Robert Mauro

The role of appraisal in human emotions : a cross-cultural study

Several theories of emotion propose that emotional responses are largely determined by the way events are appraised. To determine whether the proposed dimensions of appraisal are consistent across cultures, 973 Ss from the United States, Japan, Hong Kong, and the Peoples Republic of China were asked to describe emotional experiences. Few differences between the 3 cultures were observed on the more primitive dimensions (pleasantness, attentional activity, certainty, coping ability, and goal/need conduciveness) and on 2 of the more cognitively complex dimensions (legitimacy and norm/self compatibility). More substantial differences were observed on 3 other complex dimensions (control, responsibility, and anticipated effort). Considerable pan-cultural consistency was also observed in the dimensions of subjective experience of emotion and in the relations between these dimensions and cognitive appraisals.

Understanding L.O.V.E. (left out variables error): A method for estimating the effects of omitted variables.

Whenever nonexperimental methods are used to test a hypothesis and 1 or more predictor (independent) variables that may affect the criterion (dependent) variable are omitted from the analyses, it is possible that the estimates of the effects of the predictors are biased or that the omitted variable could account entirely for the effects attributed to one or more of the predictors. In this article, a technique is developed for determining when a variable omitted from a linear model can account for the effects attributed to a predictor included in that model. Social scientists are rarely able to obtain information on all of the factors that may affect their criterion (outcome, dependent) variables. Whenever researchers use nonexperimental methods and fail to account for all of the variables that affect a criterion, their inferences about the effects of the predictors (independent variables) on that criterion may be biased. 1 Whenever a relevant variable is neither held constant nor entered into an analysis, that variable could account entirely for the effects attributed to one or more of the predictor variables included in the analysis. In this article, a technique is developed for determining when a variable omitted from a linear model can account for the effects attributed to a predictor included in that model. This technique is designed to provide a general indication of the potential effects of an omitted variable. There is no associated statistical distribution theory. For an omitted variable to account for the effect of a specific predictor, the omitted variable must (a) have a substantial effect on the criterion variable, (b) be substantially correlated with the predictor in question, and (c) not be substantially correlated with the other predictors in the model. For example, a clinical psychologist might theorize that a disorder is the result of a genetic aberration, whereas another researcher theorizes that this disorder is the result of sociocultural factors and a high level of life stress. The first investigator might then conduct a study in which the family histories of patients are examined and conclude that controlling for age, sex, and socioeconomic status, family history (reflecting the genetic component) of the disorder is a significant predictor of the disorder. The second researcher could criticize this research for not including measures of other potentially important variables, such as life stress, and hypothesize that had a measure of

Caricature and face recognition

Although caricatures are often gross distortions of faces, they frequently appear to be super-portraits capable of eliciting recognition better than veridical depictions. This may occur because faces are encoded as distinctive feature deviations from a prototype. The exaggeration of these deviations in a caricature may enhance recognition because it emphasizes the features of the face that are encoded. In two experiments, we tested the superportrait hypothesis and the encoding-by-caricature hypothesis. In the first experiment, caricatures were recognized better than faces, and true caricatures of previously seen faces were recognized better than the faces from which the caricatures had been developed. In the second experiment, faces and their caricatures were tachistoscopically presented in a sequential same/different reaction time task. Subjects were slower to distinguish the stimuli when the face preceded its caricature, indicating that caricatures are more similar to the encoded representation of a face than are stimuli in which the distinctive features are deemphasized.

The Operational Context of Procedures and Checklists in Commercial Aviation

To design effective and efficient procedures and checklists, one must take into account the full operational context within which these procedures are embedded. This context is defined by the requirements of the technology, the limitations and capabilities of the human operators, and the constraints and affordances of the operational environment. The complexity of this context arises from the interactions of the human, machine, and environment. We present a model of that operational context, THE Model, that lays the foundations for analyzing each of these elements and their interactions, and illustrate its application through the analysis of an aviation accident.

Evaluating Computer Based Training for In Flight Icing

Since the 1940’s a great deal has been learned about aircra ft icing. However, icing accidents continue to occur. Many of these accidents appear to be preventable. Had the pilots known the danger that they were in and had they taken appropriate actions, lives could have been saved. To address this apparent gap in knowledge, a variety of training products have been developed. The most elaborate of these is an interactive computer based training (CBT) product for professional pilots. This CBT was designed both to impart factual knowledge and to enhance pilots’ a bilities to make appropriate operational decisions regarding icing. To accomplish these goals, the educational design of the CBT relied heavily on current work in cognitive science on learning and decision -making. To evaluate the effectiveness of this ap proach, an experiment was conducted. Professional pilots’ factual knowledge of icing and decisions in operational situations were evaluated. Then the participants received one of three educational products: the original CBT, a CBT lacking the interactive exercises, or a booklet on icing. After completing this training, the pilots’ factual knowledge and operational decisions were again evaluated. In addition, subjective evaluations of the materials and evaluations of the pilots’ previous training experie nce were obtained. Preliminary results indicate that the pilots learned more from the CBT and rated it more highly than the other materials and their previous training. This suggests that training based on current knowledge of learning and decision -makin g can be unusually effective and that the time, money, and effort required to produce these products are justified. I. Introduction Over the last 60 years, our understanding of icing has increased substantially. We now know a great deal about the physics, meteorology, and aerodynamic effects of icing. However, the continuing occurrence of icing accidents suggests that this knowledge is not permeating through the aviation community as it should. To address this problem, the Icing Branch at Glenn Research C enter of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) developed a series of videos and other training products designed to teach pilots about in -flight icing. ‡ A recent installment in this series is A Pilot’s Guide to In -flight Icing 1 , a comput er -based training program designed for use by pilots without instructor intervention. A Pilot’s Guide to In -flight Icing was designed to provide pilots with the background and procedural knowledge that would lead them to make appropriate operational decis ions about icing. The primary goal of aviation training should be to provide pilots with the knowledge and skills they need to make appropriate operational decisions and to implement those decisions. Pilots must not only learn a great deal of informatio n, they must learn how to apply their knowledge effectively in the operational environment. In this context, cognitive psychologists make a distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge. 2

