Robert R. Hampton

Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) discriminate between knowing and not knowing and collect information as needed before acting

Humans use memory awareness to determine whether relevant knowledge is available before acting, as when we determine whether we know a phone number before dialing. Such metacognition, or thinking about thinking, can improve selection of appropriate behavior. We investigated whether rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) are capable of a simple form of metacognitive access to the contents of short-term memory. Monkeys chose among four opaque tubes, one of which concealed food. The tube containing the reward varied randomly from trial to trial. On half the trials the monkeys observed the experimenter baiting the tube, whereas on the remaining trials their view of the baiting was blocked. On each trial, monkeys were allowed a single chance to select the tube containing the reward. During the choice period the monkeys had the opportunity to look down the length of each tube, to determine if it contained food. When they knew the location of the reward, most monkeys chose without looking. In contrast, when ignorant, monkeys often made the effort required to look, thereby learning the location of the reward before choosing. Looking improved accuracy on trials on which monkeys had not observed the baiting. The difference in looking behavior between trials on which the monkeys knew, and trials on which they were ignorant, suggests that rhesus monkeys discriminate between knowing and not knowing. This result extends similar observations made of children and apes to a species of Old World monkey, suggesting that the underlying cognitive capacities may be widely distributed among primates.

Hippocampal volume and food-storing behavior are related in parids.

The size of the hippocampus has been previously shown to reflect species differences and sex differences in reliance on spatial memory to locate ecologically important resources, such as food and mates. Black-capped chickadees (Parus atricapillus) cached more food than did either Mexican chickadees (P. sclateri) or bridled titmice (P. wollweberi) in two tests of food storing, one conducted in an aviary and another in smaller home cages. Black-capped chickadees were also found to have a larger hippocampus, relative to the size of the telencephalon, than the other two species. Differences in the frequency of food storing behavior among the three species have probably produced differences in the use of hippocampus-dependent memory and spatial information processing to recover stored food, resulting in graded selection for size of the hippocampus.

The Parahippocampal Region and Object Identification

Abstract: The hippocampus has long been thought to be critical for memory, including memory for objects. However, recent neuropsychological studies in nonhuman primates have indicated that other regions within the medial temporal lobe, specifically, structures in the parahippocampal region, are primarily responsible for object recognition and object identification. This article reviews the behavioral effects of removal of structures within the parahippocampal region in monkeys, and cites relevant work in rodents as well. It is argued that the perirhinal cortex, in particular, contributes to object identification in at least two ways: (i) by serving as the final stage in the ventral visual cortical pathway that represents stimulus features, and (ii) by operating as part of a network for associating together sensory inputs within and across sensory modalities.

Hippocampus and memory in a food-storing and in a nonstoring bird species

Food-storing birds maintain in memory a large and constantly changing catalog of the locations of stored food. The hippocampus of food-storing black-capped chickadees (Parus atricapillus) is proportionally larger than that of nonstoring dark-eyed juncos (Junco hyemalis). Chickadees perform better than do juncos in an operant test of spatial non-matching-to-sample (SNMTS), and chickadees are more resistant to interference in this paradigm. Hippocampal lesions attenuate performance in SNMTS and increase interference. In tests of continuous spatial alternation (CSA), juncos perform better than chickadees. CSA performance also declines following hippocampal lesions. By itself, sensitivity of a given task to hippocampal damage does not predict the direction of memory differences between storing and nonstoring species.

Episodic memory in nonhumans: what, and where, is when?

Episodic memory is defined as the recollection of specific events in ones past, accompanied by the experience of having been there personally. This definition presents high hurdles to the investigation of episodic memory in nonhumans. Recent studies operationalize episodic memory as memory for when and where an event occurred, for the order in which events occurred, or for an animals own behavior. None of these approaches has yet generalized across species, and each fails to capture features of human episodic memory. Nonetheless, the study of episodic memory in nonhumans seems less daunting than it did five years ago. To demonstrate a correspondence between human episodic memory and nonhuman memory, progress is needed in three areas. Putative episodic memories in nonhumans should be shown to be; first, represented in long-term memory, rather than short-term or working memory; second, explicit, or accessible to introspection; and third, distinct from semantic memory, or general knowledge about the world.

