigkeit der Fragestellung benutzt. So ist die Bezeichnung des Anliegens Luthers als »Sprachereignis« zwar durchaus treffend, läßt gleichwohl aber verschiedene Probleme der Sprachphilosophie unberücksichtigt. In dieser Studie versuche ich, einen solchen grammatischen Begriff zu analysieren, der in der Lutherforschung allgemein als wichtig eingeschätzt wird. Es ist der Metapher-Begriff, der zu den vielen Tropen mittelalterlicher Grammatik bzw. Rhetorik zählt. Im folgenden wird die Metapher bei Luther jedoch nicht primär als rhetorisches Stilmittel betrachtet, sondern im Rahmen der mittelalterlichen Grammatik, insbesondere der Signifikationstheorie, dargestellt und analysiert. Mit diesem begrenzten Zugang versuche ich, einige möglichst konkrete und profilierte Ergebnisse zu gewinnen, die auf die ideengeschichtliche Stellung Luthers in der spätmittelalterlichen Sprachphilosophie verweisen können. Dieser Beitrag basiert wesentlich auf den früheren Arbeiten über Luthers Sprachauffassung und führt ihre Ergebnisse weiter. Das geschieht größtenteils durch die Aufnahme der scholastischen Signifikationstheorie. Deswegen wird im einleitenden Abschnitt (I) ein kurzer Forschungsbericht gegeben, der mit einer Darstellung der scholastischen Semantik als Teil (II) fortgesetzt wird. Erst im Abschnitt (III) sind wir in der Lage, die Analyse

Editorial for the Topical Issue “Religious Recognition”

As the European countries become increasingly multicultural and multireligious, there is a growing need to study intellectual and political strategies which enable multiculturalism to thrive in democratic and peaceful modern societies. Since the Enlightenment, the concept of toleration has been the prominent conduit of plurality in a society. Toleration is, however, a concept that does not necessarily promote cooperation: I may tolerate others without wanting to do anything with them. Such an attitude towards toleration may lead to segregation, and even to the emergence of something resembling parallel societies within a democracy. Leading philosophers Charles Taylor, Axel Honneth and Paul Ricoeur have proposed the idea of mutual recognition as a societal virtue and an attitude that can complement toleration in this respect. Rainer Forst speaks for thinkers who consider mutual recognition to be the full-fledged form of toleration in contemporary society. Others share Frank Furedi’s view that toleration and recognition are quite different attitudes that serve different purposes. Since the early 1990s, contemporary recognition theory, based largely on the foundational work of Honneth, has gradually developed into a well-established research programme.1 It provides carefully articulated conceptual instruments for studying the multidimensional dynamics of mutual respect, esteem, and love. In the most paradigmatic sense, mutual recognition is a relation between two individual persons. In an extended sense, recognition applies to groups and institutions, and, according to some suggestions, even to normative entities generally. Since recognition in its various forms is a phenomenon dealing with normative statuses, questions about power are also brought in. All these aspects are also highly relevant for the study of various forms of recognition in religious contexts. Issues of religious recognition are often rather complex, as the processes of normative recognition are, for the most part, qualified in their content. Thus, for example, we may say that we recognize your baptism or your group as an Abrahamic religion. We do not, however, usually say that we recognize everything that you represent, although we may acknowledge you as persons and as serious discussion partners. In such qualified accounts of theological processes, contemporary recognition theory offers sharp instruments for evaluating various ecumenical and societal options. While recognition theory has begun to permeate theology, there is relatively little scholarly work on the religious and theological dimensions of recognition. This situation is likely to be caused by the fact that mutual recognition is commonly understood to be a modern, post-Hegelian concept and, as such, a purely secular idea. This view can be problematized by showing that both the concept and the phenomenon of recognition have long pre-Hegelian roots that, to a considerable extent, stem from the tradition of Christian theology. The general idea that toleration and recognition are complementary virtues helping modern

Will and Freedom in Renaissance and Reformation Thought

Thomas Aquinas remains a prominent philosophical authority both in the Renaissance and during the Catholic Reform. His Aristotelian view of action, in which the practical syllogism is the tool for deliberation, prompting intentional action, remains a standard view of academic teaching in Italian, French and German universities. The conclusion of this syllogism was often considered identical with action; therefore, will and choice normally transform the result of intellectual deliberation into action. Some Aristotelians employ Walter Burley’s modified intellectualist account, according to which the conclusion of the practical syllogism is a sentence which is followed by choice and action. In all intellectualist accounts the will is regarded as rational appetite; its freedom consists in its ability to act rationally (1).

