Robert J. Mackay

Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior

By modeling sophisticated forms of committee behavior-sophistication with full information and expected utility maximization with incomplete information-this article more fully conveys the nature and importance of committee power than does previous work based on sincere committee behavior. Under the germaneness rule, for example, sophisticated committee behavior greatly expands the set of structure-induced equilibrium points. Under the closed rule, as another example, sophisticated committee behavior, based on compromise and a careful crafting of bills, moves legislative outcomes closer to the committees preferred outcomes. Incomplete information and risk aversion lead committee members to behave more cautiously, thereby introducing more inertia into the legislative process and expanding equilibrium sets.

Agenda control by budget maximizers in a multi-bureau setting

Concluding remarksWhile the present extension of the single issue model of agenda control has permitted the examination of a wide array of questions within a consistent overall framework and has generated new insights, some qualifications are in order. First, the analysis, like Niskanens and Romer and Rosenthals is strictly limited to one form of agenda control — take-it-or-leave-it offers made relative to some reversion level. Second, each of the bureaus in this extension are single activity bureaus. As a result, certain types of agenda control that might exist when there are several dimensions to each bureaus activity, such as the mix chosen for various sub-activities or the spatial distribution of the bureaus output, are ignored.See Denzau and Mackay (1980) and Mackay and Weaver (1979a, b) for analyses of these types of agenda control for the case of a single bureau. Third, as a point of reference and for expositional simplicity, the analysis for the most part was executed with a single decisive voter on all issues. As a result, certain complexities and, perhaps, additional ambiguities were avoided.Finally, in an effort to isolate and study the effects of the supply side phenomenon of agenda control, a simple, traditional model of the demand side of the collective choice process was employed. For the simplest demand side-passive supply side models this has typically proved quite adequate. As models of the collective choice process have become more complex, however, taking on more strategic features, the weaknesses of certain of the standard assumptions implicit in this demand side model become more apparent. In particular, the assumption that voters vote sincerely and non-strategically is likely to be strained by most specifications of the dynamics of the voting process since learning on the part of voters would condition expectations and, perhaps, alter choice. The inclusion of expectations formation into the model of voter behavior would certainly seem, at least at the intuitive level, to introduce an interesting additional set of constraints on agenda setters that may limit to some extent the expansionary tendencies described in this paper. In short, each of these qualifications should provide fertile ground for future research.

Consumer Behavior and Quantity Constraints: Some Implications for Monetary Theory

The critical assumption of the standard Walrasian exchange economy is, as Robert Clower and Axel Leijonhufvud point out, that each individual transactor, even though he is a price taker, believes that he will be able to realize his desired transaction quantities at the prevailing prices. The possibility that individuals may not be able to realize their desired transaction quantities has formed the basis of some current work on monetary disequilibrium-particularly that on constrained consumer behavior, or the dual-decision hypothesis (see [2, 5, 11, 15, 19, 20] ). Additionally, the dual decision hypothesis has been advanced as the theoretical rationale for the Keynesian consumption function. The purpose of this paper is to examine formally the behavior of an individual transactor when the Walrasian conditions are not fulfilled and he faces quantity constraints on his purchases and sales in an exchange economy with money. In the f1rst section of this paper we state the utility maximization problem of the individual when he faces quantity constraints and derive the partial derivatives of his constrained demand functions for commodities and money. In the second section, we present the implications of our analysis for the dual decision hypothesis. Our analysis indicates that only in a special case does the presence of quantity constraints

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATIES AND INNOVATIONS IN WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY

Concluding RemarksThe Brito and Intriligator paper is an ambitious and provocative piece of work. The lack of a satisfactory theoretical model of the interactions between the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the bureaucratic apparatus is one of the major shortcomings of modern political economy. In general, efforts by political theorists to remedy this deficiency should be encouraged. The present authors, in particular, should be encouraged to continue their line of research, refining and further developing their political model, while applying it to other important policy areas.