Rob Lawlor

Moral theories in teaching applied ethics

It is argued, in this paper, that moral theories should not be discussed extensively when teaching applied ethics. First, it is argued that, students are either presented with a large amount of information regarding the various subtle distinctions and the nuances of the theory and, as a result, the students simply fail to take it in or, alternatively, the students are presented with a simplified caricature of the theory, in which case the students may understand the information they are given, but what they have understood is of little or no value because it is merely a caricature of a theory. Second, there is a methodological problem with appealing to moral theories to solve particular issues in applied ethics. An analogy with science is appealed to. In physics there is a hope that we could discover a unified theory of everything. But this is, of course, a hugely ambitious project, and much harder than, for example, finding a theory of motion. If the physicist wants to understand motion, he should try to do so directly. We would think he was particularly misguided if he thought that, to answer this question, he first needed to construct a unified theory of everything.

Questioning the significance of the non-identity problem in applied ethics

Authors such as Tony Hope and Julian Savulescu appeal to Derek Parfits non-identity problem in relation to particular questions in applied ethics, and particularly in reproductive ethics. They argue that the non-identity problem shows that an individual cannot be harmed by being brought into existence, and therefore, we cannot say that the individual is harmed if, for example, we select an embryo in order to have a deaf child. Thus, they argue that an appeal to the non-identity problem blocks (or significantly reduces the force of) objections in a number of cases. I argue that these discussions often give the impression that this is a clear conclusion, shared by most philosophers, and largely beyond dispute. This is particularly significant because these discussions are often in journals or books with an interdisciplinary readership. My concern is that they give the impression of stating: ‘philosophers have studied this issue, and this is the conclusion they have reached. Now I will emphasise the implications for medical ethics’. I argue that, far from being the consensus view, the view presented by Hope and Savulescu is rejected by many, including Parfit himself.

Climate Change and Professional Responsibility: A Declaration of Helsinki for Engineers

In this paper, we argue that the professional engineering institutions ought to develop a Declaration of Climate Action. Climate change is a serious global problem, and the majority of greenhouse gas emissions come from industries that are enabled by engineers and represented by the engineering professional institutions. If the professional institutions take seriously the claim that a profession should be self-regulating, with codes of ethics that go beyond mere obedience to the law, and if they take their own ethical codes seriously, recognising their responsibility to the public and to future generations (and also recognising a duty of “responsible leadership”), the professional institutions ought to develop a declaration for engineers, addressing climate change. Our argument here is largely inspired by the history of the Declaration of Helsinki. The Declaration of Helsinki was created by the medical profession for the profession, and it held physicians to a higher standard of ethical conduct than was found in the legal framework of individual countries. Although it was not originally a legal document, the influence of the Declaration can be seen in the fact that it is now enshrined in law in a number of different countries. Thus, we argue that the engineering profession could, and should, play a significant role in the abatement of climate change by making changes within the profession. If the engineering profession sets strict standards for professional engineers, with sanctions for those who refuse to comply, this could have a significant impact in relation to our efforts to develop a coordinated response to climate change.

Numbers scepticism, equal chances and pluralism: Taurek revisited

The ‘standard interpretation’ of John Taurek’s argument in ‘Should the Numbers Count?’ imputes two theses to him: first, ‘numbers scepticism’, or scepticism about the moral force of an appeal to the mere number of individuals saved in conflict cases; and second, the ‘equal greatest chances’ principle of rescue, which requires that every individual has an equal chance of being rescued. The standard interpretation is criticized here on a number of grounds. First, whilst Taurek clearly believes that equal chances are all-important, he actually argues for a position weaker than the equal greatest chances principle. Second, the argument Taurek gives for the importance of equal chances ought to commit him to being more hospitable to the significance of numbers than he seems to be. Third, and as a result, Taurek should not have dismissed the significance of numbers but embraced a form of pluralism instead. Fourth, this result should be welcomed, because pluralism is more plausible than either the equal greatest chances principle or the saving the greater number principle.

The Absurdity of Economists’ Sacrifice-free Solutions to Climate Change

Abstract John Broome and Duncan Foley have argued that it is a ‘misperception’ that the ‘control of global warming is costly’ and that we can make ‘sacrifices unnecessary’. There are a number of assumptions that are essential for this idea to work. These assumptions can be challenged. Furthermore, my claim is not merely that the Broome/Foley argument is flawed, and therefore unlikely to be successful. I will argue that it is potentially harmful, leading to harms for the present generation and for future generations.

Freezing Eggs in a Warming World

Most discussions of population control focus on how many children people should have, but ignore issues to do with the timing, so there is little discussion of the value of delaying childbearing. Once we recognize that delaying childbearing can have a significant impact on the size of the population, and, therefore, on CO 2 e (carbon dioxide equivalent) emissions, our perspective on egg freezing changes significantly. In this article, I argue that, if we focus on future generations in general, rather than focusing only on the children who would be conceived using frozen eggs, policies permitting or encouraging the freezing of eggs may reduce potential harms to future generations. This, I argue, may block the objections to egg freezing for non-medical reasons which focus on the potential risks to the child (without requiring an appeal to the non-identity problem).

Cake or death? Ending confusions about asymmetries between consent and refusal.

In this paper, I will argue that much of the debate concerning asymmetries between consent and refusal (eg, in a case in which an adolescent is granted a right to consent to treatment, but not a right to refuse treatment) is confused. My aim in this paper is to highlight nuances and ambiguities, and to emphasise the fact that we are not just addressing a puzzle about one asymmetry between consent and refusal. I will show that there are a number of relevant asymmetries, not just the asymmetry of competence. And even if we focus specifically on the asymmetry of competence, we need to recognise that ‘asymmetry of competence’ is ambiguous. By clarifying these issues, my aim is to end the confusion that is common in this debate, allowing us to make progress on an issue that has previously been considered puzzling.

Questioning the significance of the non-identity problem in applied ethics: a reply to Tony Hope

In this paper I reply to Tony Hope’s response to my non-identity paper, aiming to clarify the nature of my objections, and also to address, briefly, Hope’s suggestion that the implications of my view are that any book written for a lay audience ought to seek to present a ‘balanced overview’. Essentially, I suggest that there may be a pro tanto consideration in favour of such an approach, but this would only be one consideration, to be weighed against competing considerations.

The Ethical Treatment of Animals: The Moral Significance of Darwin's Theory

Although Darwin’s theory is not a moral theory, it is not morally insignificant. In this paper, I consider one area of ethics in which Darwin’s theory has a real impact: the ethical treatment of animals. Peter Singer characterises speciesism as the discrimination between different animals (favouring humans) solely on the grounds of species membership (rather than morally relevant considerations such as sentience and self-awareness). In response, a number of Singer’s opponents have embraced speciesism. Carl Cohen, for example, states “I am a speciesist. Speciesism is not merely plausible, it is essential for right conduct.” In this paper, I argue that a proper understanding of evolution poses serious problems for those who want to oppose Singer in this way. Moral status is transitive and sortal: if A has the same moral status as B and B has the same moral status as C, then A and C must also have the same moral status. But species membership is (on standard definitions) non-transitive. Dawkins states that “Non-interbreeding is the recognised criterion for whether two populations deserve distinct species names.” According to this (and most other definitions of “species”) if A is the same species as B and B is the same species as C, it is not the case that A and C must be the same species. (A could interbreed with B but not C). It is only the fact that most intermediates have died out that gives the impression of distinct species (and gives the impression of transitivity).