Robert J. Flanagan
Stanford University
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Featured researches published by Robert J. Flanagan.
Labour Economics | 1998
Robert J. Flanagan
Abstract This paper explores the effect of a change in economic system on incentives to invest in human capital by analyzing surveys of the wage structure from before and after the November 1989 revolution in the Czech Republic. Prior to 1989, wage setting and job assignments under central planning provided positive returns to human capital acquisition, but the rates of return were lower than in advanced market economies. Returns to schooling rose rapidly during the transition however. The paper includes posttransition evidence on the changing pattern of returns to human capital investments in the state and private sectors.
Staff Papers - International Monetary Fund | 1995
Robert J. Flanagan
From the perspective of market economies, central planning produced distinct distortions in the wage structures of socialist countries. This paper examines the extent to which wage structures in the state and private sectors have adjusted to remove such distortions during the economic transition, using micro data from the Czech Republic. There is strong evidence that Czech wage structures are moving toward patterns observed in market economies, and the change is being led by developments in the private sector. At the same time, the establishment of collective bargaining does not appear to be introducing countervailing distortions into Czech wage structures.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review | 1980
Robert J. Flanagan; Ronald G. Ehrenberg
The Regulatory Process and Labor Earnings focuses on one form of government intervention in the marketplace—state regulation of public utilities. This book provides the most comprehensive study of labor costs in a regulated industry and includes a summary of a major econometric study. This text addresses a number of related issues, such as the effect of regulatory process to the structure of collective bargaining and labor earnings in regulated industries, legal rights of state utility commissions to deny proposed rate increases that are based on excessive upturns in labor cost, and incentive schemes that can be used to encourage public utilities to hold down labor and non-labor cost increases. This publication is a good reference for students and individuals involved in the regulatory process.
Journal of Labor Research | 2005
Robert J. Flanagan
ConclusionsThe view that decline unionization is a disinctive U.S. development different from the experience of our structurally similar neighbour, Canada, and different from the experience of the most advancement industrial countries in Europe and the alleged distinctiveness of U.S. experience supported the search for a cause in U.S. institutions 20 years ago, what now appears as a broad social trend almost as ubiquitous as unions themselves argues for explanations that cross international borders. Structural change is an appealing candidate, for the comparatively high income elasticity of demand for products and services produced in sectors where unions are sparse render declining union density from heavily unionized to lightly unionized sectors are only a minor source of the fall in aggregate unionization rates in most countries.
Journal of Labor Economics | 1989
Robert J. Flanagan
This article analyzes the growth of regulatory litigation under the National Labor Relations Act by modeling the compliance and enforcement decisions made by the employers, unions, and workers covered by the act. An empirical analysis of the model on time-series data for 1950-80 confirms the importance of compliance and enforcement incentives in explaining the growth of unfair labor practice charges. While some actions of the National Labor Relations Board, the regulatory agency established by the act, influence these incentives and the resulting regulatory litigation, changes in some important incentives, notably relative labor costs, are beyond the boards influence.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review | 1987
Robert J. Flanagan; Richard Edwards; Paolo Garonna; Franz Tödtling
The first cross-national study of unions during the troubled past decade in labor relations. The editors have selected six nations as representative of the different ways unions in western industrialized countries participate in politics and the economy. They examine and compare how each system has been affected by and has responded to similar political, social, and economic changes and trends.
Industrial Relations | 1998
Robert J. Flanagan
This paper outlines the industrial relations system under postwar central planning in eastern Europe, examines the changes in these industrial relations systems during the subsequent political and economic transitions, and evaluates the micro and macro impacts of the new institutions on labor market developments during the transitions.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review | 1976
Robert J. Flanagan
Explores the prevalence of employment discrimination against minorities in the United States. Analysis of income received by African-Americans; Measurement of market discrimination; Efficiency of government antidiscriminatory programs; Overview of studies on government employment programs. (Abstract copyright EBSCO.)
Industrial and Labor Relations Review | 1980
Robert J. Flanagan
In September 1979 the Carter administration and the AFL-CIO issued the text of a National Accord, which discussed general principles to be followed in several areas of economic and social policy. In combining discussions of pay-price policy and other economic and social issues, the accord resembles “social contract” arrangements in several Western European countries. This invited paper assesses the viability of the National Accord as a social contract by examining three interrelated issues: the suitability of the accord as an institutional mechanism to secure wage and price restraint, given the characteristics of the underlying wage-determination process in this country; the breadth of institutional representation in the negotiations leading to the accord; and the ability of the negotiators to deliver on their commitments. The author concludes that the accord fails on all those counts to be an effective social contract, but he also argues that any social contract approach to wage and price restraint is unlikely to be successful in this country.
Archive | 1995
Robert J. Flanagan
Changes in economic systems provide a rare opportunity to redesign basic institutional structures in labor markets. This paper attempts to provide guidance for such institutional choice by drawing on the findings of recent labor market research in market economies on the links between institutional structure and labor market performance. After considering the suitability of research from market economies for the labor market problems faced by economies in transition from central planning, the paper considers the effects of alternative institutions for wage determination (collective bargaining structures and minimum wage and indexation legislation), employment security, income security, and active labor market policy.