Robert Elgie

Variations on a Theme

Abstract:This paper provides a definition of semipresidentialism and identifies the set of semipresidential countries in the world. It aims to isolate the independent impact of semipresidentialism on democratic performance. The conclusion is that countries should avoid highly presidentialised semipresidential systems, whereas semipresidential systems with ceremonial presidents and strong prime ministers have performed well. In semipresidential systems where both the president and the prime minister have significant powers, the situation is more complex. Many such countries have democratized successfully, but only despite the institutional crises caused by this particular form of semipresidentialism. So, a balanced form of semipresidentialism is a risky choice for newly-democratizing regimes.

Semi-presidentialism in Europe

1. The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism 2. Austria 3. Finland 4. France 5. Iceland 6. Republic of Ireland 7. Bulgaria 8. Lithuania 9. Poland 10. Romania 11. Russia 12. Slovenia 13. Ukraine 14. Semi-presidentialism and Comparative Institutional Engineering

Credible commitment, political uncertainty, or policy complexity? Explaining variations in the independence of non-majoritarian institutions in France

A common feature of contemporary political systems is the increasing amount of delegation from governments to non-majoritarian institutions. Governments may decide to delegate authority to such institutions for reasons relating to credible commitments, political uncertainty and policy complexity. This article focuses on Independent Administrative Authorities ( Autorites administratives independantes ) in France. We demonstrate that these institutions enjoy varying degrees of independence. We find that the degree of independence varies as a function of two factors: the need to make a credible commitment in areas subject to market opening and the complexity of policy in particular areas.

The classification of democratic regime types: Conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions

This article examines the classification of regime types. It shows that most writers classify regime types with reference to both their dispositional properties (whether there is a president and/or a prime minister, whether or not they are popularly elected and whether or not they serve for a fixed term) and their relational properties (the actual patterns of executive politics in the political system). It is argued that this juxtaposition of dispositional and relational properties creates a conceptual ambiguity. As a result, it is concluded that classifications of regime types should be made on the basis of either dispositional or relational properties but not both together. It then shows that writers who classify regime types with reference to relational properties are likely to make highly contestable assumptions about how power is actually exercised. This is because the question of where executive power lies in a particular country is often subject to not just one incontestable interpretation but to a number of contestable and mutually exclusive interpretations. This point is illustrated by examining the case of the Fifth French Republic. Therefore, it is concluded that the classification of regime types should be made with reference to dispositional properties alone.

Democratic accountability and central bank independence: Historical and contemporary, national and European perspectives

Recently there has been a general move towards greater central bank independence in Europe. Countries such as Belgium, Britain, France and Spain have all increased the autonomy of their respective central banks. In this context, some people have argued that the prospects for democratic, representative government have been weakened. In these countries, democratically elected governments can no longer control the process of monetary policy making. By constructing an index of central banks’ independence, this article shows that the recent moves towards central bank independence in Britain and France have not challenged the basic foundations of indirect political accountability. However, it also shows that the proposed institutional architecture of the European Central Bank is a departure from the norms of political accountability and that, in this case, there is a distinct ‘democratic deficit’ which needs to be addressed.

Divided government in comparative perspective

Divided government occurs when the executive fails to enjoy majority support in at least one working house of the legislature. To date, the study of divided government has focused almost exclusively on the United States. However, divided government occurs much more widely. It occurs in other presidential systems. Moreover, it is also the equivalent of minority government in parliamentary regimes and cohabitation in French-style semi-presidential systems. This book examines the frequency, causes and management of divided government in comparative context, identifying the similarities and differences between the various experiences of this increasingly frequent form of government. The countries studied include Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Mexico, Poland, and the US.

