Robert B. Welker

Testing a Model of Cognitive Budgetary Participation Processes in a Latent Variable Structural Equations Framework

Abstract Previous accounting research has suggested that subordinate participation in the budgetary process has two cognitive aspects: (1) participation enhances budget quality, and hence the utility of budgets, by allowing subordinates to introduce private knowledge into the budgetary process, and (2) participation enables subordinates to obtain information that is relevant to performing their jobs. This study tests a model that encompasses both cognitive aspects of budgetary participation. Data were gathered with a questionnaire distributed to managers from a variety of different national origins who were working in many different global locations. The data were analysed with latent variable structural equation modelling, which provides several advantages over more conventional analytic methods generally used in budgetary participation and other behavioural accounting research. The results indicated that participation enhances budget quality and that budget quality, in turn, has a positive effect on bud...

The Fairness of Formal Budgetary Procedures and Their Enactment Relationships with Managers’ Behavior

Regression analysis of questionnaire data from 149 managers across 96 predominately manufacturing firms supported an interaction between fairness perceptions of formal budgetary procedures and their enactment by supervisors. Specifically, formal budgetary procedures justice was significantly (p <. 05) related to job performance (positively), helping behavior (positively), and propensity to create budgetary slack (negatively) when budgetary procedures enactment justice was high, but not when it was low. The results suggest that managers exhibit particularly positive organizational behavior when they view both the formal budgetary procedures and the supervisory enactment of these procedures as fair.

Examining the impression management orientation of managers

The motive to manage impressions has been broken down into protective and acquisitive orientations. A protective orientation exists when an individual is concerned primarily with encountering disapproval, rather than approval, from the relevant audience. An acquisitive orientation exists when an individual is concerned primarily with obtaining approval from the audience. This study tests the proposition that organizational managers have primarily an acquisitive orientation. The affective sentiments of 95 international middle‐ and upper‐level business managers toward their organization, its leaders, and its business control mechanisms were compared with their perceptions of the acquisitiveness and protectiveness of their work environment. The results indicate that affective sentiments of managers are correlated with the acquisitiveness, but not the protectiveness, of the work environment, supporting the notion that managers have primarily an acquisitive orientation.

DOES ORGANIZATION-MANDATED BUDGETARY INVOLVEMENT ENHANCE MANAGERS’ BUDGETARY COMMUNICATION WITH THEIR SUPERVISOR?

Large organizations typically mandate that managers attend budget meetings and exchange budget reports with their immediate supervisor and budget staff. We explored whether such organization-mandated budgetary involvement is related to managers’ budgetary communication with their supervisor in terms of budgetary participation, budgetary explanation, and budgetary feedback. Questionnaire data from 148 managers employed by 94 different companies were analyzed with regression. Mandatory budget meetings with supervisor had a positive relationship with all three forms of budgetary communication with supervisor, and mandatory budget reports from supervisor had a positive relationship with budgetary explanation from supervisor. Mandatory budget meetings with budget staff had a positive relationship with both budgetary participation with supervisor and budgetary feedback from supervisor. Mandatory budget reports from budget staff had a negative relationship with all three forms of budgetary communication with supervisor. The results failed to support proposed relationships between mandatory budget reports to supervisor and budgetary participation with supervisor, and between mandatory budget reports from supervisor and budgetary explanation from supervisor. Implications of the results for future research and budgetary system design are discussed.

Behavioral genetics of deception detection performance

Purpose Deception detection is instrumental in business management but professionals differ widely in terms of deception detection performance. The purpose of this paper is to examine the genetic basis of deception detection performance using the classic twin study design and address the research question: how much variance in individual differences in deception detection performance can be accounted for by the variance in genetics vs environmental influences? Design/methodology/approach In total, 192 twins, with 65 pairs of monozygotic (identical) twins and 31 pairs of dizygotic (fraternal) twins participated in an experiment. A series of behavioral genetic analyses were performed. Findings The variability in deception detection performance was largely determined by differences in shared and non-shared environments. Research limitations/implications The subjects were solicited during the Twins Days Festival so the sample selection and data collection were limited to the natural settings in the field. In addition, the risks and rewards associated with deception detection performance in the study are pale in comparison with those in practice. Practical implications Deception detection performance may be improved through training programs. Corporations should continue funding training programs for deception detection. Originality/value This is the first empirical study that examines the complementary influences of genetics and environment on people’s ability to detect deception.

An experimental study of the effect of budget favorability on the formation of pseudo-participation perceptions

Budget decision-makers are forced at times to assign budgets that deviate substantially from budget participants’ requests. In these instances, budget participants likely interpret their budgetary involvement as lacking influence and perhaps as pseudo-participative. This experimental study examined two situational factors that may affect perceptions of pseudo-participation: budget favorability (receiving a much better or much worse budget than requested) and disclosure of budget intention (the decision-maker discloses or does not disclose a preliminary budget before the budget decision, with the final budget exactly matching the preliminary budget). As hypothesized, budget participants had a self-serving tendency to discount pseudo-participation as the cause of low influence when they received a favorable budget. However, contrary to a hypothesized effect, budget participants did not have a self-serving tendency to inflate pseudo-participation as the cause of low influence when they received an unfavorable budget. Instead, they formed strong, unbiased pseudo-participation perceptions. Also contrary to a hypothesized effect, the budget decision-makers disclosure of an intended budget, which should have provided clear indications of an insincere request for budget input, did not increase perceptions of pseudo-participation. Budget outcomes that indicate low influence may evoke such strong perceptions of pseudo-participation as to override other information that suggests pseudo-participation.

Estimating Profit Performance from Similar Profit Centers

A decision model involving discriminant analysis provides a method by which both upper and middle managers can avoid some pitfalls that are likely to result in the substantially subjective process of pertbrmance evaluation of profit centers. It is designed to provide more objective, more timely, and possibly more accurate information. The model is not designed to estimate the return on investment for a profit center. The resulting discriminate score provides a direct evaluation of a profit center’s management.