Robbie M. Sutton
University of Kent
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Featured researches published by Robbie M. Sutton.
Social Psychological and Personality Science | 2012
Michael J. Wood; Karen M. Douglas; Robbie M. Sutton
Conspiracy theories can form a monological belief system: A self-sustaining worldview comprised of a network of mutually supportive beliefs. The present research shows that even mutually incompatible conspiracy theories are positively correlated in endorsement. In Study 1 (n = 137), the more participants believed that Princess Diana faked her own death, the more they believed that she was murdered. In Study 2 (n = 102), the more participants believed that Osama Bin Laden was already dead when U.S. special forces raided his compound in Pakistan, the more they believed he is still alive. Hierarchical regression models showed that mutually incompatible conspiracy theories are positively associated because both are associated with the view that the authorities are engaged in a cover-up (Study 2). The monological nature of conspiracy belief appears to be driven not by conspiracy theories directly supporting one another but by broader beliefs supporting conspiracy theories in general.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin | 2008
Robbie M. Sutton; Karen M. Douglas; Katie Wilkin; Tracey J. Elder; Jennifer M. Cole; Sofia Stathi
The present studies examine why people think the world is more just to themselves than to others generally. Beliefs in justice for the self were uniquely associated with psychological adjustment, consistent with the theoretical motive to believe in justice for the self (Studies 1 and 2). However, this “justice motive” did not appear to affect the relative strength of justice beliefs. Instead, self–other differences in justice beliefs appeared to reflect objective assessments of the justice received by various demographics. Undergraduates believed the world to be more just to themselves than to others but not their undergraduate peers specifically (Study 1). Participants of both genders believed the world to be more just to men, and to themselves, than to women (Study 2). Women did not exempt themselves individually from injustice but believed, similar to men, that undergraduate women receive as much justice as men (Study 3).
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin | 2006
Robbie M. Sutton; Tracey J. Elder; Karen M. Douglas
Recent research has documented the intergroup sensitivity effect (ISE) whereby people respond more favorably to internal versus external criticism of their group. The present studies examine the reactions of bystanders who do not belong to the criticized group and whose reactions are therefore more likely to be informed by social conventions than by defensiveness. Studies 1 and 2 presented British participants with criticisms of Australians, manipulating their ostensible source. These British bystanders exhibited the ISE, responding more favorably to the speaker and comments when the critic was Australian rather than non-Australian. These responses were driven by the perceived motives of speakers rather than their level of experience with the group (Study 2). Study 3 provides direct evidence that internal criticism is more conventionally acceptable than is external criticism.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations | 2005
Tracey J. Elder; Robbie M. Sutton; Karen M. Douglas
Criticism is an important aspect of communication within and between groups, but reactions to criticism of groups have been little studied. Past research has shown that criticism elicits greater sensitivity when made by an outgroup member, compared to an ingroup member. Two experiments were conducted to examine how this intergroup sensitivity effect (ISE) is affected by the context of the criticism. Experiment 1 showed that the ISE occurs in a private context, but disappears when it is clear that the criticism is made to a large public audience. Experiment 2 investigated intragroup criticism and manipulated both audience size and audience composition. Results showed that ingroup criticism elicited greater sensitivity and less favorable evaluations of the speaker when made to an outgroup rather than an ingroup audience. The results highlight strategic considerations and tacit protocols governing the criticism of groups.
Thinking & Reasoning | 2016
Karen M. Douglas; Robbie M. Sutton; Mitchell J. Callan; Rael J. Dawtry; Annelie J. Harvey
Abstract We hypothesised that belief in conspiracy theories would be predicted by the general tendency to attribute agency and intentionality where it is unlikely to exist. We further hypothesised that this tendency would explain the relationship between education level and belief in conspiracy theories, where lower levels of education have been found to be associated with higher conspiracy belief. In Study 1 (N = 202) participants were more likely to agree with a range of conspiracy theories if they also tended to attribute intentionality and agency to inanimate objects. As predicted, this relationship accounted for the link between education level and belief in conspiracy theories. We replicated this finding in Study 2 (N = 330), whilst taking into account beliefs in paranormal phenomena. These results suggest that education may undermine the reasoning processes and assumptions that are reflected in conspiracy belief.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology | 2001
Robbie M. Sutton; John McClure
Covariational and goal-based approaches to social attribution have been treated as competitive or incommensurable. This article integrates key aspects of each approach. Four studies examined preferences for motivating factors (or goals) and enabling factors (or preconditions) as explanations of intentional actions. The studies manipulated (Studies 1-3) and measured (Study 4) the perceived covariation of these goal-based causes with target actions. Causes that covaried with actions were preferred explanations, in contrast with the goal-based view that motivating factors are generally preferred to enabling factors. Combining goal-based beliefs and covariational reasoning resolves problems faced by each individual approach and generates a novel explanatory typology that combines strengths of goal-based and covariational typologies.
