Robert Fleetcroft

Effects of payment for performance in primary care: qualitative interview study.

Objectives To understand the effects of a large scale ‘payment for performance’ scheme (the Quality and Outcomes Framework [QOF]) on professional roles and the delivery of primary care in the English National Health Service. Methods Qualitative semi-structured interview study. Twenty-four clinicians were interviewed during 2006: one general practitioner and one practice nurse in 12 general practices in eastern England with a broad range of sociodemographic and organizational characteristics. Results Participants reported substantial improvements in teamwork and in the organization, consistency and recording of care for conditions incentivized in the scheme, but not for non-incentivized conditions. The need to carry out and record specific clinical activities was felt to have changed the emphasis from ‘patient led’ consultations and listening to patients’ concerns. Loss of continuity of care and of patient choice were described. Nurses experienced increased workload but enjoyed more autonomy and job satisfaction. Doctors acknowledged improved disease management and teamwork but expressed unease about ‘box-ticking’ and increased demands of team supervision, despite better terms and conditions. Doctors were less motivated to achieve performance indicators where they disputed the evidence on which they were based. Participants expressed little engagement with results of patient surveys or patient involvement initiatives. Some participants described data manipulation to maximize practice income. Many felt overwhelmed by the flow of policy initiatives. Conclusions Payment for performance is driving major changes in the roles and organization of English primary health care teams. Non-incentivized activities and patients’ concerns may receive less clinical attention. Practitioners would benefit from improved dissemination of the evidence justifying the inclusion of new performance indicators in the QOF.

Do the incentive payments in the new NHS contract for primary care reflect likely population health gains

Objective: The new contract for primary care in the UK offers fee-for-service (FFS) payments for a wide range of activities in a quality outcomes framework (QOF), with payments designed to reflect likely workload. This study aims to explore the link between these financial incentives and the likely population health gains. Methods: The study examines a subset of eight preventive interventions covering 38 of the 81 clinical indicators in the quality framework. The maximum payment for each service was calculated and compared with the likely population health gain in terms of lives saved per 100,000 population based on evidence from McColl et al. (1998). Results: Maximum payments for the eight interventions examined make up 57% of the total maximum payment for all clinical interventions in the (QOF). There appears to be no relationship between pay and health gain across these eight interventions. Two of the eight interventions (warfarin in atrial fibrillation and statins in primary prevention) receive no incentive. Conclusions: Payments in the new contract do not reflect likely population health gain. There is a danger that clinical activity may be skewed towards high-workload activities that are only marginally effective, to the detriment of more cost-effective activities. If improving population health is the primary goal of the NHS, then FFS incentives should be designed to reflect likely health gain rather than likely workload.

Value for money and the Quality and Outcomes Framework in primary care in the UK NHS.

BACKGROUND The Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) is a pioneering attempt to improve the quality of primary care in the UK through the use of financial rewards. Despite its achievements, there are concerns that the QOF may offer poor value for money. AIM To assess the cost-effectiveness of QOF payments. DESIGN OF STUDY Economic analysis. SETTING England, UK. METHOD Cost-effectiveness evidence was identified for a subset of nine QOF indicators with a direct therapeutic impact. These data were then applied to an analytic framework to determine the conditions under which QOF payments would be cost-effective. This framework was constructed to assess the cost-effectiveness of QOF payments by modelling the incentive structure using cost-effectiveness thresholds of 20 000 and 30 000 UK pounds per quality-adjusted life year (QALY) gained, to represent good value to the NHS. It used 2004/2005 data on the QOF performance of all English primary care practices. RESULTS Average indicator payments ranged from 0.63 to 40.61 UK pounds per patient, and the percentage of eligible patients treated ranged from 63% to 90%. The proportional changes required for QOF payments to be cost-effective varied widely between the indicators. Although most indicators required only a fraction of a 1% change to be cost-effective, for some indicators improvements in performance of around 20% were needed. CONCLUSION For most indicators that can be assessed, QOF incentive payments are likely to be a cost-effective use of resources for a high proportion of primary care practices, even if the QOF achieves only modest improvements in care. However, only a small subset of the indicators has been considered, and no account has been taken of the costs of administering the QOF scheme.

The UK pay-for-performance programme in primary care: estimation of population mortality reduction

BACKGROUND General practices in the UK contract with the government to receive additional payments for high-quality primary care. Little is known about the resulting impact on population health. AIM To estimate the potential reduction in population mortality from implementation of the pay-for-performance contract in England. DESIGN OF STUDY Cross-sectional and modelling study. SETTING Primary care in England. METHOD Twenty-five clinical quality indicators in the contract had controlled trial evidence of mortality benefit. This was combined with condition prevalence, and the differences in performance before and after contract implementation, to estimate the potential mortality reduction per indicator. Improvement was adjusted for pre-existing trends where data were available. RESULTS The 2004 contract potentially reduced mortality by 11 lives per 100 000 people (lower-upper estimates 7-16) over 1 year, as performance improved from baseline to the target for full incentive payment. If all eligible patients were treated, over and above the target, 56 (29-81) lives per 100 000 might have been saved. For the 2006 contract, mortality reduction was effectively zero, because new baseline performance for a typical practice had already exceeded the target performance for full payment. CONCLUSION The contract may have delivered substantial health gain, but potential health gain was limited by performance targets for full payment being set lower than typical baseline performance. Information on both baseline performance and population health gain should inform decisions about future selection of indicators for pay-for-performance schemes, and the level of performance at which full payment is triggered.

