Robert Kleinberg

Geographic Routing Using Hyperbolic Space

We propose a scalable and reliable point-to-point routing algorithm for ad hoc wireless networks and sensor-nets. Our algorithm assigns to each node of the network a virtual coordinate in the hyperbolic plane, and performs greedy geographic routing with respect to these virtual coordinates. Unlike other proposed greedy routing algorithms based on virtual coordinates, our embedding guarantees that the greedy algorithm is always successful in finding a route to the destination, if such a route exists. We describe a distributed algorithm for computing each nodes virtual coordinates in the hyperbolic plane, and for greedily routing packets to a destination point in the hyperbolic plane. (This destination may be the address of another node of the network, or it may be an address associated to a piece of content in a Distributed Hash Table. In the latter case we prove that the greedy routing strategy makes a consistent choice of the node responsible for the address, irrespective of the source address of the request.) We evaluate the resulting algorithm in terms of both path stretch and node congestion.

Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations

Algorithmic pricing is the computational problem that sellers (e.g.,in supermarkets) face when trying to set prices for their items to maximize their profit in the presence of a known demand. Guruswami etal. (SODA, 2005) proposed this problem and gave logarithmic approximations (in the number of consumers) for the unit-demand and single-parameter cases where there is a specific set of consumers and their valuations for bundles are known precisely. Subsequently several versions of the problem have been shown to have poly-logarithmic in approximability. This problem has direct ties to the important open question of better understanding the Bayesian optimal mechanism in multi-parameter agent settings; however, for this purpose approximation factors logarithmic in the number of agents are inadequate. It is therefore of vital interest to consider special cases where constant approximations are possible. We consider the unit-demand variant of this pricing problem. Here a consumer has a valuation for each different item and their value for aset of items is simply the maximum value they have for any item in the set. Instead of considering a set of consumers with precisely known preferences, like the prior algorithmic pricing literature, we assume that the preferences of the consumers are drawn from a distribution. This is the standard assumption in economics; furthermore, the setting of a specific set of customers with specific preferences, which is employed in all of the prior work in algorithmic pricing, is a special case of this general Bayesian pricing problem, where there is a discrete Bayesian distribution for preferences specified by picking one consumer uniformly from the given set of consumers. Notice that the distribution over the valuations for the individual items that this generates is obviously correlated. Our work complements these existing works by considering the case where the consumers valuations for the different items are independent random variables. Our main result is a constant approximation algorithm for this problem that makes use of an interesting connection between this problem and the concept of virtual valuations from the single-parameter Bayesian optimal mechanism design literature.

Adaptive routing with end-to-end feedback: distributed learning and geometric approaches

Minimal delay routing is a fundamental task in networks. Since delays depend on the (potentially unpredictable) traffic distribution, online delay optimization can be quite challenging. While uncertainty about the current network delays may make the current routing choices sub-optimal, the algorithm can nevertheless try to learn the traffic patterns and keep adapting its choice of routing paths so as to perform nearly as well as the best static path. This online shortest path problem is a special case of online linear optimization, a problem in which an online algorithm must choose, in each round, a strategy from some compact set S ⊆ Rd so as to try to minimize a linear cost function which is only revealed at the end of the round. Kalai and Vempala[4] gave an algorithm for such problems in the transparent feedback model, where the entire cost function is revealed at the end of the round. Here we present an algorithm for online linear optimization in the more challenging opaque feedback model, in which only the cost of the chosen strategy is revealed at the end of the round. In the special case of shortest paths, opaque feedback corresponds to the notion that in each round the algorithm learns only the end-to-end cost of the chosen path, not the cost of every edge in the network.We also present a second algorithm for online shortest paths, which solves the shortest-path problem using a chain of online decision oracles, one at each node of the graph. This has several advantages over the online linear optimization approach. First, it is effective against an adaptive adversary, whereas our linear optimization algorithm assumes an oblivious adversary. Second, even in the case of an oblivious adversary, the second algorithm performs better than the first, as measured by their additive regret.

Adaptive limited-supply online auctions

We study a limited-supply online auction problem, in which an auctioneer has k goods to sell and bidders arrive and depart dynamically. We suppose that agent valuations are drawn independently from some unknown distribution and construct an adaptive auction that is nevertheless value- andtime-strategy proof. For the k=1 problem we have a strategyproof variant on the classic secretary problem. We present a 4-competitive (e-competitive) strategyproof online algorithm with respect to offline Vickrey for revenue (efficiency). We also show (in a model that slightly generalizes the assumption of independent valuations) that no mechanism can be better than 3/2-competitive (2-competitive) for revenue (efficiency). Our general approach considers a learning phase followed by an accepting phase, and is careful to handle incentive issues for agents that span the two phases. We extend to the k›1 case, by deriving strategyproof mechanisms which are constant-competitive for revenue and efficiency. Finally, we present some strategyproof competitive algorithms for the case in which adversary uses a distribution known to the mechanism.