Design of Cockpit displays to explicitly support flight crew intervention tasks

In a class of accidents, known as Controlled Flight into Stall (CFIS), a structurally, mechanically, and electronically sound aircraft decelerated through the minimum safe operating speed (1.3 VStall) to the stick-shaker stall speed. These accidents followed a pattern in which a triggering event (e.g., sensor failure, flight crew entry) resulted in an automation mode change, which led to an inappropriate flight control command, which in turn resulted in a trajectory that violated the speed envelope. In all of these cases, the flight crew, who are required to “mind the gap” between the 10-5 automation design standard and the 10-9 operational hazard reliability standard, were not able to intervene in a timely manner. To address this phenomenon, researchers have proposed “low speed alerting” solutions, but this alerting takes place after the speed deviation has occurred. What would it take to detect the speed violation scenario before it occurs? An analysis of the accidents, described in this paper, identified a subcategory of CFIS scenarios in which the automation was no longer actively controlling to the airspeed target. This situation was caused by: (1) the automation no longer being coupled to the control surfaces or (2) the automation being coupled but transitioning to a mode that intentionally does not control to the airspeed target (e.g. Flare, or dormant). The analysis shows that flight deck displays do not provide the explicit information that would enable the flight crew to detect and recognize the inactive speed control or the two contributing factors. The implications of these results for design and certification of flight deck automation are discussed.

Cognitive Science and Aviation Training: Foundations for Effective Learning and Operational Application

Aviation training has remained largely untouched by decades of development in cognitive science. In aviation, people must be trained to perform complicated tasks and make good operational decisions in complex dynamic environments. However, traditional approaches to professional aviation training are not well designed to accomplish this goal. Aviation training has been based mainly on relatively rigid classroom teaching of factual information followed by on-the-job mentoring. This approach tends to compartmentalize knowledge. It is not optimal for teaching operational decision-making, and it is costly in time and personnel. The effectiveness of training can be enhanced by designing programs,that support the psychological processes involved in learning, retention, retrieval, and application. By building programs that are informed by current work in cognitive science and that utilize modern technological advances, efficient training programs can be created. Such programs could accommodate individual differences in training, experience, and temperament, and could build upon the learners existing mental organization. In this paper, we present a brief analysis of how training can be designed to increase the likelihood that learners will be able to retrieve and apply their knowledge when it is needed, and we present concrete examples of how these ideas are being applied in the NASA in-flight icing training program.

Mitigating functional complexity failures: Designing the operator inside the vehicle OODA-Loop

A class of aircraft accidents and incidents, known as Controlled Flight into Stall (CFIS), are characterized by a structurally, mechanically, electronically sound aircraft that is commanded by the automation to fly into the onset of an aerodynamic stall. These accidents are not the results of failed components; instead, they occur as a result of the complexity of the behavior and architecture of the automation that under rare circumstances results in an inappropriate command. This type of “failure,” is known as a Functional Complexity Failure (FCF). One of the most pernicious characteristics of FCFs is that they are difficult for operators to detect and intervene (i.e. they “start a fire and simultaneously turn off the fire alarm”). Researchers studying the CFIS accidents have proposed specific point-fixes to the automation to assist in preventing a specific FCF or by alerting the flight crew in these scenarios (e.g. energy-situation awareness, low speed alerting, etc). Without a holistic view for combating FCFs, these solutions are simply fighting battles in the last war. This paper describes a holistic approach to analyzing the manner in which FCFs occur and how to mitigate them. The novel approach described in this paper is to conduct a thought experiment in which the flight crew and automation are treated as adversaries in an Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Loop. This analysis shows how in an FCF, the automation deploys techniques (e.g. creating complacency, uncertainty and disorder, hidden intentions, deception, and distraction) to get “inside” the flight crew OODA-loop. A holistic mitigation approach is described to design the automation to ensure that the operator is always inside the vehicles OODA loop.

A Survey Methodology for Measuring Safety-Related Trends in the National Airspace System

Making informed judgments about the effects of technological, human, or environmental changes on civil aviation requires reliable information. The National Aviation Operational Monitoring Service (NAOMS), a research project under NASA’s Aviation Safety Program, developed and tested a survey methodology designed to provide statistically reliable information on changes over time in safety-related events in the national airspace. Such information would aid decision makers in determining what areas required attention. To evaluate the NAOMS concept, data from nearly 20,000 randomly selected air-carrier pilots were collected over 3 years. Results demonstrate that the NAOMS approach can reliably identify changes over time in the rates of safety-related events.

Aircrew decision training and evaluation using the Internet

Investigators conducting research on human performance and decision-making in aviation and other applied domains have frequently been deterred from conducting research with individuals of varying capacities, temperament, experience, and training because of logistical difficulties. Recent developments in computer technology may provide a solution to many of these problems. Potential participants can be reached at home or at work through the Internet using aesthetically enticing video and audio materials. In this paper, an Internet-based Decision Research System (IDRS) that is capable of reproducing simulated decision environments and conducting research using other typical laboratory procedures is described. This system allows researchers to reach participants at remote locations and gather many of the measures typically obtained in the laboratory (e.g., time spent accessing different sources of information, order of access, decisions made, self reports of confidence, and subjective probability estimates). The IDRS and other systems like it could dramatically alter the way behavioral research and training program evaluations are conducted.