Robert C. Runkle

Securing special nuclear material: Recent advances in neutron detection and their role in nonproliferation

Neutron detection is an integral part of the global effort to prevent the proliferation of special nuclear material (SNM). Applications relying on neutron-detection technology range from traditional nuclear nonproliferation objectives, such as safeguarding material and verifying stockpile reductions, to the interdiction of SNM—a goal that has recently risen in priority to a level on par with traditional missions. Large multinational programs targeting interdiction and safeguards have deployed radiation-detection assets across the globe. In parallel with these deployments of commercially available technology, significant research and development has been directed toward the creation of next-generation assets. Neutron-detection technology plays a prominent role because of the capability of neutrons to penetrate materials that readily absorb gamma rays and the unique fission signatures neutrons possess. One particularly acute technology-development challenge results from dwindling supplies of H3e, partially ...

Point source detection and characterization for vehicle radiation portal monitors

Many international border crossings presently screen cargo for illicit nuclear material using radiation portal monitors (RPMs) that measure the gamma ray and/or neutron flux emitted by vehicles. The fact that many target sources have a point-like geometry can be exploited to detect subthreshold sources and filter out benign sources that frequently possess a distributed geometry. This report describes a two-step process, which has the potential to complement other alarm algorithms, for detecting and characterizing point sources. The first step applies a matched filter whereas step two uses a weighted nonlinear least squares method. In a base-case simulation, matched filtering detected a 250-cps source injected onto a white-noise background at a 95% detection probability and a 0.003 false alarm probability. For the same simulation, the maximum likelihood estimation technique performed well at source strengths of 250 and 400 cps. These simulations provided a best-case feasibility study for this technique, which will be extended to experimental data that possess false point-source signatures resulting from background shielding caused by vehicle design and cargo distribution

Examination of Count-starved Gamma Spectra Using the Method of Spectral Comparison Ratios

We discuss the determination of energy region (bin) boundaries and decision metrics for gamma-ray spectra, acquired using a mid-resolution detector, that are useful for detecting illicit sources at low total counts. The bins are designed to produce the lowest minimum detectable counts using a spectral comparison ratio technique at a given false-positive rate for a specified population of benign-source spectra. Spectra from the benign source population consist of observations taken by a detector on a moving vehicle, as would be obtained during a search for a missing or hidden source. Raw counts in bins are transformed into a vector of background-corrected count differences. Bin boundaries are determined to yield large values of a standardized length of this vector for benign-plus-benchmark sources by applying an optimization technique. The objective function includes penalties for overlap with the spectral features of naturally occurring radioactive materials. We compare estimated minimum detectable count values for such bins applied to depleted uranium and barium-133 sources with those based on gross counting, and we examine the effect of nuisance potassium-, radium- and thorium-dominated sources. Using this methodology, we demonstrate that energy bins may be chosen to be sensitive to special nuclear materials, improving the likelihood of detection in low-count or masked-source searches.

A shallow underground laboratory for low-background radiation measurements and materials development.

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory recently commissioned a new shallow underground laboratory, located at a depth of approximately 30 meters-water-equivalent. This new addition to the small class of radiation measurement laboratories located at modest underground depths houses the latest generation of custom-made, high-efficiency, low-background gamma-ray spectrometers and gas proportional counters. This paper describes the unique capabilities present in the shallow underground laboratory; these include large-scale ultra-pure materials production and a suite of radiation detection systems. Reported data characterize the degree of background reduction achieved through a combination of underground location, graded shielding, and rejection of cosmic-ray events. We conclude by presenting measurement targets and future opportunities.

The photon haystack and emerging radiation detection technology

The resources devoted to interdicting special nuclear materials have increased considerably over the last several years in step with growing efforts to counter nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. This changing landscape has led to a large amount of research and development that aims to improve the effectiveness of technology now deployed worldwide. Interdicting special nuclear materials is most commonly addressed by detecting and characterizing emitted gamma rays, but modest signature emissions can be obscured by attenuating material and must be differentiated from large and highly variable environmental background emissions. It is a daunting technical challenge to identify special nuclear materials via gamma-ray detection, but a host of new detection technologies is now emerging. This challenge motivates our review of special nuclear material signatures, the physics of detection approaches, emerging technologies, and performance metrics. The use of benchmark gamma-ray sources aids our discussion.

