Robert G. Harris

Public Regulation of Marketing Activity: Part I: Institutional Typologies of Market Failure:

This is the first of a three-part article which provides a comprehensive typology useful in any analysis of how public policies are used to control the operations of market exchanges and marketing systems. The first part, presented here, provides a typology of market failures. The second and third parts, to appear in subsequent issues, provide typologies of regulatory responses and of regulatory failures.

Public Regulation of Marketing Activity, Part III: A Typology of Regulatory Failures and Implications for Marketing and Public Policy

This is the third part of an article which presents comprehensive typologies of market failures (Part 1), regulatory responses (Part II), and regulatory failures. A typology of regulatory failures is provided which examines why public actions intended to correct purported market failures fail to achieve their goals. Key questions that should be addressed in evaluating regulatory responses are discussed.

Public Regulation of Marketing Activity: Part II: Regulatory Responses to Market Failures:

This is the second of a three-part article which provides a comprehensive typology useful in any analysis of how public policies are used to control the operations of market exchanges and marketing systems. The first part (JMM, Spring 1983) provided a typology of market failures. The second part, presented here, provides a typology of regulatory responses to market failures. The third part, to appear in a subsequent issue, provides a typology of regulatory failures and discusses the implications of the three typologies for public policy and marketing decisions.

Divestiture and regulatory policies: Implications for research, development and innovation in the US telecommunications industry

This article reviews recent changes in the structure of the US telecommunications industry and in public policies following the divestiture of AT & T, and examines their implications for R&D and innovation. A brief review of changes in the organization of R&D in the former Bell system is followed by a consideration of the effects of market structures on R&D incentives and organization. Finally the article examines the effects of the line-of-business restrictions imposed on the regional holding companies by the Modification of Final Judgment, the FCCs requirement for open network architecture, and rate-of-return regulation by state utility commissions. The central conclusion of the article is that US telecommunications policies may undermine incentives for R&D by the Bell operating companies while providing considerable incentives for them to turn to foreign manufacturers for new technology.

Competition Access Policies in the Rail Freight Industry, with Comparisons to Telecommunications

One of the essential premises underlying the deregulation of transportation, communications and energy utilities is that, in the absence of price and entry regulation, these industries would be sufficiently competitive to generate improvements in allocative, technical and dynamic efficiency. While legislative changes, regulatory policies and enforcement actions have attempted to sustain competition in each of these industries, there have been substantial differences in approaches across industries. We believe that understanding these differences, and the reasons for the differences, can improve public policies, for three reasons.

Structural economics of the U.S. rail freight industry: Concepts, evidence, and merger policy implications

Abstract The structure of the U.S. rail freight industry has dramatically changed in the past decade due to bankruptcies, mergers and deregulation. Historically, dozens of major railroads covered limited geographic areas, so that most shipments required connections of two or more carriers. There was considerable evidence that most carriers were operating at less than efficient scale. This article presents the basic concepts relating firm size to production costs and reviews empirical studies attempting to measure those relationships. We then review the implications of this evidence for future mergers, merger policy and the research agenda.