A review of clinical practice guidelines found that they were often based on evidence of uncertain relevance to primary care patients

Objectives Primary care patients typically have less severe illness than those in hospital and may be overtreated if clinical guideline evidence is inappropriately generalized. We aimed to assess whether guideline recommendations for primary care were based on relevant research. Study Design and Setting Literature review of all publications cited in support of National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) recommendations for primary care. The relevance to primary care of all 45 NICE clinical guidelines published in 2010 and 2011, and their recommendations, was assessed by an expert panel. Results Twenty-two of 45 NICE clinical guidelines published in 2010 and 2011 were relevant to primary care. These 22 guidelines contained 1,185 recommendations, of which 495 were relevant to primary care, and cited evidence from 1,573 research publications. Of these cited publications, 590 (38%, range by guideline 6–74%) were based on patients typical of primary care. Conclusion Nearly two-third (62%) of publications cited to support primary care recommendations were of uncertain relevance to patients in primary care. Guideline development groups should more clearly identify which recommendations are intended for primary care and uncertainties about the relevance of the supporting evidence to primary care patients, to avoid potential overtreatment.

How a universal health system reduces inequalities: lessons from England

Background Provision of universal coverage is essential for achieving equity in healthcare, but inequalities still exist in universal healthcare systems. Between 2004/2005 and 2011/2012, the National Health Service (NHS) in England, which has provided universal coverage since 1948, made sustained efforts to reduce health inequalities by strengthening primary care. We provide the first comprehensive assessment of trends in socioeconomic inequalities of primary care access, quality and outcomes during this period. Methods Whole-population small area longitudinal study based on 32 482 neighbourhoods of approximately 1500 people in England from 2004/2005 to 2011/2012. We measured slope indices of inequality in four indicators: (1) patients per family doctor, (2) primary care quality, (3) preventable emergency hospital admissions and (4) mortality from conditions considered amenable to healthcare. Results Between 2004/2005 and 2011/2012, there were larger absolute improvements on all indicators in more-deprived neighbourhoods. The modelled gap between the most-deprived and least-deprived neighbourhoods in England decreased by: 193 patients per family doctor (95% CI 173 to 213), 3.29 percentage points of primary care quality (3.13 to 3.45), 0.42 preventable hospitalisations per 1000 people (0.29 to 0.55) and 0.23 amenable deaths per 1000 people (0.15 to 0.31). By 2011/2012, inequalities in primary care supply and quality were almost eliminated, but socioeconomic inequality was still associated with 158 396 preventable hospitalisations and 37 983 deaths amenable to healthcare. Conclusions Between 2004/2005 and 2011/2012, the NHS succeeded in substantially reducing socioeconomic inequalities in primary care access and quality, but made only modest reductions in healthcare outcome inequalities.

Mind the gap! Evaluation of the performance gap attributable to exception reporting and target thresholds in the new GMS contract: National database analysis

BackgroundThe 2003 revision of the UK GMS contract rewards general practices for performance against clinical quality indicators. Practices can exempt patients from treatment, and can receive maximum payment for less than full coverage of eligible patients. This paper aims to estimate the gap between the percentage of maximum incentive gained and the percentage of patients receiving indicated care (the pay-performance gap), and to estimate how much of the gap is attributable respectively to thresholds and to exception reporting.MethodsAnalysis of Quality Outcomes Framework data in the National Primary Care Database and exception reporting data from the Information Centre from 8407 practices in England in 2005 – 6. The main outcome measures were the gap between the percentage of maximum incentive gained and the percentage of patients receiving indicated care at the practice level, both for individual indicators and a combined composite score. An additional outcome was the percentage of that gap attributable respectively to exception reporting and maximum threshold targets set at less than 100%.ResultsThe mean pay-performance gap for the 65 aggregated clinical indicators was 13.3% (range 2.9% to 48%). 52% of this gap (6.9% of eligible patients) is attributable to thresholds being set at less than 100%, and 48% to patients being exception reported. The gap was greater than 25% in 9 indicators: beta blockers and cholesterol control in heart disease; cholesterol control in stroke; influenza immunization in asthma; blood pressure, sugar and cholesterol control in diabetes; seizures in epilepsy and treatment of hypertension.ConclusionThreshold targets and exception reporting introduce an incentive ceiling, which substantially reduces the percentage of eligible patients that UK practices need to treat in order to receive maximum incentive payments for delivering that care. There are good clinical reasons for exception reporting, but after unsuitable patients have been exempted from treatment, there is no reason why all maximum thresholds should not be 100%, whilst retaining the current lower thresholds to provide incentives for lower performing practices.

