Robert P. Abelson

Psychological status of the script concept.

Suggests that there has been growing interest within several subfields of psychology in the schematic nature of mental representations of real-world objects and events. One simple form of schema is the “script,” embodying knowledge of stereotyped event sequences. The present author traces applicatio

A Variance Explanation Paradox: When a Little is a Lot

Concerning a single major league at bat, the percentage of variance in batting performance attributable to skill differentials among major league baseball players can be calculated statistically. The statistically appropriate calculation is seriously discrepant with intuitions about the influence of skill in batting performance. This paradoxical discrepancy is discussed in terms of habits of thought about the concept of variance explanation. It is argued that percent variance explanation is a misleading index of the influence of systematic factors in cases where there are processes by which individually tiny influences cumulate to produce meaningful outcomes.

Modes of resolution of belief dilemmas

There are two levels of analysis of intrapersonal conflict: the action level and the belief level, the former dealing with external motor responses and the latter with internal affective and cognitive processes. Particular instances of conflict may, for theoretical convenience, be localized at one or another of these levels. For example, one may ask how a person acts when simultaneously motivated to approach and to avoid an external object (3, 9, 10). Or one may ask instead what happens to the cognitive representation of an external object when the object simultaneously incurs favorable and unfavorable cognitions (12). The present paper is addressed to the latter type of question. We shall not consider the problem of whether and how the action level is to be reduced to the belief level or vice

Velocity relation: Satisfaction as a function of the first derivative of outcome over time.

Social scientists have found that satisfaction with an outcome is positively related not just to the position (i.e., actual level) of the outcome, but also to the displacement (i.e., directional difference) between the current level and a reference level. Extending the displacement notion, the present research hypothesized that satisfaction is positively related to the velocity (i.e., rate) at which the outcome changes over time, and tested this hypothesis by using hypothetical outcomes presented in questionnaires (Study 1) and displayed on a computer screen (Study 2). Results from both studies supported the hypothesis. The findings are discussed with regard to their implications for a formal model of the outcome-satisfaction relationship and for a dynamic analysis of human behavior. The present research investigates the relation(s) between the desired outcome of an event and the satisfaction of the person who experiences the event. For example, what is the relation between the grade point average (GPA) of a student and his satisfaction with his grade? What is the relation between the salary of a worker and her satisfaction with her salary? What is the relation between the amount of fame an actor has and his satisfaction with it? What is the relation between the weight of a dieter and her satisfaction with her weight? We believe that there exists more than one relation between outcome and satisfaction. Probably the simplest relation is that satisfaction depends on the actual value of the outcome: The more (less) positive an outcome, the greater (less) the satisfaction.1 For example, the higher the GPA, the more satisfied a student is with it; the higher the salary, the more satisfied a worker is with it. Formally, this relation can be expressed as

Knowledge structures in the organization and retrieval of autobiographical memories

In this paper, the role of knowledge structures in organizing and retrieving autobiographical experiences is investigated. It is proposed that autobiographical events are organized in memory by the knowledge structures that guided comprehension and planning during the experience. Individual experiences are retrieved from memory by first accessing the knowledge structures used to encode the event, then using information in those structures to predict features of the target event, thus directing search to paths likely to lead to that event. Two types of structures are investigated as candidates for these organizing contexts. Activities are sequences of actions performed to achieve a goal, while general actions are situation-free components occurring as part of several activities and represent what is common to that action across those activities. It is predicted that activities are more important in retrieving experiences, because (1) these structures constitute the principal contexts used to store experiences and (2) information contained within these structures is more useful for predicting features of target events. The greater utility of activities in retrieving experiences was demonstrated in two autobiographical memory retrieval time experiments. First, retrieval of a personal experience matching an activity and action combination was faster when subjects were given an activity cue before a general action cue, because processing could get a “head start” when the activity context was presented first. Second, specifying an activity and action led to faster memory retrievals than specifying only the action, while no such facilitation occurred when an activity was augmented by a general action. In both experiments, retrieval was slowed when more processing was required to infer probable features of the target experience, as predicted by the directed nature of the search process. These experiments and this model provide a general framework for studying the organization of events in autobiographical memory.

Differences Between Belief and Knowledge Systems

Seven features which in practice seem to differentiate belief systems from knowledge systems are discussed. These are: nonconsensuality, “existence beliefs” alternative worlds, evaluative components, episodic material, unboundedness, and variable credences. Each of these features gives rise to challenging representation problems. Progress on any of these problems within artificial intelligence would be helpful in the study of knowledge systems as well as belief systems, inasmuch as the distinction between the two types of systems is not absolute.

