Risza Rusli

Managing process safety information based on process safety management requirements

Many accidents in process industries have occurred because of employees did not recognize the hazards and risk associated with the activities they were undertaking such as when operating, changing, or maintaining processes, plants, and equipment. Recognizing these hazards and risk requires a company to develop and maintain a corporate memory through an effective management of process safety information (PSI). One of the established standards that addressed the above issue is PSI of Process Safety Management (PSM) 29 CFR 1910.119(d). This article presents a PSI implementation technique that could fulfill with 29 CFR 1910.119(d) requirements. It provides organized strategies to manage documentations, communicate information, and written program for maintaining, revising, and updating hazardous chemical, equipment, and technology information. Process and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) is used as a foundation for data management. The developed technique has been transformed to computer database prototype known as Process Safety Information Management System (PSI4MS), which articulately demonstrate the concept. Implementation of this technique could help employers manage and control hazards of process plant and compliance with PSM regulation.

Interrelations between process safety management elements

OSHA PSM standard has been established with 14 elements that define the management principles to control process hazards and protect the workplace. One of the key factors to the success of Process Safety Management (PSM) implementation is that each element comes as a component in an integrated PSM program. Although various kind of integrated safety management systems have been introduced, direct integration system between PSM elements was not extensively studied due to vague concept on interrelation between PSM elements. This also hampers efforts in designing and developing integrated system for PSM. In this study, the interrelation of critical PSM elements was analyzed based on objectives and information functional of the elements stipulated in OSHA PSM regulations. From the conducted analysis, all the critical elements are interrelated at least with other seven PSM elements. Among the elements, Process Hazard Analysis and Mechanical Integrity were identified to have the highest interrelations comprising of 12 interrelated PSM elements. The developed PSM matrix has systematically showed the interrelation of critical PSM elements that useful for the development of Integrated PSM system.

Consequence Study of Pressurized CO2 Release Containing Impurities with Obstacles

A rupture or puncture of a carbon dioxide (CO2) pipeline will result in a release of dense CO2 gas cloud mixed with toxic impurities such as hydrogen sulfide (H2S) to the ambience. This paper has proposed an approach for developing an accurate consequence model for CO2 release containing H2S in order to demonstrate a safe layout and other safeguards. Thus, a validated code using computational fluid dynamics (CFD) was applied to predict time-varying concentrations of CO2 and H2S at a point of downwind release area. Then overall fatality rate due to both CO2 and H2S has been estimated at this point. Results indicate that this is a suitable method for assessing the consequences of the release of CO2 via pipeline leakage.

Operational Training Management System (OPTRAMS) for Safe Operation in Process Plant

Many publications have reported about 37% of major accidents in petroleum, chemical, nuclear, aviation, and in the other process industries that occurred worldwide were due to human error. One of the keys contributing factors that could prevent these accidents is to provide appropriate training to the plant personnel. However, accidents still can happen if training is poorly managed and improperly trained personnel handling the operation of the plant. One of the established industrial standards to manage the training is Training element of Process Safety Management (PSM) 29 CFR 1910.119(g). This paper presents a system to manage training for safe operation following 29 CFR 1910.119(g) namely Operational Training Management System (OPTRAMS). It provides strategies to manage information and documentation related to training. OPTRAMS was implemented at the CO2-Hydrocarbon Absorption System (CHAS) pilot plant at Universiti Teknologi PETRONAS as a case study. The study showed that all operational training can be managed efficiently with OPTRAMS and also assists end users to identify the gaps that hinder training of PSM compliance. The implementation of this technique could help end users to prevent and minimize catastrophic accidents and comply with training of PSM standard.

Evaluation of Inherent Safety Strategies Using FAHP to Reduce Human Error

Inherent safety concept has been introduced to overcome the shortcoming of traditional hazard assessments by allowing modification to be made at any stage of lifecycle of a process plant. However, most of the proposed inherent safety modifications were suitable to prevent fire, explosion and toxic hazards assessment but less attention on human and organizational factor. Therefore, this paper introduces the inherently safer analysis for human and organizational factor to be implemented during design stage or process operation. Analytic Hierarchy Process model integrated with fuzzy logic and known as FAHP was employed to rank identified inherently safer strategies. The model was applied to select inherently safer strategies to reduce collision risk of a floating production, storage and offload and the authorized vessel. The result shows that minimization of hazardous procedure when the procedure is unavoidable is the best strategy to increase human performance. It is proven that the proposed methodology is capable to select the inherently safer strategy without requiring a bunch of precise information to transfer expert judgment in human performances perspective.

CFD Study on Syngas Dispersion for Biomass Process Industry

Synthesis gas (syngas) refers to a mixture primarily of hydrogen (H2) and carbon monoxide (CO) which may also contain significant but lower concentrations of methane (CH4) and carbon dioxide (CO2) as well as smaller amounts of impurities such as chlorides, sulphur compounds, and heavier hydrocarbons. Available syngas dispersion study found in literatures mostly focused on pure gas dispersion specifically H2 compared to the syngas mixture. It has been reported in most literatures that available commercial tools tend to give an overestimated results for these types of gas since it is more suitable for dense gas rather than the light gas. Therefore, the current study aim to investigate potential dispersion and evaluate the flammability of syngas release from biomass processes using CFD-FLUENT. Results of the mixture simulation is compared with the results obtain from simulation of pure H2 release. When all components in syngas were release together, competition to gain oxygen increased resulting in lesser mixing of syngas-oxygen and increasing the concentration of the syngas mixture. As a result, H2 in syngas concentration is higher compared to pure H2 when accidental release from biomass process.

Assessment of Human Factor Performance Using Bayesian Inference and Inherent Safety

Simply attributing incidents to human error is not adequate; human factors aspects should be investigated such that lessons are learnt and the true root causes are established in order to prevent recurrence. Whilst many petroleum and allied industry businesses have investigated and analyzed incidents – whether with major hazards or occupational injuries potential – human factors aspects are rarely addressed sufficiently. Therefore, this paper presents a hybrid methodology that combines a conventional Swiss Cheese model with Bayesian inference to predict the failure probability of human factors. An inherent safety concept associated with human factor is proposed and utilized as preventive measures to overcome the identified root causes. This approach is then applied to offshore safety assessment study. As a result, the failure probability of human factor can be monitored with time and the best preventive measure can be prioritized once human performance is degraded. It is proven that the approach has the ability to act as predictive tool that provides early warnings toward human deficiency. A preventive measure can then be taken to enhance the overall human performance and ultimately to reduce the likelihood of major incidents.