Robert K. Fleck

World Bank Independence: A Model and Statistical Analysis of US Influence

This paper develops a model to test whether World Bank lending caters to US interests. We use country-level panel data to examine the geographic distribution of World Bank lending to 110 countries from 1968 to 2002. After controlling for country characteristics expected to influence the distribution of lending in a manner consistent with the World Banks charter and stated allocation mechanisms, we introduce variables reflecting US interests. The empirical results are consistent with a significant US influence, but one which varies across presidential administrations. These findings have important implications because donor influence may reduce the credibility, and hence the development effectiveness, of multilateral aid organizations.

How Do Political Changes Influence US Bilateral Aid Allocations? Evidence from Panel Data

This paper examines the role of US domestic politics in aid allocation using panel data on 119 countries from 1960 to 1997. Employing proxies for four allocation criteria (development concerns, strategic importance, commercial importance, and democratization), we find evidence that each has influence, although the evidence is stronger for some criteria (development, commercial) than for others (strategic, democratization). Their influence depends on the composition of the US government. When the president and Congress are liberal, development concerns receive more weight than when the president and/or Congress are more conservative. When the Congress is more conservative, commercial concerns have more weight than when the Congress is liberal. These findings are important in light of current attempts to overhaul the allocation of aid.

The Origins of Democracy: A Model with Application to Ancient Greece*

Abstract This paper seeks to provide an improved understanding of the origins of democracy. It begins by developing a theoretical model to demonstrate how exogenous economic conditions can influence the incentives to establish democratic institutions. The model predicts that democratic institutions will expand where they mitigate important time‐inconsistency problems and, therefore, encourage investment. Exogenous conditions determine the magnitude of those time‐inconsistency problems and, hence, the likelihood of democracy. A comparison of ancient Greek city‐states suggests that the conditions under which democracy first emerged support the model. Other potential applications are discussed.

Foreign Aid and Domestic Politics: Voting in Congress and the Allocation of USAID Contracts across Congressional Districts

This paper investigates the relationship between congressional support for foreign aid and the distribution of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) contract spending across congressional districts within the United States. The extent to which such a relationship matters has become increasingly important in recent years, as the end of the Cold War and the advent of the Republican-controlled Congress have eroded the traditional base of support for foreign aid. We develop a model to illustrate how the distribution of contract spending could be used to increase support for foreign aid, but at the expense of development impact, in effect trading quality for quantity. Data on domestic foreign aid contract spending and votes in the 104th Congress House of Representatives allow us to test whether the geographic distribution of USAID contract spending within the United States is consistent with a systematic attempt to build support for foreign aid in Congress. Econometric results provide little evidence of such attempts, apparently because voting on this issue is insensitive to the distribution of contract spending.

“Rulers ruled by women”: an economic analysis of the rise and fall of women’s rights in ancient Sparta

Until modern times, most women possessed relatively few formal rights. The women of ancient Sparta were a striking exception. Although they could not vote, Spartan women reportedly owned 40 percent of Sparta’s agricultural land, and enjoyed other rights that were equally extraordinary. We offer a simple economic explanation for the Spartan anomaly. The defining moment for Sparta was its conquest of a neighboring land and people, which fundamentally changed the marginal products of Spartan men’s and Spartan women’s labor. To exploit the potential gains from a reallocation of labor—specifically, to provide the appropriate incentives and the proper human capital formation—men granted women property (and other) rights. Consistent with our explanation for the rise of women’s rights, when Sparta lost the conquered land several centuries later, the rights for women disappeared. Two conclusions emerge that may help explain why women’s rights have been so rare for most of history. First, in contrast to the historical norm, the optimal (from the men’s perspective) division of labor among Spartans involved women in work that was not easily monitored by men. Second, the rights held by Spartan women may have been part of an unstable equilibrium, which contained the seeds of its own destruction.

Voter Influence and Big Policy Change: The Positive Political Economy of the New Deal

What conditions cause major policy changes under representative government? This article addresses that question by providing a theoretically grounded analysis of a massive policy change: the New Deal. It explains how the economic problems of the early 1930s initiated changes on several dimensions of policy: federal spending, labor market regulation, and civil rights. The article concludes by considering the broader lessons learned from the political economy of the New Deal.

On the Benefits and Costs of Legal Expertise: Adjudication in Ancient Athens

Legal expertise permits detailed laws to be written and enforced, but individuals with expertise may employ their special knowledge to skew decisions in privately beneficial directions. We illustrate this tradeoff in a simple model, which we use to guide our analysis of the legal system in ancient Athens. Rather than accepting the costs of expertise in return for the benefits, as do most modern societies, the Athenians designed a legal system that banned professional legal experts. And this was not because Athenian society was simple: The Athenians employed sophisticated contingent contracts and litigated frequently (to the point that the law courts featured prominently in several famous comedies). Furthermore, the Athenians recognized that forgoing expertise was costly, and where the cost was particularly high, designed institutions that made use of expertise already existing in society, employed knowledgeable individuals who were unable to engage in significant rent-seeking, or increased the private returns to collecting publicly beneficial information. Although the Athenian legal system differs in many ways from modern legal systems, it nonetheless functioned very effectively. Investigation of the Athenian system highlights how important it is for institutional designers to consider legal institutions as a bundle, whose pieces must complement one another.

How Tyranny Paved the Way to Democracy: The Democratic Transition in Ancient Greece

Considerable scholarly work has examined the transition to democracy. In this paper, we investigate a path to democracy that is very different from that typically described. During the Archaic period (800–500 BCE), many Greek poleis (city-states) replaced aristocracies with a more narrow governing institution—an autocrat known as the tyrant. Yet as classical scholars have noted, many of the poleis where tyrants reigned in the Archaic period became among the broadest democracies in the subsequent Classical period (500–323 BCE). We analyze a data set of ancient Greek political regime types and review the history of the best-known Archaic period tyrants in order to explore why a transitory narrowing of power—Greek tyranny was a transitory institution—can set the stage for democratization. We briefly consider other historical and modern examples. Our paper shows why an understanding of progress toward democracy requires recognizing the potential importance of nonmonotonic transition paths.

Democratic Opposition to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Reply to Seltzer

Andrew J. Seltzer raises an interesting question: How large was the net effect of southern political institutions on congressional support for the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)? Although Seltzer claims to use my econometric results to show that those institutions had little effect, his interpretation of my results depends entirely on two assumptions that I did not make and that he does not justify. The first assumption is that two variables—the Turnout-Manufacturing Correlation and Turnout —somehow “defined the southern political system.” The second is that southern political institutions caused higher values of Turnout-Manufacturing Correlation . Seltzers assumptions are theoretically baseless and empirically indefensible, and they lead him to the wrong conclusion. I will explain why.

Vicious Cycle: Presidential Decision Making in the American Political Economy. By Constantine J. Spiliotes. College Station: Texas A M University Press, 2002. Pp. xv, 212.

Constantine J. Spiliotes makes a substantial new contribution to the literature on presidential decision making. Spiliotes seeks to bring together two largely separate literatures: presidential studies and rational choice theory. This is a formidable task: Economists and rational-choice political scientists typically view traditional presidential studies as excessively anecdotal for the purpose of establishing generally applicable theories, and presidential-studies scholars typically view rational-choice models as excessively abstract and parsimonious for the purpose of understanding the complexities of the presidency.