Robert K. Faulkner

The First Liberal Democrat: Locke's Popular Government

This article discusses the democratic side of Lockes political thought, which is generally not appreciated. How is it that Lockean constitutionalism is also “popular government,” institutions, that is, but institutions considerably informed by a democratic spirit? The answer involves Lockes three characteristic innovations in institution-planning: “civil” government, a supreme “legislative” power coupled with a responsible executive, and, inter alia , a vigilant “majority”—a party or movement of the people with authority to elect to government and to rebel against any non-popular government. While Locke does raise up a powerful executive, he also makes it dependent as a rule on a rather democratic legislative. What Locke wishes to induce over time is something like parliamentary government, with the executive vested in a cabinet and the whole more or less responsible to the people in his sense, especially to a majority. To what extent are liberal democracies democratic? That question guides this reconsideration of the first and fundamental plan for liberal government, that of John Locke. I shall argue that Lockes plans are more democratic, and more radical too, than is generally believed. True, important parts of Lockes teaching correspond to undemocratic features with which we are now quite familiar. Liberal democracies have more or less capitalist economies in which wealth and big corporations are protected, they are moved not only by public opinion but also by liberal opinion-leaders of one stripe or another, they are governed not by the people in assembly but by constitutional governments.

Preface to Liberalism: Locke's First Treatise and the Bible

A modern constitution is a man-made fundamental law, and it sets up a supreme government as agent of the people. What, however, of the commandments of the supreme God? How in face of Him can a man-made law and government be fundamental and supreme?1

Bickel's Constitution: The Problem of Moderate Liberalism

Alexander Bickels three most comprehensive books explore a common constitutional-political theme, the manner in which sound political judgment should guide judges and scholars who authoritatively interpret the United States Constitution. Yet the works differ, and the differences illuminate a dual development of Bickels understanding: a growing fear of the contemporary obstacles to politic constitutional judgment, and a growing thoughtfulness in coming to grips with these obstacles. The Least Dangerous Branch had invented politic techniques for applying the judiciarys principles. The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress cautioned against judicial application, by novel techniques, of an impolitic egalitarian faith. The Morality of Consent , upon which this paper concentrates, elaborates Bickels turn from the techniques of judicial power to the wise direction of judicial power. The paper considers the direction that Bickel proposes.

The Price of Efficacy: Aristotle and Executive Power

How to understand that now ubiquitous form of political and social leadership, the executive? We Americans, of course, begin by looking at our own executives, chief executives, and the chief executive, our president. Executive education programs abound, as do treatises on CEOs and the presidency. We look at what we have and how and whether it works, and we should rightly judge by what seems inevitable or best for our organizations and country.

Honorable Ambition: Reply to Critics

Abstract Does Aristotles case for honorable statesmen endanger the case for democratic institutions and equal rights, as two critics contend? It had better not: democracies too need the guidance of a Mandela, an FDR, a Washington. Also, the ancient thinkers had their own doubts about grand ambition, seeking to cabin such types through education and moderate republics, including democratic republics. Also, the objection neglects the relativism, doctrinairism, and postmodernist disillusion that eventually undermined modern political philosophy. Might the old philosophers’ reasonableness, not least on the topic of leadership, be now indispensable to political science? After such points I address the other criticisms: have I not neglected the Biblical improvements on classical political science? Do I portray adequately Platos analysis of that quintessential lover of power and glory, Alcibiades?