Current Directions in Psychological Science | 2017
Karen M. Douglas; Robbie M. Sutton; Aleksandra Cichocka
What psychological factors drive the popularity of conspiracy theories, which explain important events as secret plots by powerful and malevolent groups? What are the psychological consequences of adopting these theories? We review the current research and find that it answers the first of these questions more thoroughly than the second. Belief in conspiracy theories appears to be driven by motives that can be characterized as epistemic (understanding one’s environment), existential (being safe and in control of one’s environment), and social (maintaining a positive image of the self and the social group). However, little research has investigated the consequences of conspiracy belief, and to date, this research does not indicate that conspiracy belief fulfills people’s motivations. Instead, for many people, conspiracy belief may be more appealing than satisfying. Further research is needed to determine for whom, and under what conditions, conspiracy theories may satisfy key psychological motives.
Archive | 2016
Carolyn L. Hafer; Robbie M. Sutton
In this chapter, we review past and current developments on individual differences in belief in a just world (BJW). Research focusing on measurement of BJW has led to critiques of the original Just World Scale (Rubin & Peplau, Journal of Social Issues, 29, 1973; Journal of Social Issues, 31, 1975) and a trend toward multiple scales assessing different forms of BJW; most notably, personal vs. general forms of BJW. The overall concept of BJW has been well validated by studies of correlates, including certain reactions to victims and ideological variables. With respect to the broader significance of BJW, though BJW is adaptive for the self, the implications of BJW for society are more ambiguous. The developmental foundations of BJW are also unclear, but possible sources include experience with justice and injustice, social learning, and so on. In future, researchers should integrate the forms of BJW into a coherent theoretical framework, further explore the adaptive and maladaptive correlates of BJW, and employ longitudinal designs to better address developmental processes.
Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists | 2015
Karen M. Douglas; Robbie M. Sutton
Uncertainty surrounds the public understanding of climate change and provides fertile ground for conspiracy theories. Typically, such conspiracy theories assert that climate scientists and politicians are distorting or hijacking the science to suit their own purposes. Climate change conspiracy theories resemble other conspiracy theories in some respects, but in others they appear to be quite different. For example, climate change conspiracy theories appear to be motivated by the desire to deny or minimize an unwelcome and threatening conclusion. They also appear to be more contentious than other types of conspiracy theories. Perhaps to an unparalleled extent, people on both sides of the issue champion climate change conspiracy theories. Finally, more than other conspiracy theories, those concerning climate change appear to be more politically loaded, dividing opinion across the left-right continuum. Some empirical evidence suggests that climate change conspiracy theories may be harmful, steering people away from environmentally friendly initiatives. They therefore present a significant challenge for governments and environmental organizations that are attempting to convince people to take action against global warming.
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology | 2014
Mitchell J. Callan; Robbie M. Sutton; Annelie J. Harvey; Rael J. Dawtry
Abstract Immanent justice reasoning involves causally attributing a deserved outcome to someone’s prior moral deeds or character, even when such a causal connection is physically implausible. This chapter describes a body of work showing that immanent justice reasoning is (a) motivated, in part, by the need to construe outcomes as deserved; (b) driven by intuitive more than controlled mental processes; and (c) more openly expressed among individuals who believe in supernatural phenomena. This review also documents several additional lines of inquiry exploring key assumptions about the nature, origins, and functions of immanent justice reasoning, including immanent justice reasoning for self-relevant fortuitous outcomes, the social-communicative function of immanent justice reasoning, and the interplay between immanent justice and normative causal reasoning. Early research portrayed immanent justice reasoning as unique to children, but this chapter identifies several conditions under which it is predictably displayed by adults. Immanent justice reasoning serves important psychological functions in adulthood, and is underpinned by reasoning processes and metaphysical assumptions that are not put away when children become adults.