Robert Kissack

The performance of the European Union in the International Labour Organization

Abstract This article examines European Union (EU) performance by assessing its effectiveness in the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the relevance of the EU to its major stakeholders between 1992 and 2010. Making a distinction between technical and political domains, it maps the ILO policy-making structures in which the EU must operate. In the technical domain, it argues that although the EU has been effective in uploading its policy preferences into ILO labour standards, the relevance of collective EU representation to the member states has marginally increased since 1992 by comparison to the previous 20 years. In the political domain, there has been considerable progress enhancing EU performance in promoting compliance with labour standards within the ILO’s monitoring system, although the increase results more from higher relevance than from greater effectiveness. It also argues that the institutional environment of the ILO, constituted by its rules, norms and practices, plays an important role in assessing EU performance. Doing so calls into question established assumptions about EU behaviour in international organisations.

The EU in the Negotiations of a UN General Assembly Resolution on a Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty

The Nobel Laureate Gabriel Garcia Marquez begins A Chronicle of a Death Foretold with a description of a brutal murder. The novel then proceeds to tell the story of the events leading up to the murder, of coincident, chance and (mis)fortune during the previous day. The reader’s knowledge of what happens reinforces a belief in destiny, despite the haphazardness of the protagonists’ actions. In this chapter, something not altogether dissimilar will be presented; there is no suspense, nor drama. The Member States of the European Union (EU) were part of broad coalition that supported a resolution in the 62nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) calling for a moratorium on the use of the death penalty (A/RES/62/149). That the EU should have been part of this process seems so obvious as to be trivial, considering the commitment to effective multilateralism articulated in the 2003 European Security Strategy, or the centrality of outlawing the death penalty in the context of EU normative power (Manners, 2002, pp. 245–52). It appears on the surface to be a straightforward example of the EU promoting human rights externally, consistent with treaty principles and its international identity.

Consensus in Multilateral Institutions

The second of Inis Claude’s three ideal types of decision making in international organisations is the egalitarianism of international law in which ‘every state has equal voice in international proceedings, and that no state can be bound without its consent’ (Claude 1984: 119). The logical implications of giving equal weight to ‘sovereign equality and sovereign immunity from externally imposed legislation’ imply demanding unanimity in all decisions taken between states (Claude 1984: 119). Both in the EU and in multilateral organisations more generally, unanimity equates to an effective veto power by each state over the others. In a perversion of the principle that unanimity means the rule of all by all, in effect ‘it confers upon a minority of one the procedural competence and the moral authority to determine policy in a negative fashion’ (Claude 1984: 125). The literature applying rational choice modelling to states bargaining in a unanimity–based decision–making system is divided into two camps, one asserting a pessimistic view that lowest common denominators tend to favour the status quo position, while the more optimistic suggesting that median outcomes are possible in the long–term (Koenig & Slapin 2006). The critics of unanimity have been around for a considerable length of time, dating back at least as far as Politis who stated that in international organisations, ‘the rule of unanimity may lead to paralysis and anarchy’ (Politis 1928, quoted in Claude 1984: 120).

European Union Performance in the Maritime Labour Convention

This chapter examines the performance of the European Union (EU) in the International Labour Organization during the six years negotiating the 2006 Maritime Labour Convention (MLC). The existing literature on the case portrays the EU as an important participant in the process. By following the common methodology of identifying EU output, the outcome of its negotiating efforts and the impact on the final document, the chapter challenges this assessment of the EU. It argues that many of the EU’s goals were widely supported by all negotiators and demonstrating EU impact on the eventual outcome is hard. Through a detailed analysis of the records of proceeding of the seven preparatory conferences, it argues that of five important components of the MLC, in three the EU was not influential, in the fourth its influence is ambiguous and only in the fifth (social security provision) did it make an unequivocal impact. The primary reason is that during the early years of negotiations, the EU was not a relevant actor for its member states, which chose to participate directly in the process. During this time, many important issues were decided and the EU qua EU was present. Later, when it did promote common positions through the Presidency and Commission, the tripartite structure of negotiations, the norm of seeking consensus and the relative alignment of preferences among all actors lessened the ability of the EU to stand out as a key actor. In short, EU performance was low because it came to the table too late.

The Global Financial Crisis and Emerging Economies: EU Accommodation and Entrenchment in the IMF

This chapter examines the impact of emerging economies’ efforts to reform the International Monetary Fund in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis on the European Union and its member states. It argues that EU member states have accommodated some demands for reform by accepting changes to the distribution of votes on the Executive Board and the number of European Executive Directors that diminish European influence. Yet at the same time, the EU has increased its cooperation with the IMF in addressing crises inside the eurozone, going so far as unilaterally formalising the relationship in the European Stability Mechanism Treaty. This, it is argued, is an example of entrenchment of a controversial policy in the eyes of non-EU IMF members.