A Knapsack Secretary Problem with Applications

We consider situations in which a decision-maker with a fixed budget faces a sequence of options, each with a cost and a value, and must select a subset of them online so as to maximize the total value. Such situations arise in many contexts, e.g., hiring workers, scheduling jobs, and bidding in sponsored search auctions. This problem, often called the online knapsack problem, is known to be inapproximable. Therefore, we make the enabling assumption that elements arrive in a randomorder. Hence our problem can be thought of as a weighted version of the classical secretary problem, which we call the knapsack secretary problem. Using the random-order assumption, we design a constant-competitive algorithm for arbitrary weights and values, as well as a e-competitive algorithm for the special case when all weights are equal (i.e., the multiple-choice secretary problem). In contrast to previous work on online knapsack problems, we do not assume any knowledge regarding the distribution of weights and values beyond the fact that the order is random.

Group-theoretic algorithms for matrix multiplication

We further develop the group-theoretic approach to fast matrix multiplication introduced by Cohn and Umans, and for the first time use it to derive algorithms asymptotically faster than the standard algorithm. We describe several families of wreath product groups that achieve matrix multiplication exponent less than 3, the asymptotically fastest of which achieves exponent 2.41. We present two conjectures regarding specific improvements, one combinatorial and the other algebraic. Either one would imply that the exponent of matrix multiplication is 2.

Continuous-time model of structural balance

It is not uncommon for certain social networks to divide into two opposing camps in response to stress. This happens, for example, in networks of political parties during winner-takes-all elections, in networks of companies competing to establish technical standards, and in networks of nations faced with mounting threats of war. A simple model for these two-sided separations is the dynamical system dX/dt = X2, where X is a matrix of the friendliness or unfriendliness between pairs of nodes in the network. Previous simulations suggested that only two types of behavior were possible for this system: Either all relationships become friendly or two hostile factions emerge. Here we prove that for generic initial conditions, these are indeed the only possible outcomes. Our analysis yields a closed-form expression for faction membership as a function of the initial conditions and implies that the initial amount of friendliness in large social networks (started from random initial conditions) determines whether they will end up in intractable conflict or global harmony.

Online auctions and generalized secretary problems

We present generalized secretary problems as a framework for online auctions. Elements, such as potential employees or customers, arrive one by one online. After observing the value derived from an element, but without knowing the values of future elements, the algorithm has to make an irrevocable decision whether to retain the element as part of a solution, or reject it. The way in which the secretary framework differs from traditional online algorithms is that the elements arrive in uniformly random order. Many natural online auction scenarios can be cast as generalized secretary problems, by imposing natural restrictions on the feasible sets. For many such settings, we present surprisingly strong constant factor guarantees on the expected value of solutions obtained by online algorithms. The framework is also easily augmented to take into account time-discounted revenue and incentive compatibility. We give an overview of recent results and future research directions.

The K-armed dueling bandits problem

We study a partial-information online-learning problem where actions are restricted to noisy comparisons between pairs of strategies (also known as bandits). In contrast to conventional approaches that require the absolute reward of the chosen strategy to be quantifiable and observable, our setting assumes only that (noisy) binary feedback about the relative reward of two chosen strategies is available. This type of relative feedback is particularly appropriate in applications where absolute rewards have no natural scale or are difficult to measure (e.g., user-perceived quality of a set of retrieval results, taste of food, product attractiveness), but where pairwise comparisons are easy to make. We propose a novel regret formulation in this setting, as well as present an algorithm that achieves information-theoretically optimal regret bounds (up to a constant factor).

Merlin: A Language for Provisioning Network Resources

This paper presents Merlin, a new framework for managing resources in software-defined networks. With Merlin, administrators express high-level policies using programs in a declarative language. The language includes logical predicates to identify sets of packets, regular expressions to encode forwarding paths, and arithmetic formulas to specify bandwidth constraints. The Merlin compiler maps these policies into a constraint problem that determines bandwidth allocations using parameterizable heuristics. It then generates code that can be executed on the network elements to enforce the policies. To allow network tenants to dynamically adapt policies to their needs, Merlin provides mechanisms for delegating control of sub-policies and for verifying that modifications made to sub-policies do not violate global constraints. Experiments demonstrate the expressiveness and effectiveness of Merlin on real-world topologies and applications. Overall, Merlin simplifies network administration by providing high-level abstractions for specifying network policies that provision network resources.