Living Sola Fide: Features of Religious Recognition

This article discusses the life of faith and forensic justification as related to some new issues in social theory, especially Axel Honneths notions of love, respect, and esteem. The article is critical of virtue ethics and recommends an ethics of vocation as a path toward equal respect and individual social esteem. The article also discusses why Lutherans consider faith (or even faith alone) rather than love as a proper starting-point of this path.

The Language of Giving in Theology

SUMMARY This paper wants to bring about a “linguistic turn” in the current theological discussion on gifts and giving. It focuses on the linguistic constructions around “give” and their use in religious and theological texts. The linguistic approach is enriched with the help of Senecas philosophy of gifts and services. Senecas De beneficiis is not, however, interpreted as a handbook of anthropology and economic exchange, but as a guide to the proper use of the words “give” and “receive”. In the last sections of this paper, some prominent themes of Reformation theology are discussed from the linguistic perspective of giving. In particular, the issue of receiving something purely passively is addressed. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Dieser Beitrag will eine Art »linguistic turn« in der gegenwärtigen theologischen Diskussion über Gaben und Geben bewirken. Er konzentriert sich auf die linguistischen Konstruktionen von »geben« und deren Gebrauch in religiösen und theologischen Texten. Der linguistische Zugang wird erweitert mit Hilfe von Senecas Philosophie der Gabe und des Dienstes. Senecas De beneficiis wird hier jedoch nicht als Handbuch der Anthropologie und des ökonomischen Tausches interpretiert, sondern als Anleitung zum richtigen Gebrauch der Wörter »geben« und »empfangen«. In den letzten Abschnitten dieses Beitrages werden einige prominente Themen der reformatorischen Theologie aus der linguistischen Perspektive auf das Geben diskutiert. Im Besonderen wird die Frage des rein passiven Empfangens thematisiert.

Wisdom as intellectual virtue: Aquinas, Odonis and Buridan

This chapter focuses reception history of Nicomachean Ethics . It surveys some features of the scholastic interpretation of the three intellectual virtues of science, understanding and wisdom. The chapter deals with the nature of wisdom as compilation of science and understanding. It examines Thomas Aquinass definition of the three virtues in Summa theologiae and compares it with two later commentaries on Nicomachean Ethics , namely those by Gerald Odonis and John Buridan. The scholastic authors were well aware of Aristotles view of wisdom as metaphysics and theology. In addition, they continued other classical, Hellenistic, biblical and Augustinian traditions of interpreting the many-sided phenomenon of wisdom. In an Aristotelian manner, Thomas begins his response by stating that the speculative intellect can reach the truth in two ways: in the case of principles, the intellect perceives their truth immediately. It is evident that Odonis employs Aquinas and that Buridan employs both Aquinas and Odonis. Keywords: Aristotles view of wisdom; Gerald Odonis; intellectual virtues; John Buridan; Nicomachean Ethics ; Summa theologiae ; Thomas Aquinas

Retraction Note to: Michael Baius (1513–89) and the Debate on ‘Pure Nature’: Grace and Moral Agency in Sixteenth-Century Scholasticism

The chapter: Michael Baius (1513–89) and the Debate on ‘Pure Nature’: Grace and Moral Agency in Sixteenth-Century Scholasticism appearing in: The New Synthese Historical Library Volume 57, 2005, pp 51-90 has been retracted at the request of the employer of the author at the time of writing, because it contains passages from the previously published manuscripts without acknowledging the source. The previously published manuscripts that have been duplicated in this chapter are: J.F. SOLLIER, “Baius (or de Bay), Michel”, in The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 2 (New York: The Encyclopedia Press, 1913); P.J. DONNELLY, “Baius and Baianism”, in New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 2 (2nd ed.; Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2003); Henri DE LUBAC, S.J., Augustinianism and Modern Theology, trans. Lancelot SHEPPARD (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1969); Lawrence FEINGOLD, The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters (Roma: Pontificia Universitas Sanctae Crucis, 2001).”.