Breaking the Deadlock of Regional Bloc Politics: Cross-Regional Coalitions and Human Rights in the UNGA

Let us begin with a simple question: what ‘regions’ are we talking about? The membership of the UN Organisation is divided into five regional constituencies from which representative states are nominated to serve on the various bodies where membership is restricted – such as the Security Council, ECOSOC and the Human Rights Council.1 Alternatively, a region can be a self-selected and exclusive group of states with economic, political or ideational ties. Regional organisations such as the European Union (EU), MERCOSUR or Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) clearly fit this definition as having limited membership set predominantly, but not exclusively, by geographic criteria.2 Much has been written about the relationship between these sorts of regional organisation and universal organisations such as the UN, its specialised agencies or the World Trade Organisation. There are three dominant theoretical perspectives on their relationship. The first, federalism, advocates the principal of subsidiary in which regional organisations serve specific political purposes that neither universal organisations, nor nation states, can adequately do. The second, functionalism, regards regional organisations as stepping stones towards universal membership of universal organisations and is concerned with the ‘administration of things, not the governance of men’ (Mitrany 1943). A third way of understanding the relationship between regional and universal organisations is to see regional organisations supersede their member states as the primary actors at the world level, which is neofunctional in intellectual ancestry.

Privilege in Multilateral Institutions

This quotation from Paul Kennedy’s The Parliament of the Man refers to the constitutional arrangements of the UNSC, where the victorious powers of World War II sought to institutionalise their privileged position as primus inter pares among sovereign states. Permanent membership of the UNSC and the ability to veto resolutions potentially damaging to national interests is the exclusive privilege of China, France, Russia, the UK and the US. More than 60 years later, the Great Power status of every member is questioned, albeit on different grounds. Britain and France are better considered upper–medium powers rather than Great Powers in the twentyfirst century, as well as skewing the composition of the UNSC drastically in favour of Europe. Russia’s inheritance of the Soviet seat is justifiable through its possession of a considerable amount of the Soviet Union’s military capability. The necessity of the arsenal, coupled with only middling economic clout, are marks against it. China qualifies by population, geographic size, economic might and is developing ever more sophisticated military capabilities, but critics challenge the legitimacy of an authoritarian government wielding a veto, especially to prevent the UN fulfilling its obligations with respect to human rights (Gowan & Brantner 2008).

The European Union, Multilateralism and the Heterogeneous Multilateral System

The attacks of 9/11 that sent the US spiralling into a neo- conservative vortex of pre- emptive warfare, regime change and unilateral military action had a well- documented spillover into the European Union (EU) (Peterson & Pollack 2003; Calleo 2004). The (in)famous reference by US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to ‘new Europe’ and ‘old Europe’ became the shorthand notation for the divisions in Europe over the 2003 invasion of Iraq,1 led by the US and including among its ‘coalition of the willing’ the UK and Poland. Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro sum up the complex web of political negotiations that took place across Europe and in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in New York during the months leading up to the war (Gordon & Shapiro 2004). They conclude that the divisions that emerged inside Europe and across the Atlantic were in no way inevitable. By the end of 2003, the EU, only a few months away from

Negotiation, Rhetoric and Legitimacy in Multilateral Institutions

Over the previous three chapters, the representation, influence and power of the EU in different international organisations of the multilateral system has been explored. Using Claude’s three ideal types of decision making (majoritarianism, consensus and privilege) as a prism to see multilateral organisations at work, we have generated new important evidence on the behaviour of the EU and its member states across the multilateral system, to show that it cannot be seen as a benign and positive influence in all circumstances and cases. Its report card has been mixed, and there are a number of lessons to be learnt from the exercise that we shall come to presently. As with any framework built on ideal types, actual practice often differs greatly, and without doubt it is impossible to think of a one-size-fits-all approach to studying the EU in the multilateral system. Frequently, international organisations employ composite decision- making structures that make their decision- making procedures highly varied according to their institutional evolution.

Majoritarianism in Multilateral Institutions

As Miles Kahler has stated, the fact that states ‘bitterly contest voting rules’ implies that states care greatly about them and how they operate in practice. This is the first of three chapters that explore in detail the idealtype decision–making processes of consensus intergovernmentalism, majoritarianism and privilege- granting. Inis Claude identifies these as the three primary competing principles for the making of decisions in IR.