Robert G. Bea

The MRGO Navigation Project: A Massive Human-Induced Environmental, Economic, and Storm Disaster

Abstract It is generally felt in the water resources community that the most significant twenty-first century public works projects will be those undertaken to correct environmental damage caused by twentieth century projects. A second axiom is that the switch from economic development to restoration and mitigation, what we call redemption, often will be precipitated by disaster. Finally, it must be expected that the repair project will cost far more than the initial public investment but also may have economic revitalization potential far exceeding anticipated environmental benefits. We examine this cycle for the federally funded Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO) navigation project east of New Orleans, beginning with its much heralded birth in 1963 as a 122 km long free-flowing tidal canal connecting New Orleans to the Gulf of Mexico and ending with its recent de-authorization and closure. We track the direct and indirect effects of the project through its commercial failure, and then on to the official denial, the pervasive environmental impacts, and finally exposure of its role in flooding New Orleans during Hurricane Betsy in 1965 and more seriously during Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Post de-authorization planning to curtail continuing environmental and economic damage now offers an opportunity to apply lessons that have been learned and to reinstate natural processes that were disrupted or interrupted by the MRGO during the half-century of its operation. One surprising outcome is that the restoration program may turn out to be more commercially successful than the original navigation project, which was conceived as an agent of economic transformation. The U.S. Army Core of Engineers still does not acknowledge, even in the face of compelling scientific evidence, that the MRGO project was a significant cause of early and catastrophic flooding of the Upper and Lower 9th Wards, St. Bernard Parish, and New Orleans East during Hurricane Katrina. A modeling effort that removed the MRGO from the landscape, and restored the cypress swamps and marshes killed by the MRGO, reduced flooding from Hurricane Katrina by 80%. We conclude that the MRGO spelled the difference between localized flooding, and the catastrophe that killed 1464 people and inflicted tens of billions of dollars of property damages. If the MRGO-caused economic damages associated with Hurricanes Betsy and Katrina are combined with those of construction, operation and maintenance, and wetlands destroyed, then the total economic cost of the MRGO is in the hundreds of billions of dollars.

Simulated Wave-Induced Erosion of the Mississippi River–Gulf Outlet Levees during Hurricane Katrina

This case study on the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet earthen berm/spoil bank (EBSB) illustrates a method to quantitatively analyze wave-induced lateral erosion and breaching through the flood side of coastal flood protection levees with grass armor prior to overtopping. Lateral wave-induced erosion was evaluated based on a three-step process: (1) velocity profiles were generated using a general purpose transient dynamic finite element program; (2) resistance to wave-induced erosion as a result of grass cover (turf) on the flood face of the EBSB was estimated and no wave-induced erosion was applied until the grass cover protection failed; and (3) estimated soil erodibility characteristics were used, in combination with the estimated wave-induced flood face velocities, to estimate the magnitude of lateral erosion. This case study identified that soil erodibility characteristics directly impact coastal flood protection levee performance, grass/turf armoring provides erosion protection for a limited duration,...

Investigation of the performance of the New Orleans regional flood protection systems during Hurricane Katrina: Lessons learned

The recent flooding and devastation of the greater New Orleans region during hurricane Katrina represented the most costly peace-time failure of an engineered system in North American history. Extensive investigations and analyses have been performed by several major teams in the wake of this disaster, and some very important lessons have been learned. Many of these have very direct and urgent applications to levee systems in other regions throughout the U.S., and the world. Lessons include the importance of proper evaluation of risk and hazard; so that appropriate decisions can be made regarding the levels of expense and effort that should be directed towards prevention of catastrophe, and the levels of post-disaster response capability that should be maintained as well. The making of appropriate decisions, given this information regarding risk levels, is then also important. Also of vital importance are numerous “engineering” lessons regarding analysis, design, construction and maintenance; hard-won lessons with applications to flood protection systems everywhere. We must now do everything possible to capitalize upon these; and to prevent a recurrence of this type of catastrophe in the future. 1 Professor, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, California 94720. Email: seed@ce.berkeley.edu GSP 161 Embankments, Dams, and Slopes Copyright ASCE 2007 Geo-Denver 2007: New Peaks in Geotechnics Redistribution subject to ASCE license or copyright. Visit http://www.ascelibrary.org

Integrated risk assessment for the natomas basin (California) analysis of loss of life and emergency management for floods

This article assesses the risk to life for the Natomas Basin, a low-lying, rapidly urbanizing region in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta in California. Using an empirical method, the loss of life is determined for a flood (high water), seismic, and sunny-day levee breach scenario. The analysis indicated that more than 1000 fatalities may occur in the flood scenario and that there is a high flood risk compared to similar systems (such as dams and flood-prone areas in the Netherlands). Findings show that risk to life highly depends on evacuation effectiveness. The evacuation and emergency management system (EEM) was further analyzed through interviews with regional emergency managers and training exercise evaluation reports. Using an analytic framework, critical factors that affect EEM performance and reliability were identified. Results indicate a need to assess EEM performance to improve preparedness and reduce the risk to life. Findings from the investigation contribute to more integrated risk analyses of both the technical and management components for engineered systems.

Lessons From Failure of the Flood Protection System for the Greater New Orleans Area During Hurricane Katrina

This paper summarizes the key lessons that have been learned from the failure of the flood defense system for the greater New Orleans area during hurricane Katrina. This was a manmade disaster whose roots were firmly embedded in failure of the Technology Delivery System that had been charged with providing adequate flood protection for the public. Two basic approaches for going forward are explored. Recommendations for improvements in engineering criteria and guidelines and in the Technology Delivery System charged with providing acceptable flood protection are advanced.Copyright

Investigation of levee performance in Hurricane Katrina: The inner harbor navigation channel

The Inner Harbor Navigation Channel (IHNC) sits at the heart of the three main populated regions of New Orleans. As shown in Figure 1, a number of breaches of varying severity occurred along the shores of the IHNC during Hurricane Katrina, contributing to the flooding of all three of the most heavily populated protected areas flooded in this event. This paper presents the results of geotechnical and geo-forensic investigations performed to determine the causes of the various failures along the shorelines of the IHNC. This includes the two massive breaches at the west end of the Lower Ninth Ward, and a number of lesser breaches and partial breaches (distressed sections) along other sections of the canal. There are many lessons here, not just for the greater New Orleans region, but for the nation and for the Profession as well.

Determining the Standard of Care of Structural Engineers

In some courts, technical expert testimony can be ruled inadmissible at the sound judicial discretion of the judge. The Daubert and Kumho cases (among others) establish standards under which technical evidence can be admitted, and based on these cases, a judge may deem inadmissible any expert testimony that is not developed through valid, reliable means. However, there is no published valid, reliable method to determine the standard of care of structural engineers. This paper presents a valid, reliable method for expert structural engineers to come to their opinions regarding the standard of care, and regarding a defendants fulfilling that duty. The method presented here is based on the deductive logic of case-based reasoning, with the support, if necessary, of the Delphi Method of determining a consensus of expert opinion. An example of the use of the method as the basis for an experts opinion in a test case is presented.