Models of Executive Politics: a Framework for the Study of Executive Power Relations in Parliamentary and Semi-presidential Regimes

The study of executives politics has been characterized by dichotomous country-specific debates about whether there is, for example, prime ministerial or cabinet government. Recent work has established new terms for these debates leading to more pluralistic conceptualizations of executive politics. Nevertheless, this work has not created the conditions for rigorous cross-national comparison. This article establishes a framework to compare executive branch power relations. It identifies six models of executive politics comprising a comprehensive set of ways in which power may be distributed amongst chief executives, cabinets, ministers and bureaucrats. On the basis of this framework it is argued that it is necessary to engage in empirical observation to determine which models of government occur and to identify the reasons why these models emerge.

From Linz to Tsebelis: three waves of presidential/parliamentary studies?

The debate about the relative merits of presidentialism and parliamentarism has a long history, but it was revived in 1990 with Juan Linzs articles about the supposed perils of presidentialism and the virtues of parliamentarism. The argument presented in this review is that we are now witnessing a ‘third wave’ of presidential/parliamentary studies since 1990. The ‘first wave’ began with Linzs articles. It was characterized by a debate in which there was one explanatory variable (the regime type) and one dependent variable (the success of democratic consolidation). The ‘second wave’ of presidential/parliamentary studies began around 1992–93. In the ‘second wave’ there is more than one explanatory variable (the regime type, usually, plus the party system and/or leadership powers) and often a different dependent variable (‘good governance’ as opposed to democratic consolidation). The ‘third wave’ is quite different. This work is informed by more general theories of political science. Here, the respective merits of presidential and parliamentary regimes are not necessarily the sole focus of the work. However, its overarching approach informs the debate in this area in a more or less direct manner. The argument in this review article is that the ‘third wave’ of studies has much to offer the ongoing debate about the relative merits of presidentialism and parliamentarism.

Maximizing the Reliability of Cross-National Measures of Presidential Power

This article aims to maximize the reliability of presidential power scores for a larger number of countries and time periods than currently exists for any single measure, and in a way that is replicable and easy to update. It begins by identifying all of the studies that have estimated the effect of a presidential power variable, clarifying what scholars have attempted to capture when they have operationalized the concept of presidential power. It then identifies all the measures of presidential power that have been proposed over the years, noting the problems associated with each. To generate the new set of presidential power scores, the study draws upon the comparative and local knowledge embedded in existing measures of presidential power. Employing principal component analysis, together with the expectation maximization algorithm and maximum likelihood estimation, a set of presidential power scores is generated for a larger set of countries and country time periods than currently exists, reporting 95 per cent confidence intervals and standard errors for the scores. Finally, the implications of the new set of scores for future studies of presidential power is discussed.

Semi-presidentialism and democracy

Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy R.Elgie , S.Moestrup & Y-S.Wu PART I: VARIETIES OF SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy: Institutional Choice, Performance and Evolution R.Elgie The Study of Semi-Presidentialism: An Holistic Approach Y-S.Wu PART II: THE PERFORMANCE OF SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM: GENERAL AND REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES Overview of the Performance of Semi-Presidentialism S.Moestrup Parliamentary Cohesion and Government Formation in Semi-Presidential Democracies J-W.Lin Semi-Presidentialism in Western Europe R.Elgie Semi-Presidentialism under Post-Communism O.Protsyk Semi-Presidentialism and Democratic Development in East Asia B.Reilly Semi-Presidentialism in Africa Patterns and Trends S.Moestrup PART III: THE PERFORMANCE OF SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM: COUNTRY PERSPECTIVES The President as a Backseat Driver: Portugals Evolving Semi-Presidentialism C.Jalali Taiwan: Democratic Consolidation under Presidential Supremacy Y-S.Wu & J-H.Tsai Semi-Presidentialism and Parliamentary Oligarchy in Post-Orange Ukraine K.Matsuzato Moldovas Transition from Semi-Presidentialism: Parliamentary Intentions, Presidential Outcome W.Crowther Semi-Presidentialism in the Weimar Republic: A Failed Attempt at Democracy Y-C.Shen Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy: What Have we Learnt? R.Elgie