Direct measurement of the N-14(p, gamma) O-15 S-factor

The 14N(p,gamma)15O reaction regulates the rate of energy generation in the stellar CN cycle. Because discrepancies have been found in the analysis and interpretation of previous capture data, we have measured the 14N(p,gamma)15O excitation function for energies in the range E(lab)(p)=155-524 keV. Fits of these data using R-matrix theory yield a value for the S factor at zero energy of 1.68+/-0.09(stat)+/-0.16(syst) keV b, which is significantly smaller than the previous result. The corresponding reduction in the stellar reaction rate for 14N(p,gamma)15O has a number of interesting consequences, including an impact on estimates for the age of the Galaxy derived from globular clusters.

Contamination Studies of LaCl

Original lanthanum halide scintillators suffered significantly from internal alpha contamination due to 227Ac. As the effect of this contamination has been substantially reduced, and the crystal sizes have grown towards volumes that are useful for many applications, the effect of the gamma-, beta-, and x-ray-contamination due to 138 La in these materials has risen to the foreground. This paper discusses and quantifies the current status of lanthanum halide contamination. Included are comparisons with other internally-contaminated, commercially-available scintillators and computer simulation results to breakdown contamination versus background contributions. Although the high resolution of the lanthanum halides holds great promise, the internal activity clearly places limits on their superiority

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Radiation portal monitors are commonly used at international border crossings to detect illicit transport of radioactive material. Most monitors use plastic scintillators to detect gamma rays, but next-generation monitors may contain NaI(Tl). In order to directly compare the performance of the two types of detectors, a prototype NaI(Tl) monitor was tested at two international border crossings adjacent to a comparable plastic scintillator monitor. The NaI(Tl) monitor housed four large detectors, each 10.2 cm /spl times/ 10.2 cm /spl times/ 41 cm. The empirical data set from the two field tests contains approximately 3800 passages with known cargo loads for each vehicle. For a small subset of the vehicles, high purity germanium detector spectra were also collected. During the survey period several vehicles containing commercial products with naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) passed through the monitor. Typical NORM cargo included pottery, large granite slabs, rock-based floor tiles, construction stone blocks, abrasive material, and fertilizer. Non-NORM sources included a large source of /sup 60/Co (200,000 GBq) and a shipment of uranium oxide, both items being legally transported. The information obtained during the tests provides a good empirical data set to compare the effectiveness of NaI(Tl) and plastic-scintillator portal monitors. The capability to be sensitive to illicit materials, but not alarm on NORM, is a key figure of merit for portal monitors.

:Ce Scintillators

Gamma-ray spectroscopy is a critical research and development priority to a range of nuclear security missions, specifically the interdiction of special nuclear material involving the detection and identification of gamma-ray sources. We categorize existing methods by the statistical methods on which they rely and identify methods that have yet to be considered. Current methods estimate the effect of counting uncertainty but in many cases do not address larger sources of decision uncertainty, which may be significantly more complex. Thus, significantly improving algorithm performance may require greater coupling between the problem physics that drives data acquisition and statistical methods that analyze such data. Untapped statistical methods, such as Bayes Modeling Averaging and hierarchical and empirical Bayes methods, could reduce decision uncertainty by rigorously and comprehensively incorporating all sources of uncertainty. Application of such methods should further meet the needs of nuclear security missions by improving upon the existing numerical infrastructure for which these analyses have not been conducted.

Field tests of a NaI(Tl)-based vehicle portal monitor at border crossings

As a complement to passive detection systems, radiographic inspection of cargo is an increasingly important tool for homeland security because it has the potential to detect highly attenuating objects associated with special nuclear material or surrounding shielding, in addition to screening for items such as drugs or contraband. Radiographic detection of such threat objects relies on high image contrast between regions of different density and atomic number (Z). Threat detection is affected by scatter of the interrogating beam in the cargo, the radiographic system itself, and the surrounding environment, which degrades image contrast. Here, we estimate the extent to which scatter plays a role in radiographic imaging of cargo containers. Stochastic transport simulations were performed to determine the details of the radiography equipment and surrounding environment, which are important in reproducing measured data and to investigate scatter magnitudes for typical cargo. We find that scatter plays a stronger role in cargo radiography than in typical medical imaging scenarios, even for low-density cargo, with scatter-to-primary ratios ranging from 0.14 for very low density cargo, to between 0.20 and 0.40 for typical cargo, and higher yet for dense cargo.