Robert S. Jordan

The Battles for Unification and for Berlin

Throughout the war, Arnold had been very sensitive to the public’s perception of the uses of air power. He wanted public opinion to assist him to move quickly, as soon as the hostilities ceased, to establish the Air Force as a separate and coequal Service with the Army and the Navy. This is one reason for his focus on “strategic” bombing as the central concept of Air Power doctrine, rather than on the use of air power in support of the land (or naval) battle. As he had written to Eaker in June 1943, when Eaker was Commanding General of the Eighth Air Force: It is also very important, for whole-hearted public and official support of our Air Forces in their operations, that the people understand thoroughly our Air Forces precepts, principles, and purposes … it is important for the people to understand that our prime purpose is destruction of the enemy’s ability to wage war, by our planned persistent bombing and sapping of his vital industries, his transportation, and his whole supply system …. In short, we want the people to understand and have faith in our way of making war.2 In December 1943, Major General Barney M. “Bennie” Giles, Arnold’s Chief of Staff, wrote: “We are devoting a great deal of thought to plans for the organization and composition of a postwar Air Force.

The End and the Beginning

This is the story of a Supreme Commander and the institutions for which he served. These institutions doubtless contributed to the making of General Lauris Norstad. They certainly provided the opportunities that propelled his spectacular rise from very modest beginnings to become one of the leaders of the “Free World” at the height of the Cold War. In the course of this rise, his sharp and disciplined intellect and physical bearing brought him to the attention of powerful sponsors — General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, the architect of the US Air force (USAF), and General Dwight D. “Ike” Eisenhower, the hero of World War II and a denning figure in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The Berlin Crisis Intensifies

This crisis over Berlin sparked Norstad to consider how best to coordinate NATO plans and policy in a situation in which the “rights” were non-NATO in origin, even though the “responsibilities” had become SACEUR’s. As recalled in the previous chapter, the three “Occupying Powers” — the US, the UK, and France — were still in Berlin by right of conquest. The other member-states of NATO had no direct involvement in the evolution of the status of Berlin stemming from the Yalta Declaration to its de facto partitioning.2 Consequently, in February 1959 Norstad directed the establishment at Headquarters USEUCOM of a “small concealed US only group as nucleus for any tripartite staff he might have to form.”3

The 1961–62 Berlin Crisis: The Unraveling of a Relationship

The negotiations over Berlin continued as the US presidency changed hands. A distinct difference, however, between the Eisenhower approach to European security and the Kennedy approach was the latter’s desire to show “strength,” and also to provide a “flexible response” concept rather than an — at least articulated — “all-or-nothing” concept to meet a Soviet threat to Berlin.2 For both reasons, it was obvious to the Kennedy Administration that more planning, effort and resources should be given to a conventional military buildup in Europe, even while not neglecting the nuclear dimension.

The End Nears

In order to facilitate rapid communications, Norstad reluctantly departed from his insistence that normal military command channels be followed in dealing with episodes over Berlin. He authorized the CINCUSAREUR, Lt. General Clarke, to communicate directly with the USCOB, Maj. General Watson. Norstad also insisted, of course, that he and his Deputy USCINCEUR, Lt. General Willis W. Palmer, be kept fully-informed about developments in Berlin.2 Norstad’s reasoning was that prompt decisions in the face of a Soviet-East German provocation were essential to stave off any sign of weakness or hesitation on the part of the Tripartite Powers. This deviation from normal communications procedure was to apply only to episodes in Berlin itself, and not to any activities on the autobahn. By giving operational control to CINCUSAREUR, located in Heidelberg, Norstad as USCINCEUR had removed himself from being directly involved in such decisions, unless there was a sharp change in the Berlin situation that might result in more extensive or unique responses than had already been authorized or contemplated.3

Applying Planning and Operational Skills in North Africa and the Pacific

In an effort not to lose sight of the long-term perspective while dealing with short-term problems, Arnold decided to create his own informal group of advisors to help him in long-range thinking. He had found that he was swamped with short-term problem-solving — or putting out brushfires. As he described it: My office organization in Washington contained an Advisory Council, a group of young men, the brightest I could get, who sat in an office close to me, and whose instructions were: “Don’t get mixed up with any routine business. What I want you to do is sit down and think. Think of the problems confronting us. Think of the solutions to those problems. Bring in new ideas. If you bring in one new idea every two or three days I will be satisfied. But don’t get mixed up with the routine operations of this office. Think! Think of the future of the Air Force!” That Advisory Council, made up changeably of anywhere from three to five officers, was invaluable to me. They brought me new ideas; kept me up-to-date, and best of all, made certain that I was very seldom caught off base by higher authority with any new problem before I had been able to give some thought to it.2

The 1958–59 Crisis Over Berlin: Putting the Consultative Machinery In Place

In December 1958, with tensions on the rise between the US and the USSR over Berlin, Dulles flew to Paris to attend the annual meeting of the NAC. While in Paris, he discussed with Norstad the possibility that Norstad should take certain “tightening up” actions that would not be lost on the Soviets.2 The source of tension arose from Chairman Khrushchev’s pronouncement of November 10, 1958 that he intended to sign a peace treaty “at an early date” with the German Democratic Republic (GDR), thus in his view terminating the Allies’ wartime rights in West Berlin. The official Soviet Note said: “the government of the USSR hereby notifies the United States Government that the Soviet Union regards as null and void the ‘Protocol of the Agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, and the United Kingdom on the zones of occupation in Germany and on the administration of Greater Berlin,’ of September 12, 1944, and the related supplementary agreements, including the agreements on the control machinery in Germany, concluded between the governments of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, and France on May 1, 1945, i.e., the agreements that were intended to be in effect during the first years after the capitulation of Germany.”3

Nuclear Weapons for Europe’s Defense: Norstad and the Eisenhower Administration

Having come to Europe as Commander-in-Chief, US Air Forces, Europe (CINCUSAFE), Norstad was all too familiar with the problems and possibilities of creating an effective “nuclear umbrella” for NATO. Even though, as pointed out earlier, nuclear weapons played no formal part in the early planning of NATO, Norstad had emphasized that NATO could not just ignore them. He was convinced that a way must be found to give the European Allies a sense of sharing in the formulation of the doctrine for their employment and, if deterrence were to fail, their possible use. The issue, in a nutshell, was whether NATO nuclear proliferation should be unilateral or multilateral. In this respect, he had to work closely with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) as well as with France and Britain. As it was put: The relationship between the nuclearization of NATO and the settlement with the Federal Republic is not totally clear, but I suspect that there was an important link: nuclearization meant that the Americans, who controlled the most important forces and who in effect operated the strategy, would have to stay in Europe for a very considerable period of time, and as long as the Americans were in the French and many of the other allies could be relatively relaxed about a buildup of German power. Any possible German threat would be contained in a structure dominated by American power.2

Norstad and the “Grand Strategy” for the Cold War

By January 1950 Norstad expected to leave his assignment as Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, to replace Twining as Commander in Chief of the Alaska Command.2 But, as he said to Barton Leach: “I wouldn’t bet even money on it at this time.”3 Planning had been going rapidly forward as to how the US should confront the Soviet Union in Europe.4 It was becoming increasingly apparent that the loose structure created after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 did not provide enough political reassurance as well as military security.5