Robert Michael Field

Slow Growth of Labour Productivity in Chinese Industry, 1952–81

Since the death of Mao Zedong in the autumn of 1976, Beijings economic advisers have been trying to explain what went wrong with the Chinese economy during the past 25 years and, in particular, why the growth of productivity has been so slow. Their findings are pieced together in the series shown in Tables 1 and 2. These Figures demonstrate the impact of the Leap Forward (1958–60), the Cultural Revolution (1966–69), and the final struggle against the “gang of four“ (1976).

Trends in the Value of Agricultural Output, 1978–86

The gross value of agricultural output in the Peoples Republic of China increased as much in the eight years from 1978 to 1986 as it did in the 21 years from 1957 to 1978. In per capita terms, the average annual rate of growth rose from 0·4 per cent to 4·8 per cent, the most rapid growth for any comparable period since 1949. How was this dramatic turnaround achieved?

Chinese Grain Production: An Interpretation of the Data

Not only was there a consensus, but it was widely assumed that the figures were consistent with those published in the late 1950s. Since then, evidence has been accumulating that the definition of grain has changed and that not all of the figures released in any given year conform to the definition commonly used at the time. We will review the changes in the definition of grain and present our interpretation of the data that have been released in the past 20 years.

A Slowdown in Chinese Industry

The increase of 13·5 per cent in 1978 masks a remarkable slowdown in the rate of industrial growth in China. The data in Table 1 suggest that the gross value of industrial output (GVIO) has been growing at an annual rate of less than 5 per cent since the end of 1977 – which is less than half the average annual rate projected for the 10–Year Plan period (1976–85).

Recent Chinese Grain Claims

The Chinese have released a new figure for grain output in 1974 that is far larger than output claimed for any previous year. At an FAO conference held in Rome in mid-November 1975, the vice-minister of agriculture and forestry, Yang Li-kung, reported that total grain output was 274.9 million tons. And a 10 December Reuters dispatch from Peking speculated on the basis of this 1974 figure that Chinas 1975 harvest could be more than 280 million tons.

Industrial Output by Province in China, 1949–73

This article presents data on the gross value of industrial output (GVIO) by province for the years 1949–73 and shows their relationship to GVIO figures published for the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) as a whole. From the founding of the Peoples Republic on 1 October 1949 until the Great Leap Forward in 1958, Chinese statistical authorities made conscious and sustained efforts to copy Soviet statistical organization and practices. Consequently, the Chinese statistical system, as it developed in the 1950s, mirrored the Soviet system. Descriptions of the Soviet statistical system give valuable insights into the functioning of the Chinese system, and an understanding of problems noted in western studies of Soviet statistics has often been important to an understanding of statistical data from China.

Some Overlooked National Product Data

The performance of the Chinese economy is a subject of great interest to many people, and a number of western scholars have put considerable effort into estimating the growth of Chinas national product, but no one has made use, either directly in his calculations or indirectly as a check on his work, of the aggregative data that Premier Chou En-lai gave to the late Edgar Snow during the winter of 1970–71.

Industrial Production in Communist China: 1957–1968

For the years before 1958, because Communist China published data on the physical output of a large number of industrial commodities, it was possible to construct an index of industrial production that could be used with confidence. As early as 1959, however, there was a noticeable drying up of official reports as a source of data and objective commentary and, since the collapse of the Leap Forward in 1960, the regime has imposed an almost complete blackout on the disclosure of specific economic facts and figures. As a result, the number of commodities for which physical output can be estimated has been reduced sharply, and the estimates are subject to a wide range of error.