Robert MacCulloch

Partisan Social Happiness

We use a new approach to study questions in political economy that relies on data on the subjective well-being of a large sample of people living in the OECD over the period 1975-1992. Controlling for the personal characteristics of the respondents, year and country fixed effects and country-specific time trends, we find that the data describe social happiness functions for left-wing and right-wing individuals where inflation and unemployment enter negatively. We use these functions to test the root assumption of partisan business cycle models. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that left-wing individuals care more about unemployment relative to inflation than right-wingers. Interestingly, we find that individuals declare themselves to be happier when the party they support is in power, even after controlling for macroeconomic variables. The effect of politics is large. Finally, we find that these partisan differences cannot be traced back to income differences. That is, it is misleading to assume—as it is done in the previous literature—that the poor (rich) behave similarly to the left (right). For example, inflation and unemployment do not have differential effects across rich and poor and the happiness levels of these two groups are unaffected by the identity of the party in power. Our findings are hard to explain using median voter models but are to be expected in a partisan world. Copyright 2005, Wiley-Blackwell.

Informal Family Insurance and the Design of the Welfare State

We study the problem of unemployment benefit provision when the family is also a provider of social insurance. As a benchmark, a simple model is presented where risk-sharing motives govern intra-family transfers and more generous unemployment benefits, provided by the State, crowd out family risk-sharing arrangements one-for-one. The model is then extended to capture the idea that the State has an advantage vis-a-vis the family in the provision of insurance because it can tax individuals, whereas the family must rely on self-enforcing agreements. In this case, the effect of State transfers on intra-family transfers is found to be more than one-for-one. Thus, somewhat perversely, both informal transfers and total insurance transfers to the unemployed fall as the States generosity increases. This does not imply that the optimal size of the Welfare State is zero. Our results still hold when families are assumed to be better than the State at monitoring the job search activities of the unemployed.

The Determination of Unemployment Benefits

While much empirical research has been done on the labour market consequences of unemployment benefits, there is remarkably little evidence on the forces determining benefits. The paper presents a simple model where workers desire insurance against the possibility of unemployment and unemployment benefits increase the unemployment rate. We then conduct, what we believe, is one of the first empirical analyses of the determinants of the parameters of the unemployment benefit system. Using OECD data for 1971-1989, controlling for year and country fixed effects, and controlling for the political colour of the government, we find evidence suggesting that benefits fall when the unemployment rate is high. This is consistent with the tax-effect described in Wright (1986) and Atkinson (1990). There is weaker evidence that benefits increase with positive changes in the unemployment rate, which may be proxying for the inflow rate and could be called an insurance effect.

Income Inequality and the Taste for Revolution

Although property rights are the cornerstone of market economies, throughout history existing claims have been frequently overturned by revolutions. One unsettled question is whether income inequality affects the likelihood of revolt. This paper takes an approach different from previous studies by introducing data derived from two surveys of revolutionary preferences across a quarter‐million randomly sampled individuals. More people are found to have a preference for revolt when inequality in their nation is high. A 1‐standard‐deviation increase in the Gini coefficient explains up to 38 percent of the standard deviation in revolutionary support. The results hold after controlling for a set of personal characteristics and country and year fixed effects. Since higher levels of income are found to have a negative impact on the taste for revolt, the results suggest that either “going for growth” or implementing policies that reduce inequality can buy off those individuals with revolutionary preferences.

The Role of Freedom, Growth and Religion in the Taste for Revolution

A fundamental question about the determinants of civil conflict is the relative importance of political freedoms versus economic development. This paper takes a new approach to provide an answer by using micro-data based on surveys of revolutionary tastes of 130,000 people living in 61 nations between 1981 and 1997. Controlling for personal characteristics, country and year fixed effects, more freedom and economic growth both reduce revolutionary support. Losing one level of freedom, equivalent to a shift from the US to Turkey, increases support for revolt by 4 percentage points. To reduce support by the same amount requires adding 14 percentage points onto the GDP growth rate. Being Muslim in a free country has no effect on the probability of supporting revolt compared to a non-religious person. However being Muslim in a country that is not free increases it by 13 percentage points. Being Christian in a free country decreases the chance of supporting revolt by 4 percentage points, compared to a non-religious person, and in a not-free country by 1 percentage point.

The Impact of Income on the Taste for Revolt

A fundamental question for economists is whether more income reduces the chance of revolt. To provide answers a large literature has used aggregate level data on actual conflict. This paper takes a different approach by using micro-data sets based on surveys of revolutionary support across one-quarter of a million people. This makes it possible to differentiate, for the first time, between the effects of a persons relative income position within a country and the level of average GDP per capita on the taste for revolt. Studying preferences rather than outcomes helps overcome several empirical problems. These include collective action problems that may lead to no large-scale conflict despite a public taste for revolt and endogeneity problems that exist when actual conflict affects income levels. Controlling for personal characteristics, country and year fixed effects, as well as country-specific time trends, a higher level of average GDP per capita and being relatively high in the income distribution within a country both reduce revolutionary tastes.

Happiness and Beliefs in Criminal Environments

This paper uses newly available data to describe the distribution of crime victimization and other criminal activities (including drug trafficking and corruption) around the world. The paper then documents a negative (positive) correlation between measures of criminal activity and happiness and measures of positive (negative) emotions. The paper also studies the correlation between ideological beliefs and criminal activity, finding that crime victims are more likely to believe that hard work does not pay and that the government should increase the amount of redistribution to the poor.

The taste for revolt

Abstract This paper tests for the characteristics affecting the revolutionary preferences of over 200,000 randomly sampled individuals from surveys taken over the 1970s to 1990s. The chances of supporting revolt are higher if young, lower in the income distribution or unemployed. There are strong differences across ideological lines. For people identifying with the religious right, falling from the top to bottom income quartile increases the probability of supporting revolt by 2 percentage points whereas falling unemployed has no effect. For those identifying with the non-religious left both events increase the probability of supporting revolt by at least 5 percentage points.

Culture, Beliefs and Economic Performance

Beliefs are one component of culture. Data from the World Values Survey is available on a subset of beliefs concerning (broadly) meritocracy and poverty that appear relevant for economics. We document how they vary as well as their distribution across countries. We then correlate these measures of beliefs with economic growth and compare them with institutional and geographical determinants of income. A strong negative relationship is found between leftist economic beliefs and growth but little evidence is found of a relationship with respect to non-economic beliefs. Finally, we briefly discuss some causal effects on beliefs. The evidence suggests that higher country risk and more dependence on natural resources shifts nations to a more leftist set of economic beliefs. Overall the evidence supports the view that cultural specificities may explain why certain institutions cannot be transplanted between nations with different cultural histories and underlines the limit to policy activism.

Unemployment Benefits as a Substitute for a Conservative Central Banker

In the many years since their introduction, positive theories of inflation have rarely been tested. This paper documents a negative relationship between inflation and the welfare state (proxied by the parameters of the unemployment benefit program) that is to be expected in such theories. Because unemployment benefits make the monetary authority less concerned about the plight of the unemployed, building a welfare state has a similar effect to appointing a conservative central banker. The relationship holds in a panel of 20 OECD countries over the period 19611992, a region where Romer finds no evidence of commitment problems. It holds controlling for country and time fixed effects, country specific time trends, other covariates, and using a decadal panel. Interpreted as causal, the estimated effect is economically large: a 1-standard deviation decrease in benefit duration is predicted to add 1.4 percentage points onto inflation, or 31 of the standard deviation in inflation.