Rob Nicholls

Right to Privacy: Telephone Interception and Access in Australia

In its first thirty years of operation, the 1979 Australian Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act moved from providing a strict prohibition on telephone interception (wiretapping), to legislating rights of access for law enforcement and revenue protection agencies [5], [6], [12][14], [18]. Currently, Australian legislation permits access to call content through the use of a warrant issued by a member of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal [5]. The legislation also allows bureaucratic authorization for access to a suspects location information [13]. Here we consider whether the impacts of this regime are appropriate for Australians in terms of financial costs and in term of impositions on privacy rights.

Franchisor Insolvency in Australia: Profiles, Factors, and Impacts

Franchisor failure is enduring and important in terms of cost, nationally and internationally. This article presents research into Australian franchisor firms that went into a form of bankruptcy protection known in Australia as “voluntary administration.” The research was driven by the commonality and divergence of the interests of franchisors and franchisees. The article provides an insight into franchisor failure and its effect on franchisees. It presents the substantial literature survey that was used to frame questions for franchisor administrators to understand issues associated with franchisors in administration. The limited data demonstrate diversity in the treatment of franchisees during the franchisors administration. In Australia, franchisees remain a captive, financially committed counterparty during insolvency and potentially deliver a great financial benefit to the franchisors creditors. The article concludes that administration of franchisors does not take into account the distinct relationship between franchisors and their franchisees and provides policy recommendations to address this matter.

Hanging together or hanging separately: is competition law in the process of eclipsing financial regulation?

This article examines the potential for the application of competition law in the banking sector to eclipse financial regulation. Financial regulation has changed in response to the global financial crisis. Competition law acts to promote the interests of consumers, whereas finance regulation at best only protects the interests of consumers. Successful use of leniency provisions means that competition law is achieving successes in punishing financial institutions that have engaged in cartel conduct. This success may lead to regulatory scope creep and the application of abuse of market power provisions in the financial sector unless financial regulation can be seen to be for the benefit of consumers, rather than the regulated.

Interconnection of Next Generation Networks - A Regulatory Perspective

The deployment of next generation networks by incumbent fixed-line operators presents a challenge to regulators. This challenge is to balance the needs of end-users with a desire to encourage workable competition between the incumbent and new entrants. The next generation network architecture has the potential to alter the liberalised regulatory environment and reinstate the incumbent as a monopoly provider. This paper analyses the issues that arise from such a deployment and proposes options available to regulators if intervention is required. The analysis sets out the architecture of next generation networks, the impact that their deployment has on competitors and potential access to the core network and access network of a next generation network. The paper concludes by setting out some of the regulatory options that are available.

Telecommunications Regulation and the Global Digital Divide

The liberal-market model for telecommunications regulation is designed to promote access to voice telecommunications and is unlikely to improve internet access. As such, the liberal-market regulatory model will not enable countries to bridge the digital divide. The application of this model in least developed countries is widening the global digital divide by increasing the inequality of access to the information society in those countries compared with developed countries. The paper quantifies the scope and extent of the global digital divide by way of comparison of access to the internet in member states of the OECD and those states defined by the United Nations to be least developed countries (LDCs). The paper contrasts the statist Posts Telegraphs and Telecommunications regulatory regime with the neoliberal, market-based, privatisation approach for which the International Financial Institutions and the World Trade Organization act as agent of dissemination. The paper examines the dissemination of neoliberal policy frameworks from the wealthy North to the poorer South and sets out the limitations of these frameworks. There is a review of the role of the community of consultants created by the operation of the international financial institutions and their actions as agents. The paper shows that the regulatory policies disseminated improve access to voice telephony services but access to the internet (and the information society) has not increased nearly so significantly in LDCs. The particular kinds of solution imposed by international financial institutions reinforce some of the inequalities that they are intended to reduce. The paper advances some policy alternatives which are designed to remedy some of these problems.

Do it once, get it right: Wholesale regulatory intervention in price and cost disclosure

Price regulation of the utility sector occurs mainly at the wholesale level. In contrast, in Australian superannuation, regulation requires limited disclosure of fees and costs at the retail level. This paper reviews the regulatory theory that has led utilities regulators to focus on wholesale-level disclosure. It then applies the insights used in these sectors to analyse mechanisms for price and cost disclosure which could be applied to Australian superannuation. The paper argues that intervention done once, but done right, may reduce the need for mandatory retail-level disclosure and would reduce some aspects of regulatory information asymmetry.

George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller. Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and Deception. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2015) pp. 272

One of the ways allowing complex ideas to be conveyed in an accessible way is to build a narrative that provides examples that are relevant and clear. Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx do this with c...

Socio-Ethical Implications of Implantable Technologies in the Military Sector [Guest Editorial]

The military sector has been investing in nanotechnology solutions since their inception. Internal assessment committees in defense programmatically determine to what degree complex technologies will be diffused into the Armed Forces. The broad term nanotechnology is used in this Special Issue of IEEE Technology and Society Magazine to encompass a variety of innovations, from special paint markers that can determine unique identity, to RFID implants in humans. With the purported demand for these new materials, we have seen the development of a fabrication process that has catapulted a suite of advanced technologies in the military marketplace. These technologies were once the stuff of science fiction. Now we have everything from exoskeletons, to wearable headsets with accelerated night vision, to armaments that have increased in durability in rugged conditions along with the ability for central command without human intervention. Is this the emergence of the so-called supersoldier, a type of Iron Man?

Too connected to fail: the regulation of systemic risk within Australia’s superannuation system

The funds, entities, and regulators involved in the Australian superannuation industry together comprise a system that is complex and dynamic. The differentiation between roles and the distribution of responsibility amongst entities provides the system with a measure of resilience against the local failure of any one of the entities. However, the interconnections that bind and constitute the system also have the potential to transmit risks within the system, creating the potential for the impact of local failures to amplify through propagation, or in other ways to pose risks to the system as a whole. This article uses a new data set on 200 of Australia’s largest superannuation funds to map and assess those links and to identify the challenges those links pose to the scheme of prudential regulation applied to the superannuation system in Australia. It finds that the function of the entity and the legal form of the linkages, both of which are more variegated than typically occurs in banking sector transactions, crucially influences whether, and to what extent, various types of failures might be transmitted across the system. It also finds that we may be materially under-estimating the possibility that local failures in the superannuation system, which are a near certainty given the current regulatory risk appetite, will have a systemic impact. The findings have broad application across pension and institutional investment markets worldwide.

Balancing competition and stability in Australian retail banking

The Australian Government initiated two major reviews in 2014: the Financial System Inquiry and the Competition Policy Review. These have highlighted policy trade-off between competition and financial stability. Since the global financial crisis, policymakers and economic researchers internationally have highlighted the need for prudential regulation while sidelining the importance of competition. The working paper argues that competition is still essential to consumer welfare and that the evidence does not support the position that ‘competition prejudices stability’ in financial services. Instead, there is division in the academic literature and the issues are far more complex than are often assumed. This working paper uses the rich and publicly available research to consider the balance between competition and stability in the Australian context. It concludes that the evidence is that competition supports stability and that a failure to prioritise competition increases the systemic importance of large financial firms