The Relative Weighting of Position and Velocity in Satisfaction

Satisfaction with a desired outcome depends both on its position (i.e., the actual value of the outcome) and on its velocity (i.e., the change in the value). In a questionnaire study, we investigated factors that influence the relative weighting of position and velocity in satisfaction and found that the relative weight of velocity loomed larger when the outcome was (a) framed in terms of change (rather than in terms of overall position), (b) related to consummatory (rather than instrumental) behaviors, or (c) internally (rather than externally) controlled. The findings suggest that the relative importance of position and velocity in satisfaction varies, depending on the condition and nature of the outcome.

Perceptions of the Collective Other

It is contended that perceptions of groups are affected by particular variables that do not apply to individuals (e.g., intragroup similarity and proximity). Importantly, the perception of outgroup threat has incomplete analogs at the individual level. Results from 3 studies support predictable distinctions between representations of individuals and of groups. Study I showed that priming of the word they produces more extreme negative judgments of the protagonist(s) in a story about 4 individuals acting jointly than in the same story with a single person acting alone. The opposite result holds for priming with the word he. Study 2, with Korean participants, demonstrates that actions by individuals or groups elicit differing preferences for redress. Individual responses (e.g., getting mad) to an individual racial insult (e.g., a snub by a waitress) are preferred to collective responses (e.g., circulating a petition), whereas the reverse preferences holdfor a group insult (e.g., taunts from a gang of White youths). In Study 3, cues to the entitivity of a group are introduced. This concept, introduced by Donald Campbell (1958), distinguishes different degrees of “groupness. ” Visual depictions of collections of unfamiliar humanoid creatures (greebles) were used to convey that they were either similar or dissimilar and either proximate or scattered. Results confirm the expectation that similarity and proximity-two entitive conditions-elicit more negative judgments of the group. Attention to other cues for entitivity may enrich social psychological views of stereotyping and prejudice by focusing on perceptions of groups as coordinated actors with the potential to bring about negative consequences. Such experiments point to the needfor greater research focus on the vastly understudied but fundamental problem of the social cognition of group behavior.

On the Surprising Longevity of Flogged Horses: Why There Is a Case for the Significance Test:

Criticisms of null-hypothesis significance tests (NHSTs) are reviewed Used as formal, two-valued decision procedures, they often generate misleading conclusions However, critics who argue that NHSTs are totally meaningless because the null hypothesis is virtually always false are overstating their case Critics also neglect the whole class of valuable significance tests that assess goodness of fit of models to data Even as applied to simple mean differences, NHSTs can be rhetorically useful in defending research against criticisms that random factors adequately explain the results, or that the direction of mean difference was not demonstrated convincingly Principled argument and counterargument produce the lore, or communal understanding, in a field, which in turn helps guide new research Alternative procedures–confidence intervals, effect sizes, and meta-analysis–are discussed Although these alternatives are not totally free from criticism either, they deserve more frequent use, without an unwise ban on NHSTs

Computer Simulation of Individual Belief Systems1

Abelson [ 19631 *), this complex project has not heretofore been totally outlined in print. We shall begin with several clarifying comments on the nature of our goals and the problems we have faced, thence procecding further and further into the details of operation of our sirnulation. By an individtral belief sgstem we refer to an interrelated set of affect-laden cognitions concerning some aspects of the psychological world of a single individual. In simulating such a system, our intention is not only to represent its structure of interrelationships, but also some of the processes by which the system maintains itself against the intrusion of new and potentially upsetting information. Our use of the technique of comprrtcr simiiIation is intended to maximize tlie explicitness with which we state our assumptions and the vividness with \vhich the consequences of these assumptions are made apparent. The operation of simulated belief systems can be played out on the computer and die detaiIs scrutinized in order to refine our level of approximation to real systems. The psychology of belief systems lies athwart the ancient philosophical battleground of whether inan is basically “rational” or “irrational.” Without claiming to have resolved this honorable controversy, we adopt the useful compromise position current among social psychologists that man is “subjectively rational,” i.e., rational within the constraints of his own experience and motivation. This position owes much to Heider’s5. analysis of “naive psychology,” and can be found implicitly or explicitly in the work of many “cognitive consistency” theorists ( Festinger7; Osgood and Tannenbaums; Rosenberg and Abelson3). To be sure, there is still much room within this compromise position for differences in emphasis as between motivational and cognitive components of tlie total system. The work of Rokeach9 and Smith, Bruner, and White’” among others reminds us that individual belief systems are heavily determined by personality needs. Our