Incentive payments are not related to expected health gain in the pay for performance scheme for UK primary care: cross-sectional analysis

BackgroundThe General Medical Services primary care contract for the United Kingdom financially rewards performance in 19 clinical areas, through the Quality and Outcomes Framework. Little is known about how best to determine the size of financial incentives in pay for performance schemes. Our aim was to test the hypothesis that performance indicators with larger population health benefits receive larger financial incentives.MethodsWe performed cross sectional analyses to quantify associations between the size of financial incentives and expected health gain in the 2004 and 2006 versions of the Quality and Outcomes Framework. We used non-parametric two-sided Spearman rank correlation tests. Health gain was measured in expected lives saved in one year and in quality adjusted life years. For each quality indicator in an average sized general practice we tested for associations first, between the marginal increase in payment and the health gain resulting from a one percent point improvement in performance and second, between total payment and the health gain at the performance threshold for maximum payment.ResultsEvidence for lives saved or quality adjusted life years gained was found for 28 indicators accounting for 41% of the total incentive payments. No statistically significant associations were found between the expected health gain and incentive gained from a marginal 1% increase in performance in either the 2004 or 2006 version of the Quality and Outcomes Framework. In addition no associations were found between the size of financial payment for achievement of an indicator and the expected health gain at the performance threshold for maximum payment measured in lives saved or quality adjusted life years.ConclusionsIn this subgroup of indicators the financial incentives were not aligned to maximise health gain. This disconnection between incentive and expected health gain risks supporting clinical activities that are only marginally effective, at the expense of more effective activities receiving lower incentives. When designing pay for performance programmes decisions about the size of the financial incentive attached to an indicator should be informed by information on the health gain to be expected from that indicator.

Attitudes of people with osteoarthritis towards their conservative management: a systematic review and meta-ethnography

Abstract This paper determines the perceptions of people diagnosed with osteoarthritis towards their conservative management strategies. A systematic review of the published (AMED, CINAHL, EMBASE, PsychINFO, SportsDisc, MEDLINE, Cochrane Clinical Trials Registry, PubMed) and unpublished/trial registry databases (WHO International Clinical Trials Registry Platform, Current Controlled Trials, the United States National Institute of Health Trials Registry, NIHR Clinical Research Portfolio Database) searched from their inception to July 2013. Eligible studies included those which presented the attitudes or perceptions of people with osteoarthritis towards non-operative management strategies. Study quality was appraised using the CASP and the Gough’s weight of evidence appraisal tools. Data were analysed through a meta-ethnography approach. Thirty-three studies including 1,314 people with osteoarthritis were sampled; the majority diagnosed with knee osteoarthritis. The overarching themes indicated people with osteoarthritis delay their diagnosis, opting for self-management and informal information gathering. This informal rather than health professional-led guidance is sought and maintained as an important resource throughout the care of this population and is valued. Diagnosis is sought at a ‘critical point’. Healthcare interventions largely provided are poorly perceived. The period of subsequent self-management is an expectation before the inevitable requirement for joint replacement. There remains uncertainty regarding when this is required, but the expected failure of conservative treatment to manage pain and symptoms is common. In conclusion, patients should be enthused towards the principles of self-management and clinicians should not trivialise osteoarthritis. This may provide a more valuable perception of non-operative management to promote its adoption and adherence in managing osteoarthritis.

Living with osteoarthritis: a systematic review and meta-ethnography

Objectives: To review and synthesize the existing literature on the experience of living with a diagnosis of hip and/or knee osteoarthritis (OA). Method: A systematic review was undertaken using meta-ethnography. A search of both published (AMED, CINAHL, EMBASE, PsychINFO, SportsDisc, MEDLINE, Cochrane Clinical Trials Registry, PubMed) and unpublished/trial registry databases [World Health Organization (WHO) International Clinical Trials Registry Platform, Current Controlled Trials, the United States National Institute of Health Trials Registry, National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Clinical Research Portfolio Database] was undertaken from their inception to 5 June 2013. Results: Thirty-two studies formed the meta-ethnography of the lived experiences of people with OA. In total, 1643 people with OA were sampled, the majority diagnosed with knee OA. The evidence base was weak to moderate in quality. The majority of studies indicated that people viewed living with OA negatively. Four key factors influenced their attitudes to the condition: the severity of their symptoms; the impact of these symptoms on their functional capability; their attitude towards understanding their disease; and their perceptions of other people’s beliefs towards their disease. Conclusions: The current literature suggests that greater knowledge of the pathology of OA, management of symptoms, promotion of functional activity for patients and their family/friends networks, and understanding to better inform OA patient’s role in society are all important elements that affect a person’s attitude to OA. By better understanding these factors during future consultations, clinicians may forge stronger relationships with their patients to more effectively manage this long-term disabling condition.