An assessment of memory awareness in tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

Humans, apes, and rhesus monkeys demonstrate memory awareness by collecting information when ignorant and acting immediately when informed. In this study, five capuchin monkeys searched for food after either watching the experimenter bait one of four opaque tubes (seen trials), or not watching (unseen trials). Monkeys with memory awareness should look into the tubes before making a selection only on unseen trials because on seen trials they already know the location of the food. In Experiment 1, one of the five capuchins looked significantly more often on unseen trials. In Experiment 2, we ensured that the monkeys attended to the baiting by interleaving training and test sessions. Three of the five monkeys looked more often on unseen trials. Because monkeys looked more often than not on both trial types, potentially creating a ceiling effect, we increased the effort required to look in Experiment 3, and predicted a larger difference in the probability of looking between seen and unseen trials. None of the five monkeys looked more often on unseen trials. These findings provide equivocal evidence for memory awareness in capuchin monkeys using tests that have yielded clear evidence in humans, apes, and rhesus monkeys.

Learning of discriminations is impaired, but generalization to altered views is intact, in monkeys (Macaca mulatta) with perirhinal cortex removal.

Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were taught a large number of visual discriminations and then either received bilateral removal of the perirhinal cortex or were retained as unoperated controls. Operated monkeys were impaired in retention of the preoperatively learned problems. To test for generalization to novel views, the monkeys were required to discriminate, in probe trials, familiar pairs of images that were rotated, enlarged, shrunken, presented with color deleted, or degraded by masks. Although these manipulations reduced accuracy in both groups, the operated group was not differentially affected. In contrast, the same operated monkeys were impaired in reversal of familiar discriminations and in acquisition of new single-pair discriminations. These results indicate an important role for perirhinal cortex in visual learning, memory, or both, and show that under a variety of conditions, perirhinal cortex is not critical for the identification of stimuli.

Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) show robust evidence for memory awareness across multiple generalization tests

The possibility that memory awareness occurs in nonhuman animals has been evaluated by providing opportunity to decline memory tests. Current evidence suggests that rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) selectively decline tests when memory is weak (Hampton in Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 98:5359–5362, 2001; Smith et al. in Behav Brain Sci 26:317–374, 2003). However, much of the existing research in nonhuman metacognition is subject to the criticism that, after considerable training on one test type, subjects learn to decline difficult trials based on associative learning of external test-specific contingencies rather than by evaluating the private status of memory or other cognitive states. We evaluated whether such test-specific associations could account for performance by presenting monkeys with a series of generalization tests across which no single association with external stimuli was likely to adaptively control use of the decline response. Six monkeys performed a four alternative delayed matching to location task and were significantly more accurate on trials with a decline option available than on trials without it, indicating that subjects selectively declined tests when memory was weak. Monkeys transferred appropriate use of the decline response under three conditions that assessed generalization: two tests that weakened memory and one test that enhanced memory in a novel way. Bidirectional generalization indicates that use of the decline response by monkeys is not controlled by specific external stimuli but is rather a flexible behavior based on a private assessment of memory.

Effects of photoperiod on food-storing and the hippocampus in birds.

Birds that store food have a relatively large hippocampus compared to non-storing species. The hippocampus shows seasonal differences in neurogenesis and volume in black-capped chikadees (Parus atricapillus) taken from the wild at different times of year. We compared hippocampal volumes in black-capped chickadees captured at the same time but differing in food-storing behaviour because of manipulations of photoperiod in the laboratory. Differences in food-storing behaviour were not accompanied by differences in the volume of the hippocampus. Hippocampal volumes also did not differ between two groups of a non-food-storing control species, house sparrows (Passer domesticus), exposed to the same conditions as the chickadees.

Automated cognitive testing of monkeys in social groups yields results comparable to individual laboratory-based testing.

Cognitive abilities likely evolved in response to specific environmental and social challenges and are therefore expected to be specialized for the life history of each species. Specialized cognitive abilities may be most readily engaged under conditions that approximate the natural environment of the species being studied. While naturalistic environments might therefore have advantages over laboratory settings for cognitive research, it is difficult to conduct certain types of cognitive tests in these settings. We implemented methods for automated cognitive testing of monkeys (Macaca mulatta) in large social groups (Field station) and compared the performance to that of laboratory-housed monkeys (Laboratory). The Field station animals shared access to four touch-screen computers in a large naturalistic social group. Each Field station subject had an RFID chip implanted in each arm for computerized identification and individualized assignment of cognitive tests. The Laboratory group was housed and tested in a typical laboratory setting, with individual access to testing computers in their home cages. Monkeys in both groups voluntarily participated at their own pace for food rewards. We evaluated performance in two visual psychophysics tests, a perceptual classification test, a transitive inference test, and a delayed matching-to-sample memory test. Despite the differences in housing, social environment, age, and sex, monkeys in the two groups performed similarly in all tests. Semi-free ranging monkeys living in complex social environments are therefore viable subjects for cognitive testing designed to take advantage of the unique affordances of naturalistic testing environments.